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Hemisphere's Inaugural Issue:
The Readers Respond

Hemisphere seems to be one of those
rare initiatives that fills a unique
niche. It promises to become
indispensable almost immediately.
It manages somehow to be punchy,
thoughtful, and exciting at the same
time. I'll look forward to the next
issue. Everyone here found
something he or she wanted to read
in the first one!
Alex Wilde
Director, Washington Office
on Latin America
This first issue has established
Hemisphere as mandatory reading for
those concerned with Latin American and Caribbean affairs. Alert to
contemporary trends, the magazine
succeeds in combining the readability of a weekly news journal with
the analytical rigor of the academic
literature. Comprehensive in its geographic and thematic coverage,
Hemisphere provides a venue where
many different points of view can be
aired. Recognizing that no perspective has a monopoly of the truth is
a first step towards achieving the
elusive goal of understanding the
direction in which our hemisphere
is moving.
Sergio Diaz-Briquets
Research Director, Commission for
the Study of International
Migration and Cooperative
Economic Development
Washington, DC
Hemisphere is very interesting reading on the sort of subjects
that are right down my alley. The
production is also of a very high
standard.
Geoffrey Barcant
Managing Director,
Smith, Robertson & Co. Ltd.
Trinidad, WI
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Thefollowing commentary is
excerptedfrom a feature editorialon
Hemisphere's inauguralissue, in
El Nuevo Herald (November3, 1988).
The readers would be better
equipped to analyze the ideas presented and reach their own conclusions on [Central America] if
opposing points of view appeared in
the same issue. This is especially
true for a magazine that is published
only three times a year. Given such
long interludes, any magazine that
contains only one position on an
issue cannot achieve the balance
necessary for arriving at just and
correct conclusions. Hemisphere's
first issue suffers from this defect.
Roberto Sudrez
Editor, El Nuevo Herald
Miami, FL

How lucky we are to have Andres
Oppenheimer ("Cuba to the Aid of
Noriega?") to assure us that the
presence of Cubans in Panama is
not something the US should be
concerned about.
Does it matter that the New York
Times reported that General Noriega
is relying on agents from Cuba's
notorious America Department to
counsel him on standing up to US
pressure and bolstering his domestic
power?
Oppenheimer's report propagates
the myth that Fidel Castro has forsaken his subversive and violent policies of the past in order to "mend
fences" with the countries of Latin
America. I dare say no evidence
exists whatsoever that this is so.
Whether it is one Cuban or one
thousand in Panama, we can rest
assured Cuba's mission is to contravene US policy, further isolate the
America.• and perpetLatin
US
from
. .
.
. .
.
A
I

uate the bloody spiral of violence
that plagues the hemisphere. This is
nothing to scoff at.
Jose R. Ceardenas
Director of Research
and Publications
Cuban American
National Foundation
Washington, DC
Congratulations from a severe and
discerning critic for your head start
in publishing Hemisphere. I liked it
very much, even though I disagreed
with about 65 percent of the writers
-especially Carlos Monge's "The
Political Eclipse of Mario Vargas
Llosa,"' which I sense is sheer fantasy/wishful thinking.
In addition, Andres Oppenheimer's "Cuba to the Aid of
Noriega?" misses the point. The
real story is Noriega's aid to Cuba in
the matter of drugs, a story that
has grown steadily and disastrously
over the years.
Jack H. Vaughn
Senior Advisor in Natural Resources
and Environmental Management
ROCAP/USAID
Guatemala
Hemispherewill no doubt fill a vacuum in the Caribbean because of its
mix of serious journalism and readable academic writing.
Carlos A. Romero
President, Asociaci6n Venezolana
de Estudios del Caribe
I hope you are very proud of
Hemisphere. The breadth of the
first issue's content is impressive.
It is a first-rate magazine.
Lynne C. Rienner
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Boulder, CO

Below is a brief review that I will
share with the several libraries with
which I am associated, as well as the
New England Council for Latin
American Studies, the New England
Journalof History, and the New
England Historical Association.
"... This is a newly-established
journal that has come off the
presses in full stride-an 'adult
birth': mature, confident, outspoken, balanced. I recommend Hemisphere enthusiastically as a source for
students, instructors, or anyone who
wishes to inform him/herself on
Latin America and the Caribbean."

JamesJ.Harrington
Chair, Social Studies Department
Bridgewater-Raynham Regional
School District
Bridgewater, MA
You are off to a great start and have
responded to a clear need for a
broad variety of topical articles. The
first issue reflects the high quality of
the contributors and the relevance
of the subject matter. I will be looking forward to each issue.
Ambler H. MossJr
School in
Graduate
Dean,
International Studies
University of Miami
Hemisphereis beautifully produced
and forward looking, with impressive articles. I read Anthony P. Maingot's editorial on new Caribbean
politics, and wish I had the power to
make it compulsory reading for all
Caribbean leaders-not just business people and politicians but
educators and the press.
Sir PhilipSherlock
Executive Vice President,
Caribbean Resources
Development Foundation
Miami, FL

Congratulations on a fine first issue,
an excellent balance of opinion and
analysis, and a very wide range of
issues covered with exemplary competence. I would love to contribute
some time soon.
TomJ. Farer
Director of Law and
International Affairs
The American University

Bravo! Hemisphere is most impressive
-informative, handsome, a fine mix
of topics and range of viewpoints.
Judith Vecchione
Executive Producer,
WGBH/Educational Foundation
Boston, MA

Congratulations! I currently subscribe to a number of foreign affairs
journals, but I found your publication much more useful and interesting than most of the others. It is a
pleasure to see "think pieces" and
feature articles by some of my colleagues (Andres Oppenheimer, Bernard Diederich), as well as scholarly
works in such a publication. The
focus on Latin America and the
Caribbean is automatically of interest to me. But it is the quality of the
contents that makes Hemisphere a
welcome item in the mail box.
Greg Flakus
Chief Correspondent,
Voice of America

On behalf of the editors of the
Inter-American Review of Bibliography,
I wish to express to you my warmest
congratulations for Hemisphere,
which is an excellent addition to the
literature on our region.
The caliber of the contributors,
the diversity of their perspectives,
and the sponsorship of Florida
International University and its
focal geographical location, are
assets that all readers will deeply
appreciate.
The content of the first issue adequately reflects Hemisphere'sgoal:
"a magazine of interest and quality."
Celso Rodriguez
Editor, Inter-American Review
of Bibliography
Washington, DC

Congratulations on your first issue
of Hemisphere. I was very impressed
with its contents. I hope you continue to maintain the same high
standard in future issues.
Victor Bulmer-Thomas
Professor of Economics,
Queen Mary College
University of London

Congratulations on the publication
of Hemisphere. It is a balanced, fairminded issue. The interview with
Leslie Manigat is a coup in itself.
Irving Louis Horowitz
Distinguished Professor
Rutgers University

or
Editor'sNote: Articlesfrom Hemisphere's inauguralissue (Fall1988) have been reprinted
Latin
15),
(September
Report
Commodities
publications:
following
extensively discussedin the
American Weekly Report (September 22), El Nuevo Herald (November 3 and 15), The Orlando
Sentinel (December 4), and Trinidad and Tobago Review (December).
Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor.Letters must be typed, double-spaced, and may be submitted
in English, French, Portuguese,or Spanish. All letters are subject to editingfor clarity and length.
Please address letters to the Deputy Editor,Hemisphere, Latin American and CaribbeanCenter,
FloridaInternationalUniversity, University Park, Miami, FL 33199; FAX (305)554-3593.
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New Geopolitical Realities
by Anthony P. Maingot

of geography on politics,
continues to be central
the influence
to any analysis
of USCaribbean Basin relations. The nature of the
problems and opportunities presented by geographical
proximity do change, however.
Only a decade ago the Caribbean Basin was blanketed by the
rhetoric of ideological confrontation
and revolutionary challenge, as well
as by the predictable Great Power
responses. Why this is no longer so
is not hard to discern. Ideological
fervor has served neither side well, as
the Jamaican case illustrates. Neither Michael Manley's "politics of

Scopolitics,

principle" of 1976-80 nor Edward
Seaga's version of Reaganomics has
made any difference to the Jamaican
masses. The reduced price of oil and
the end of the North American
recession, as it affected the tourist
trade and the price of bauxite and
alumina, have much more to do with

the Jamaican economy's recent
slight improvement than with ideological formulations. The Jamaican
electorate made this clear on February 9, when it reelected Manley. This
promises to be a different Manley.
He has repeatedly said that he has
"matured" and "learned a few lessons" from the bitter and fruitless
years when exhilarating friendships
with Fidel Castro, Maurice Bishop,
and Daniel Ortega seemed to overshadow more mundane concerns of
state.

AClub of Pragmatists
Manley will join Carlos Andres
Perez of Venezuela-and possibly
that other veteran of Caribbean
electoral politics, Juan Bosch of the
Dominican Republic-in something

Hemisphere * Winter 1989

of a club of ex-presidents. Manley
and Perez continue to be vice presidents of the social-democratic
Socialist International. Bosch, after
leaving the PartidoRevolucionario
Dominicano, shifted strongly to the
left, but then moved closer to the
center as he became a truly viable
candidate. All three figures promise
to restore diplomatic relations with
Cuba. It remains to be seen, however, whether these will be "normal"
state-to-state relations-devoid,
thus, of unorthodoxies such as
"internationalist" party-to-party
agreements and Third World
"vanguardisms." Reason and logic
say they should.
Nothing, in the Caribbean or in
the international community, justifies 1970s-type adventures. Manley,
for one, seems to have understood
this. Before a Miami audience of
bankers and business people he was
adamant: "...we do not ever intend
again to allow the relationship with
Cuba to become internally divisive
or a source of trouble with Washington." No one expects a reappearance, therefore, of one of the
amazing features ofJamaica's turn
to the left in the late 1970s: the influential role played by the communist
Workers' Party of Jamaica and its
intellectual leader, Dr. Trevor
Munroe. The suspicion that they
represented a minute part of the
electorate was verified in 1986
when-in the party's first outing as
an independent movement-it
received 0.2 percent of the vote. The
ideologically-charged atmosphere,
which gave such groups relevance in
the Caribbean, is gone.
By emphasizing a pragmatic
foreign policy towards the US and
Cuba, the new Caribbean leadership
will be presenting both Washington
and Havana an opportunity to

reduce regional tensions. They can
all turn then to addressing the fundamental concerns shared by nearly
all who border the Caribbean Sea.
Two of these are critical in the short
term: immigration and corruption.

Immigration
Immigration is not a new phenomenon in the Caribbean region.
Whether it is migration to the US or

to other areas of employment opportunity in the region, Caribbean
peoples have moved, adjusted, and
prospered. The countries of the
Caribbean face an economic
dilemma. On the one hand, they
need a migration outlet for their
work forces, which are growing
faster than any of the Caribbean's
economies. On the other hand, the
countries can ill afford to lose their
technical and professional people.
The brain drain hurts these
developing economies in two ways.
First, because education, right
through professional training, is
invariably free, the brain drain represents a subsidy to the developed
countries. In 1982, for instance, 50
percent of the 1977-80 graduates of
Jamaica's training institutions had
migrated. The costs of training
these migrants, according to
Jamaica's National Planning Agency
in 1982, was $348 million. The
Agency made a political point when
it compared that amount to the $84
million in US loans and grants
received by Jamaica, 83 percent of
which had gone for loan financing.
Second, these countries are losing the technical and managerial
skills that are essential to their ongoing transition from raw-material
production to manufacturing and
the provision of services. For example, what employment benefits has

Y

Trinidad derived from the millions
invested in its steel industry
(ISCOTT), when it has had to hire
managers, first from Germany and
now from India? And this at a time
when thousands of educated Trinidadians are entering Canada with
the outrageous claim that they are
"refugees" suffering political and
racial discrimination. Throughout
the region hospitals are short of
nurses, skilled managers are at a
premium, and the promising tourist
industries are losing their chefs to
the booming cruise-ship business.
Calls on the US and Canada to
set limits on the number of visas
granted to certain technical occupations will not work. Caribbean
people regard migration as a
fundamental human right and will
not tolerate state interference with
that right. The situation calls for
bilateral attention.

Corruption
Corruption, the other matter in
need of immediate attention, is no
longer an issue of mere personal
greed. Corruption has become so
rampant and brazen that it is distorting development and eroding
confidence in the Caribbean's democratic institutions. Much of the
problem is fueled by the drug trade,
but it precedes the arrival of this
noxious new commodity. Not unlike
the brain drain, corruption represents another subsidy to the metropolitan centers of the world.
A case now making headlines in
Trinidad illustrates this fact of
"reverse development flows" Just as
Trinidad is seeking a standby loan
from the International Monetary
Fund for $120 million, it has been
revealed that the late John O'Halloran, a former minister of Petroleum and Mines and intimate of

then-prime minister Eric Williams,
left a fortune estimated at Can.$500
million. Needless to say, little, if any,
of the money was invested in Trinidad. It was all plowed into Canadian
shopping centers, office buildings,
and housing projects. Piece by
piece, a firm of Canadian "forensic
accountants" has provided a record
of secret commissions on an array
of projects upon which Trinidad
launched its "independence" from
foreign domination: the oil industry,
the airline, infrastructural projects,
even the race track. Also linked to
the payoffs was Francis ("Boysie")
Prevatt, the longstanding chairman
of the then-ruling People's National
Movement (PNM) and a man often
appointed acting prime minister
whenever Williams absented himself
from the island.
The degree to which the local
taxpayers subsidized foreign interests is evident in reading the testimony of an American executive who
negotiated an oil contract with the
Trinidad government. The $2 million in bribes, he noted, was "a good
deal ... a trifling amount in relation
to the long-term benefits to a small
company [Tesoro]." Indeed, based
on its "killing" in Trinidad, Tesoro
went on to become a Texas oil company of respectable size. There is
much more to be revealed, as any
Trinidad entrepreneur will tell you.
Word is that what has been publicized so far about government bobol
(graft) is but the tip of the iceberg.
A 1987 muckraking documentary
by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation embarrassed the Trinidad
government into taking action
before the Canadian courts. Is this
foreign "intervention" in the island's
affairs? Not to the people in the
street who welcome Canadian help
in this case.

The issue of seeking foreign help
to deal with corruption in independent countries raises many ticklish
questions about sovereignty and
extraterritoriality. The issue is not
limited to North-South relations, as
evident in the unfolding insidertrading scandal involving the purchase of American National Can
Company by the French state-owned
Pechiney, S.A., for five times the
original market value of the shares.
The US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) revealed the
scandal, using the well-named
"RICO" (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization) Act. The
scandal reaches right into the
French cabinet. The SEC's involvement, states one French stock
analyst, "has preempted our usual
means of burying political scandals."
The complexities of tracing dirty
money are enormous and often
beyond the reach of small states.
The sheer volume of transactions
creates a great gray area in which
legal and illegal funds get easily confused. In 1987 $25.6 billion-onefifth of the total market transactions
of US securities-were purchased
and sold abroad. Billions more of
foreign moneys are invested directly
in US businesses and real estate
while even more goes into the offshore banks.
Geography has made the Caribbean a neighbor of the world's most
powerful economy. Money and
human talent flow northward like a
river defying all geographical conventions. In between, there are a
dozen islands with hundreds of "offshore" operations to facilitate the
minority bent on an illegitimate passage. It is time to set some of these
items on the agenda of the new
leaders in Washington and the
Caribbean. .
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Commentary

Forging Consensus
by Mark B. Rosenberg

A

ings in January, Secretary
of State James A. Baker
t his confirmation
said,
with referencehearto
Latin America, "I don't
see an issue coming to us
any quicker than this
one. It's going to be right on our
doorstep when we take office."
As pointed out in The Third Century: US-Latin American Policy Choices
for the 1990s (Washington, DC, 1988),
the Bush administration faces "an
avalanche of tactical Latin American
decisions." Early progress is imperative for the amelioration of Mexico's
debt crisis, a prelude to a summit
with other debtor nations. Meanwhile, Central America remains a
stern test for US policymakers: the
Arias peace plan, US-Nicaraguan
relations, and elections in El Salvador continue to generate divisiveness and paralysis. The Bush
administration faces these problems
in a context of Latin American
impatience and frustration over US
foreign policy. Regional complaints
focus on Washington's penchant for
paternalism and its inattention to
basic matters of economic recovery
and multilateral consultation.
What is needed is a fresh, more
responsive US approach to Latin
American affairs. The key is to forge
a consensus in Washington around
three critical issues: national security,
antidrug policy, and the debt crisis.

National Security
The fundamental concepts of
"threat" and "national interest"
must be defined: What are the security concerns of the US in Latin
America? How can they best be
addressed, balancing objectives
against means? Can they be publicly
debated and congressionally
mandated?
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Soviet and Cuban interference in
Latin America is still perceived by
many as the major threat to US
security in the region. This view,
however, underplays the importance
of a wide array of entrenched problems. These include the impact of
the debt burden on government,
economy, and living standards; rampant corruption; weak and overburdened justice systems; and a
deteriorating natural environment.

ica, given the hesitant efforts in the
US to curb the nation's demand for
illicit drugs.
Supply and demand are related.
To expect help from Latin Americans before the US initiates major
antidrug efforts is to invite bilateral
cynicism and tensions. The Bush
administration's appointment of
William Bennett, former secretary
of education, to the new post of
"drug czar" is a sign of growing US
maturity. Bennett's nationwide ties
with educators promise to direct
serious attention to the demand side
of international drug trafficking.

Debt Crisis
The magnitude of the Latin American debt makes it a matter of both
finance and security. Yet, as Henry
Kissinger stated, "The dominant
view in the US government and the
major banks still denies that there is
an emergency" (Washington Post,

January 11, 1989).

Such problems can be constructively
addressed only through bilateral
and multilateral forums, channels
that demand a posture of mutual
respect. The US must become more
skillful in dealing with its friends
and adversaries. Democratic allies in
Latin America must be encouraged
to participate actively in the resolution of diplomatic problems.

Antidrug Policy
The US needs to recognize that it
confronts a national crisis of drug
abuse, exacerbated by the spread of
crack cocaine. US narco-diplomacy
and drug-eradication campaigns
have little credibility in Latin Amer-

The debt problem calls for
urgent, high-level response. US
banks have proven incapable of rising above their short-term interests
to concert a reasonable debt strategy for their Latin American clients.
Furthermore, US manufacturers
have allowed the banks to define the
agenda, thereby losing millions of
dollars in exports to the debtconstricted markets of the Americas.
It is time for the US government to
fill the void by providing an interAmerican forum for the development of policy options.

Making ItWork
During the Reagan years, excessive
partisanship and preoccupation
with Nicaragua led to disjointed US
policy toward Latin America. To
avoid this trap the Bush administra-

tion must begin laying the groundwork for bipartisanforeign policy.
This approach demands that the
government's executive and legislative branches work together to
define a shared agenda concerning
the principal objectives and the
means to achieve them.
For example, if the US seeks to
continue encouraging Latin American democratization, a thorough
interagency review of the matter
needs to be carried out. Simultaneously the Department of State
needs to coordinate its activities
with Congress. A close relationship
is especially necessary in light of the
upcoming debates on war powers,
intelligence oversight, and the
micromanagement of foreign policy.

On Capitol Hill the legacy of
intense partisanship means that policy coherence will be hard to obtain.
The task of overcoming this legacy
calls for a special effort to avoid the
Reagan-era antagonism that charac-

terized relations between Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Elliott Abrams and House and Senate leadership. The new assistant
secretary not only must know Latin
America; knowledge of Capitol Hill
and good working relations with
both political parties are also essential. In addition the assistant secretary must speak to the "parochial"
interests of congressional districts.
Members of Congress and their
staffs must also address the links
between their constituencies and
Latin American affairs.
Coordination among the
foreign-affairs staffers on Capitol
Hill would further promote policy
coherence. In practice the staffers
wield considerable influence. They
lay out policy alternatives, monitor
their executive-branch counterparts, and serve as quasi-diplomats
when receiving foreign dignitaries at
home and traveling abroad. As
information sources for the media,

they help to set the news agenda on
foreign affairs. Knowledgeable
Latin Americans aim much of their
lobbying energy at the staffers.
Perhaps most important, executive leadership must smooth the way
to improved relations with Latin
America. This role is crucial in view
of the ascendancy of populist politicians in the region, like President
Carlos Andr6s Perez of Venezuela.
Such politicians can serve either to
cement US-Latin American cooperation or to undermine prospects for
a common inter-American agenda.
President Bush's longstanding interest in Mexico is a reassuring sign
that he and his advisors will be sensitive to the concerns of Perez and his

counterparts.
A bipartisan spirit is needed in
Washington. If finger-pointing,

excessive partisanship, and a "wetold-you-so" attitude persist, then
US-Latin American relations will
continue to suffer. .
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AYear of Elections
by Don Bohning

ne of the biggest electoral
demonstrations in recent
Latin American history
is taking place in 1989,
as voters in eight countries elect new governments. The wave of
elections tests the region's democratic trend and poses potential new
policy dilemmas for the Bush administration. In addition to the Latin
American contests, there could
be as many as six national elections
in the countries of the Englishspeaking Caribbean.
Venezuela provided a preview of
Latin America's 1989 electoral
parade December 4, when it overwhelmingly elected former president
Carlos Andres P&rez, the candidate
of the Democratic Action Party, to a
five-year term as the country's chief
executive. The results of both the
Venezuelan election and a November 15 municipal vote in Brazil also
offered a hint of the emerging
nationalistic populism that may confront the new US administration.
The first Latin American election of 1989 is scheduled for March
in El Salvador. It is followed in May
by elections in Panama, Bolivia, and
Argentina. Brazil, Uruguay, and
Honduras hold elections in November. And Chile's election is planned
for December.
In the English-speaking Caribbean, elections are constitutionally required during 1989 in Jamaica,
St. Kitts-Nevis, Antigua-Barbuda,
and St. Vincent. They are likely
to be called in Grenada and Belize,
although elections in these two
countries could carry over into
early 1990.
From the Washington perspecDon Bohning is Latin American editor
of the Miami Herald.
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tive, the most critical votes in Latin
America are those in El Salvador,
Argentina, and Brazil. Chile and
Panama also are being closely
watched. In the English-speaking
Caribbean, Jamaica and Grenada
are attracting the most attention.

Latin America
During the eight years of the
Reagan administration, the US
pumped $3 billion in economic and
military assistance into embattled El
Salvador, where a decade-old guerrilla insurgency has claimed more

than 60,000 lives. Most of the US
assistance has gone to build the Salvadoran military and to support
President Jose Napole6n Duarte's
centrist Christian Democratic
government.
But with Duarte dying of cancer
as his five-year term nears an end,
the Christian Democrats are in disarray. The opposition rightist
ARENA party won control of the
National Assembly in the 1987 con-

gressional elections and is given a
good chance to win the presidency
in 1989. Although Alfredo Cristiani,
ARENAs US-educated presidential
candidate, has helped to moderate
the party's image, observers fear an
ARENA victory could mean an even
greater polarization of Salvadoran
society and jeopardize further US
assistance for the beleaguered country. "If the right wins, I see El Salvador as a major test for our policy
in terms of our staying power," says
one US official involved in regional
policymaking.
Elections in Argentina and Brazil pose a different set of problems.
Both countries are burdened with a
heavy foreign debt. Both countries
have recently emerged from military
dictatorships, with fragile civilian
governments in their first term. And
in both countries old-style populist
candidates are the early frontrunners for the presidency, which
some see as a potential test for the
continued democratic process.
In Argentina, Carlos Menem, the
Peronist governor of La Rioja province, held a large and early lead
over Eduardo Angeloz, governor of
C6rdoba province and the governing Radical Party candidate to succeed President Rail Alfonsin. In
Brazil, where next November will
see the first direct election for president since 1960, the early frontrunner is Leonel Brizola, a populist
of the left who has been anathema to
the Brazilian military for three
decades. Brizola returned to Brazil
in 1979 from a 15-year exile and was
elected in 1982 to a four-year term as
governor of Rio de Janeiro state.
The strength of the Brazilian left
was demonstrated in November 15
municipal elections in which
Brizola's Democratic Labor Party
won victories in the state capitals of

Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, Maceio,
and Sao Luis, and did well in smaller
cities. The smaller and further left
Workers' Party also demonstrated
surprising strength, winning in Sao
Paulo and two other state capitals,
Porto Alegre and Vitoria.
Menem and/or Brizola presidential victories could trigger a moratorium on the hefty foreign debts
of both countries, much of which is
owed to US banks. In Brazil a
Brizola victory also could exacerbate trade disputes over the country's protectionist policies. As for
Argentina there are fears that a
Menem victory could bring back the
chaotic days of the Isabel Per6n
presidency and, in turn, trigger a
military coup.
"Those are the three [El Salvador, Argentina, and Brazil] seen
as most critical," said one US official. "And a new administration in
Washington is going to have to deal
with them at a time when it is going
to be hard to shake this [the
Reagan] administration's obsession
with Nicaragua."
In Venezuela the Bush administration will have to deal with another
left-of-center populist after Perez's
February 2 inauguration. In the
early 1980s, Perez-who served as
president from 1974 to 1979-angered
the Reagan administration with his
outspoken support of Nicaragua's
Sandinistas, from whom he has lately
distanced himself. While Perez continues his rhetorical commitment
to Third World causes, he has moderated earlier positions. Thus Washington is confident the US can work
with him.
In Panama the May 7 election is
expected to define the future role of
General Manuel Noriega, the country's military strongman, and his
position vis-a-vis the Bush adminis-
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tration, if the situation is not
clarified before that time. Some
observers believe the election could
provide an out for both parties. The
outgoing Reagan administration
continued to recognize Eric Arturo
Delvalle as Panama's legitimate president, although he was ousted by the
Noriega-controlled National Assembly in February 1988 after he tried
to fire Noriega as Defense Forces
commander. As a footnote, the Panama election, if held as scheduled,
will mark the first in 50 years in
which the late three-time president
Arnulfo Arias is not a factor. Arias
died in Miami last August.
While less important from a US
strategic standpoint, Chile's presidential vote in December 1989-the
first since 1970-will be closely
watched to see the fate of General
Augusto Pinochet, the country's military president since he led a 1973
military coup. Voters rejected eight
more years of a Pinochet presidency
in a yes-or-no referendum last October. As a result, a constitution
approved in 1980 calls for a wideopen presidential election late in
1989. There is some speculation that
Pinochet himself might run or, more
remotely, might decide to cancel the
election and continue in power.
There is not likely to be much
anguish in Washington over the
Bolivian election in May, with none
of the leading candidates being
cause for official concern. Perhaps
the most interesting thing about the
Bolivian election is that it is likely to
be held. That in itself is an achievement for a country that had 175
changes of government in its first
162 years of independence. Neither
is the November election in traditionally democratic Uruguay-where
a rare decade-long military dictatorship gave way to an elected civilian
government in 1985-expected to
rock the hemisphere boat.
That might not be the case in
Honduras, which also selects a new
president in November. As the Central American conflict has escalated
in recent years, Honduras has
increasingly become an American
satellite, hosting a major US troop
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presence and harboring the USfinanced Nicaraguan contra rebels.
In addition Honduras is beset with
the pressure of an increasing
number of Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugees, an upsurge in
death-squad activity, and the
reported involvement of the military
in drug smuggling.

The English-speaking Caribbean
In the English-speaking Caribbean
the big election was Jamaica's contest
of February 9. The election pitted
conservative prime minister Edward
Seaga, a favorite of the Reagan
administration, against former
prime minister Michael Manley,
whose "democratic socialism" and
leftist rhetoric of the 1970s caused
consternation in Washington. Manley, who has moderated his nationalistic Third World and anti-US
rhetoric since losing to Seaga in
1980, won convincingly.
In Grenada, the other featured
Caribbean-election attraction,
Prime Minister Herbert Blaize's New
National Party (NNP)--hammered
together in the wake of the 1983 US
invasion of the island-has fragmented. Keith Mitchell, minister of
communications and work, has been

elected to lead the NNP in the election planned for December. It is
possible none of the four existing
parties will gain a majority, which
means that erratic former prime
minister Eric Gairy could be a factor
in forming the next government.
In Antigua, the Bird family
-father and sons-which has dominated island politics for more than
four decades, is expected to retain
control of the government despite
family feuding over who would eventually succeed Vere Bird Sr., the
family patriarch and present prime
minister.
In St. Vincent centrist prime
minister James Mitchell is a heavy
favorite to be back for another term.
In St. Kitts some observers think
Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds
could be in a bit of trouble but
probably not enough to lose an election.
In Belize the election is shaping
up as another confrontation
between former prime minister
George Price and incumbent prime
minister Manuel Esquivel, who
ended Price's long domination of the
country's politics in 1984. Esquivel's
United Democratic Party has internal problems, and some observers
give Price a good chance at regaining power.

Political Consequences?
No matter who wins, election results
in the English-speaking Caribbean
-with the possible exception of
Jamaica-are not likely to significantly change current direction. In
St. Vincent, Grenada, and St. Kitts,
however, the results could have a
bearing on commitment to a faltering unity movement among the
smaller Eastern Caribbean states.
The case is different in Latin
America, where one official US
regional specialist suggests the 1989
elections will provide an indication
of whether the democratic transition
"is more than just a fleeting phenomenon and whether people are
committed enough to democracy to
give it a chance over the longer
term." m

Freedom and Democracy
by Mario Vargas Llosa

reedom is, perhaps, the
most disquieting paradox
of history. It nourishes
humanity's most profound
accomplishments and
aspirations, but it also is
the abyss into which
humanity often falls and destroys
itself. Paradoxically, freedom engenders the fear of adopting liberty and
the temptation to suppress it.

The Attitude of Intellectuals
Renouncing freedom is one option,
of course. Individuals and groups
sometimes give in to this temptation
under the spell of a religion or ideology. It is only an apparent paradox
that among those who do so are
intellectuals and artists who depend
on freedom as lungs depend on oxygen. The case of Plato is not exceptional. It is merely the first in a long
sequence of events in the course of
Western civilization. Liberty puts a
terrible burden on our shoulders;
and no one carries this burden more
intimately than creative people.
We know the case of Latin America very well. Great creators have
given our literature its worldwide
renown and have extraordinarily
enriched our language, our imagination, and our sensibility. But
many of them have not vacillated in
putting their prestige and their
word at the service of ideologies and
regimes that stand at odds with freedom. Some have succumbed to the
Marxist spell. Others, sometimes of
Editor'sNote: Translatedexcerpts of
"The Enrique Benavides Lecture on
Freedom," by Peruviannovelist Mario
Vargas Llosa, on October 23, 1988, in
SanJose, Costa Rica. The lecture was
sponsoredby the newspaper La Naci6n.
© Mario Vargas Llosa, 1988.

high standing, have served, through
complacency or enthusiasm, the
cause of right-wing dictatorships,
sometimes at the very moment when
these were committing their worst
crimes.

The Peoples' Vision
The peoples of Latin America have
demonstrated a vision of freedom
that is far superior to that of many
of the intellectuals. This is something that Latin America can show
the world with pride. It is true that
our countries display scandalous
inequalities-that the spectacle of
poverty repeats itself like a recurring nightmare from the Rio
Grande to the Strait of Magellan.
It is true that, in education, health,
labor, and law, we have much to
accomplish. And yet we Latin
Americans can say that, compared
to what happened decades ago in
Europe or to what frequently occurs
in the Middle East, the Far East, and
Africa, our peoples have only occasionally fallen to the spell of despotism. When they have done so, as in
Per6n's Argentina and Castro's
Cuba, they soon regretted the fact.
Never during our republican trajectory have so many Latin American governments been born out of
more or less clean elections. Countries where, 25 years ago, no elected
official could complete his term,
today are models of pluralism and
coexistence. The remaining dictatorships or semidictatorships find
themselves on the defensive. Some of
them, such as Noriega in Panama
and Pinochet in Chile, seem to be in
the midst of their last dying gasps as
they confront their peoples' thirst
for morality, decency, and freedom.
In Latin America today the
Cuban model of violent revolution

is on the defensive. With the exceptions of Cuba, El Salvador, Peru,
and Colombia, the myth of armed
revolution is a panacea for our
ailments is no longer attractive.
Increasingly this myth seems to be
an ideology of marginal groups,
bereft of popular support.
Perhaps the greatest significance
of this democratizing trend is that,
unlike the period after World War II
when a wave of democratization also
swept the continent, it neither has
resulted from external pressures
nor has it been the exclusive work of
local "elites." This time, as freedom
and consensus replace the arbitrariness of force and personal power,
the impetus has been the humble citizens of our countries-the anonymous men and women, usually poor
and uneducated.
In analyzing the recent Latin
American elections a consistent pattern emerges. Whether the elected
parties and officials are of the moderate left or moderate right, they
unequivocally represent the democratic option of cohabitation in a
setting of lawfulness, freedom of
expression, and alternation of
power. By voting in small and sometimes insignificant numbers for
the parties and officials of both
extremes, the consulted peoples
have punished those whose
ideologies constitute a threat to
freedom.

Learning a Lesson
The lesson could not be clearer.
Our intellectuals and other leaders
should learn from it. In spite of
hunger, economic injustice, and the
lack ofjobs, schools, and hospitals;
in spite of misfortune and despair,
the predominant way of life in Latin
America, our peoples have not lost
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their appetite for freedom. Our
peoples cling to democratic regimes
in the face of their fragility and the
painfully slow pace of attempts to
improve living standards. Can any
Latin American dictators boast of
having the popular support enjoyed
in the past by Mussolini and Hitler,
or today by the Ayatollah? No. The
best proof is the brutal repression-the torture, censorship, and
crimes that our dictatorships must
carry out to remain in power. We
must not lose sight of this fact. In
the midst of the great difficulties our
countries are going through, in the
midst of the economic crisis that is
drowning us, sometimes threatening
to disintegrate us as nations, this
popular commitment to democracy
represents hope. Despite all of our
problems the peoples of Latin America continue to see freedom as the
best option. They may be poor,
uneducated, frustrated, and forlorn; yet they know what they want:
freedom.
To be sure, they cannot theorize
about freedom. If we were to ask

them, the common citizens of our
America, they most probably would
give us vague and uncertain reasons-what Sartre would have called
"their choice." It so happens that the
option of freedom often manifests
itself as an instinctive and blind
hunger from the depths of the
psyche, rather than as a conscious
and reasoned effort. It is a mysterious desire to reach a complete and
supreme individuality, breaking
away from the undifferentiated collectivity. It is the sovereignty of
being that can be attained only by
experiencing the utmost responsibility: to make one's own choices,
to decide one way or another about
the most vital issues, to be the
true maker of one's destiny.
The Homeric poems were born
from a people who felt these deepseated urges, who, even amid the
grayish darkness through which they
moved, longed for their emancipation. Even as confused ideals, these
longings marked the birth of the
West, the beginning of a culture of
freedom.

The blind globetrotting bard,
who, according to legend, gave life
to the Homeric poems, also inaugurated a tradition that infused
humanity with a fundamentally new
dimension. It opened the doors of
social and individual life to a secret,
silent lady who, little by little, transformed history and the human condition with her magic wand. She did
not bring with her happiness. If anything, she deprived us of it. But she
did bring progress, greater justice,
and, for those nations that enthroned
her as their queen and submitted
themselves to her whims and bewitching charms, a substantial improvement in the quality of life.
Even in the worst of circumstances our peoples offer her joyous
hospitality, and when they lose her
they yearn for her, fight for her, and
always end up resuscitating her. This
is proof that, in spite of dictators
and fanatics, material failings and
great disequilibria, freedom cannot
be separated from the culture and
dreams of Latin Americans. .
(Translatedby Lourdes Sim6n)
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Ecuador: The Politics of Locos
by CatherineM. Conaghan

o one can claim the
Febres-Cordero years
were boring. From 1984
to 1988 President Leon
Febres-Cordero stood
at the center of Ecuador's increasingly conflictive and often bizarre polity. In
1986 there were two abortive military uprisings, and in 1987 FebresCordero fell victim to a kidnapping
at the hands of air force paratroopers. Struggles between the
executive and other branches of
government were chronic. The
national police teargassed members
of the congress, and an executive
order physically barred supreme
court justices from entering their
offices. By the end of the FebresCordero years, high government
officials were fleeing to Miami
to avoid prosecution on corruption
charges. The "sleaze factor" had
come to Ecuador.
The deteriorating mood and
political conduct culminated in the
carnivalesque presidential election
of 1988. The populist candidate considered to have Febres-Cordero's
support, Abdala Bucaram, took
campaign politics to a new low. He
accused his social-democratic rival,
Rodrigo Borja, of everything from
alcoholism to a low sperm count.
Bucaram went on to lose the May
run-off election to Borja, but only
after personally recording his own
campaign song and music video. He
liked to close his campaign rallies
with a lip-synch to the tune that proclaimed, "Poreso, me Ilaman loco,
todos los oligarcas" ("All the oligarchs
call me crazy").

CatherineM. Conaghan is assistant
professor ofpoliticalstudies at Queen's
University, Canada.

Politics on the Skids
The strangeness of Ecuador's recent
politics reflects the deeper malaise
at work inside its political culture,
parties, and government institutions. The economic crisis since 1982
has steadily eroded the character of
political discourse and public manners. In the absence of strong institutions and new ideas, Ecuadoran
politics has devolved into a highly
personalized and often trivialized
arena of intra-elite struggle. A key
task facing President Borja, who
took office on August 10, 1988, is to
reinject sobriety and credibility into
the abused democratic system.
The irony of Ecuador's political
slide is that much of it occurred during an administration that promised
to eliminate corruption and to
enhance political efficiency and economic productivity. Febres-Cordero,

a leading Guayaquil businessman
and the candidate of a rightist electoral coalition, won a narrow victory
in 1984 on a platform aimed at
retracting state interventionism and
introducing business values to
public administration. But inconsistencies within the administration
unraveled his promise to deliver
economic growth and political certainty. Instead of serving up
pinstriped conservatism, FebresCordero experimented with an
erratic mixture of right-wing populism and authoritarianism. Thus the
military was repoliticized, the public's trust in government plummeted,
and a new bombastic populism
became entrenched in Ecuador's
political repertoire.
An essential problem was that
Febres-Cordero neither tolerated
the play of democratic institutions
nor respected his peers in the party
system. His own political ascent
relied heavily on his ability to grab
the public spotlight by denigrating
rival party leaders. Febres-Cordero
routinely referred to his rivals as
"cowards":' "tramps,:' and "Marxist
clowns:' and frequently questioned their masculinity. His disdain
extended to the Ecuadoran party
system, including his own Social
Christian Party. Febres-Cordero was
quick to declare his government
would not be one "of parties,:' and
his appointment of apolitical
technocrats and businessmen to
the cabinet underscored this point.
Febres-Cordero viewed the presidency as an opportunity to deregulate the economy, which he had
advocated as leader of the Guayaquil
Chamber of Industry. His initial
goals were economic-decontrolling
prices and exchange rates, while
creating a hospitable investment
climate for local and foreign firms.
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Surrounded by a coterie of orthodox economic technocrats, FebresCordero chafed at any attempt to
subject his economic management
to consultation and negotiation. The
fact that leftist and centrist parties
controlled the congress served to
harden his antiparty stance.
The president's strategy for
defusing the opposition ranged
from physical intimidation to ignoring the demands of contenders,
regardless of the constitutional or
legal implications. The government
enacted many key economic measures as emergency decrees, thereby
circumventing the need for congressional approval. When the congress
increased the 1985 minimum wage
in excess of the executive's request,
Febres-Cordero threw the measure
in a legal limbo by refusing to publish it in the Registro Oficial. He
followed the same course with the
congressional amnesty granted to
Frank Vargas Pazzos, the air force
general who led the 1986 uprisings
against the president to protest government corruption and meddling
in the armed forces. Although the
Tribunalde GarantiasConstitucionales
upheld the legality of the measure,
Febres-Cordero refused to implement it. Thus he prompted air force
paratroopers to pressure for compliance by kidnapping him in January 1987 In September of that year
the executive-legislative conflict
reemerged as Febres-Cordero defied
the congress by refusing to remove
Minister of Government Luis Robles
after he was censured for human
rights violations. The administration
regarded as a personal attack virtually every congressional attempt
to exercise its oversight functions.
Febres-Cordero responded to congressional actions by accusing its
members of corruption and libel.
Febres-Cordero matched these
frontal attacks on authority with
maneuvers to wear down and disorganize the opposition from within.
Offers of cash and patronage lured
some opposition congressmen away
from their parties. A combination of
desertions and deals with two "independent" populist parties enabled
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the government to forge a majority
for the 1985-86 legislative session.
But the respite from conflict was
short-lived. The center-left opposition won the 1986 mid-term elections and solidly defeated the
government's plebiscite proposal to
change the law governing political
parties. A growing climate of violence paralleled the continuing scuffles in the institutional sphere. The
government repressed antigovernment labor demonstrations, partisans of Febres-Cordero assaulted
congressmen, and international
organizations began to cite Ecuador
for human rights violations.
The administration's credibility
was further strained by continuing
economic troubles and increasingly
incoherent economic policymaking.
The March 1986 earthquake interrupted Ecuador's oil exports and
seriously aggravated the government's already weak financial position. Despite his antistatist rhetoric
and falling oil prices, FebresCordero did not restrain public
expenditures. Cultivating a populist
flourish, he turned the completion
of public works projects-many of
which were of dubious value-into a
major goal. At the same time his
attempts at deregulation faltered.
Although the economic team had
boasted that its economic reforms
would "last a thousand years"' a
fevered demand for dollars forced
Febres-Cordero to reinstate controls
over the exchange market in March
1988.

The Electoral Circus
Electioneering for the 1988 presidential and congressional races
did nothing to add sobriety to the
political atmosphere. Each of the
16 legally-registered parties sought
differentiation by choosing a wellknown figure to head the ticket. This
practice led to controversial choices
that created serious fissures inside
some parties and discord among
prospective electoral partners. It
clouded an already confusing political spectrum as factions split off
from regular parties to create their

own movimientos to back particular
candidates.
Parties of the left split over the
presidential candidacy of air force
general Vargas Pazzos. Known as
"El loco Frank:'Vargas declared himself a "man of the left." Although
two leftist parties nominated him for
president, the Frente Amplio de
Izquierda (FADI), which included the
Communist Party, endorsed Maoist
Jaime Hurtado. The pro-Vargas
members of FADI responded
by forming their own party, while
other center-left leaders left FADI to
back right-wing populist AbdalA
Bucaram. And one populist group
broke into warring factions as two
Bucaram brothers, Avicenas and
Averroes, and their followers battled
in the streets of Guayaquil over leadership positions and presidential
endorsements.
Electoral politics on the right
turned equally fractious. Each party
of the Frente de Reconstrucci6n Nacional (FRN), the electoral front that
had united rightist parties behind
Febres-Cordero's 1984 bid, launched
its own presidential candidate. The
most notable of the right's candidates were Sixto Duran Ballen and
CarlosJulio Emanuel. While FebresCordero had marginalized FRN
from his government and channeled
patronage through ad hoc government committees, many voters
blamed the rightist parties for
Ecuador's political and economic
plight. The administration believed,
nevertheless, that it could engineer a
rightist victory. The idea was that, if
the votes for the center and left were
widely dispersed across the various
Marxist, populist, and reformist parties, the rightist Duran Ballen would
take the second spot in the January
first round and go on to face centerleftist Borja in the May run-off for
the presidency.
In an attempt to dilute the
center-left's vote, Febres-Cordero
permitted AbdalA Bucaram, an
exiled party leader and the former
mayor of Guayaquil, to return from
Panama. But this Machiavellian
decision misfired. Bucaram won 17.5
percent of the vote to edge out the

rightist Duran Ballen for second
place. Bucaram's second-place
finish gave him a spot in the May
run-off against Borja, who won first
place with 24.8 percent of the vote.
The various rightist parties garnered only 17.4 percent of the firstround presidential vote and won
only 10 of 71 congressional seats.
Bucaram's promises of free
school lunches, free maternity care,
and public works articulated the
dissatisfactions of the lower classes,
particularly the poor people of
Guayaquil. But his provocative comments and personal style became
the primary issue of the campaign.
Among his most offensive ad-libs
were his praise for the political acumen of Adolph Hitler and the comparisons he drew between himself
and Jesus Christ. His emotionallycharged campaign speeches
attacked the "oligarchy"-a category
in which he lumped Febres-Cordero
along with Borja and his supporters.
Reminiscent of the populist rhetoric
of Latin America's past, Bucaram
called his supporters "los humildes"
and "los descamisados." His campaign
commercials featured martyr-like
images of himself (e.g., Bucaram in
an outstretched position like Christ
on the cross) and his family (e.g., his
son looking as if he were beaten,
smothered in catsup to simulate
blood). He even extended the religious imagery to Borja, pictured in a
commercial with devil's horns.
Bucaram appeared on television
with two empty whiskey bottles and
declared the bottles represented
Borja's daily alcohol consumption.
Bucaram's unpredictability and
mass base frightened many on the
political right. Still, some rightist
leaders confessed privately to supporting Bucaram as a lesser evil and
as a president they could control.
And the Isais family of Guayaquil, a
powerful industrial and financial
group, contributed financially to
Bucaram's campaign. But many
Quito businessmen leaned toward
Borja.
Borja responded to Bucaram's
style with his own personality-based
campaign, which included a com-

mercial featuring popular entertainers singing, "Rodrigo Borja ama
su gente" ("Rodrigo Borja loves his
people"). The circus-like campaign
reflected a fundamental problem of
Ecuadoran society: the exhaustion
of ideas and programs in the context of the nation's economic crisis.
Personality became the focal point
of the campaign because neither
side formulated a fresh set of alternatives to Febres-Cordero's policies.
Bucaram and Borja rejected the
president's half-hearted attempt at
neoliberalism. In doing so both candidates resurrected old-fashioned
Keynesian, CEPAL, and dependency
thinking.
The lack of fresh choices and the
carnivalesque atmosphere of the
campaign generated public disaffection with the candidates. Street
grafitti proclaimed, "Borja o
Bucaram, sigue la crisis" ("Borja or
Bucaram, the crisis continues"). As
the election day neared, rumors circulated that the military was poised
to intervene if Bucaram won.
The election took place on May
8 without disruptions. Borja took
46 percent of the votes cast, while
41 percent went to Bucaram, who
swiftly conceded defeat. Nonetheless, trouble spots in Borja's electoral victory may prove problematic
for his administration. The voters
split along regional lines. Borja's
support was overwhelmingly concentrated in the interior provinces;
he did not carry a single coastal province. Hence the 1988 presidential
run-off was the most regionally
polarized contest in Ecuador's
recent history. Given the traditional
animosities between the coast and
the sierra, Borja can expect little
tolerance from costenfos, should his
government falter.
Bucaram turned in a remarkable
performance-eating away at Borja's
overwhelming lead in the polls to a
margin ofjust five percentage
points. The results legitimize
Bucaram as a national leader and
assure him a role as a future presidential contender. As such,
Bucaram and his powerful political
family are sure to articulate coastal

frustrations with Borja's program.
Bucaram's sister, Elsa, is currently
the mayor of Guayaquil. Unless the
character of the Bucaram discourse
changes, bombast and personal
attacks may be permanently
entrenched in Ecuadoran politics.

Democratic Prospects?
Borja assumed office last August
with only a modest mandate and
with economic conditions that
reduce his ability to satisfy the
demands of the populace. Crashing
international oil prices and uncontrolled government spending during
Febres-Cordero's last year left Borja
little choice but to enact an austerity
package. In September he implemented the initial measures. They
included a 75.6 percent devaluation
of the currency, tax increases,
import restrictions, and a ban on
vehicle imports. The measures hiked
fuel prices by 100 percent and electricity prices by 30 percent. A 15.8
percent increase in the minimum
wage tempered the social costs of
the program.
While unhappy with the
measures, the Frente Unitariode
Trabajadores(the umbrella labor
organization composed of the major
trade-union confederations) did not
mobilize against the package. Borja
has stressed business-labor cooperation, and has made it clear that his
administration will respect the labor
movement. But he has also reached
out to the private sector by appointing well-known businessmen to key
positions in his economic team.
Recent events in Ecuador underscore the key role that politicians
play in strengthening or undermining the institutions and civic culture
of a fledgling democracy. During the
last four years, leadership's belligerence, intolerance, and aggressive
political style have brought Ecuadoran democracy to the edge
of breakdown. The politics of machos
and locos has taken its toll. In spite of
almost a decade of civilian rule, the
consolidation of Ecuadoran democracy stands as a formidable challenge to President Rodrigo Borja. .
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A Political Obituary:
Arnulfo Arias of Panama
by Steve C.Ropp

or half a century, Arnulfo
Arias was Panama's leading political figure. There
is little question that the
imposition of a militarydominated regime in 1968
stemmed from domestic
resistance to the possibility of an
Arias presidency. Just as current
developments in Argentina cannot
be understood without reference to
the legacy ofJuan Per6n, analysis of
Panamanian politics must start
with the legacy of "El Hombre"
Born in 1901 in the interior province of Coclk, Arias attended the
University of Chicago and Harvard
Medical School. On returning to
Panama in the 1920s, he became
active in a civic movement called
"Community Action." The movement's leaders were mestizo professionals from the interior provinces,
such as Arias himself. Its popular
base consisted of urban workers.
These professionals and workers felt
excluded from the political alliance
formed by Panama's urban-commercial elite and supported by the US.
Arias's political philosophy contained elements of racism directed
primarily against black West
Indians. This philosophy arose from
the US preference for hiring West
Indians, a practice that excluded a
wide swath of Panama's population
(including Spanish-speaking blacks)
from the fruits of the Canal-based
economy. Arias's flirtation with Nazi
philosophy during the 1930s was no
charade. What it masked, however,
was his more fundamental commitment to indigenous populism
Steve C. Ropp is professor ofpolitical
science at the University of Wyoming.
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against US imperialism and its Panamanian allies. This populistic commitment explains the durability and
size of Arias's political constituency,
particularly in the urban centers of
Panama City and Col6n.

Arguably, Arias's death on
August 10, 1988, was Panama's most
important domestic political event
of the year, in terms of potential
consequences. It rivaled the more
dramatic confrontation between the
Reagan administration and General
Manuel Antonio Noriega. An obvious
question is whether Arias's Panameifista Party will survive the loss of its
charismatic leader. Because Arias
regularly commanded the loyalty of
35-40 percent of the electorate, loss
of party vigor could create a large

and volatile new electoral mass.
It is unlikely, though, that
Panameftismo will remain a major
political force. Even in its heyday,
Panamefiismo was a highly personal
movement, not an institutionalized
party. Arias had great faith in the
masses but little faith in mass organizations as vehicles for social
change. This fact, as well as the
refusal of the Panameflistasto
strengthen their machinery by participating in national and local elections between 1968 and 1984, means
that the party could quickly become
an empty shell. Unlike Juan Per6n,
who left Argentina with both a class
constituency and mass organizations, Arias left Panama with merely
an ill-defined mass following.
Panama is ostensibly moving
toward "pure and clean" democratic
elections in May 1989. A civilian
president, two vice presidents, 67
members of the National Assembly,
and 505 local representatives are
to be elected for five-year terms
beginning on September 1, 1989.
At first glance the death of Arias
seems to have improved Panama's
prospects for democracy because it
eliminates a major barrier to the
military's acceptance of democratic
government. After all, the military
ousted Arias from the presidency in
1941 and in 1968 because it regarded
him as a political threat. And in
1984 the Defense Forces resorted to
electoral fraud to prevent him from
assuming the presidency.
Yet Arias's death has not
improved relations between civilian
parties and the current military leadership. The cocaine colonels-boxed
in by the US drug indictments and
by domestic opposition to their polit-

~
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ical dominance-cannot afford to
relinquish the reins of power to a
civilian government. It is therefore
likely that the scheduled 1989 elections will be a stage-managed affair.
Some of the evidence for this
political scenario is inferential.
Clearly the military leadership bears
high costs in maintaining the political status quo. But it would bear
equally high costs in permitting the
establishment of a civilian democracy. By default, what is likely is a
stage-managed election that produces another military-controlled
government.
A more tangible indication of
Noriega's intent is the fact that in
August 1988 he founded the Consultation and Political Advisory Commission. Its main purpose is "to
organize the 1989 elections within
the framework of the constitutional

and legal order of the Republic of
Panama." The 16-member commission includes only representatives of
the military-controlled political parties, the mass organizations, and the
Defense Forces. Such membership
suggests that Noriega will tightly
control the elections and exclude
the democratic opposition from
meaningful participation.
A less likely scenario is that of
"Haitianization," which would leave
the Defense Forces in direct and
open control of the government.
This scenario involves the possibility
that Noriega may see no need for a
democratic fig leaf. Alternatively, as
happened in Haiti during 1987-88,
a failed attempt to create a democratic fig leaf could result in a quick
return to direct military rule.
"Haitianization" assumes that,
above all, the military's top com-

manders seek to preserve their
domestic safe haven against extradition. Democracy, or even its semblance, may play a minor role in this
effort. As in Haiti, direct military
rule would lead to continued economic decline. Cuts in government
services and employment, coupled
with efforts to raise additional revenue at the expense of the middle
class, would result in increased
middle-class emigration.
Arias's demise has vastly
improved Panama's long-term prospects for democracy by narrowing
the differences between the military
and the civilian political parties.
Nonetheless, the short-term prospects
are bleak. Barring a civilian uprising
or a coup by progressive junior officers, Panama will experience additional years of direct or indirect
military rule. m
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Reports: Nicaragua

The Sandinistas and the US Press
by Pablo Antonio Cuadra

ne of the peculiarities of
Central American history resides in the fact
that it has fallen to the
press to defend the
rights of people against
those who have held
power and sought to expand it at
the expense of individual rights.
Newspapers have been our only
compensation for weak legislative
and judicial branches, confronted
by executives perpetually tempted
to excess. Nicaragua is a case in
point. There, the daily La Prensa has
been called "the republic of paper."
The Somozas constantly sought to
break or stretch the bonds of constitutional limitation and erode liberties, searching for greater and
greater power. In our newspaper the
republican conscience was born and
survived by stating plainly what congressmen or judges were too venal
or frightened to say. The people
remembered as much, and this is the
way they learned to identify their
rights.
For, in fact, there are two ways to
be a democrat. One can either
establish and practice from the seat
of power itself, or one can fight for
it from the outside. Spanish America
is more a democracy of desire than
of fulfillment. But that desire is
informed by a greater vehemence
and force of tradition precisely
because it has cost so much in blood
and sacrifice. Democracy is and
remains our collective ideal; so
much so that tyrannies of the left
and right pay it the ultimate compliment of hypocrisy. They speak of
themselves as "authentic democracies," thus indirectly paying tribute to the system that made America,
Pablo Antonio Cuadra, writerand
poet, is editor-in-chiefof La Prensa.
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that liberated it from colonial rule,
and that is the legacy of its heroes,
and whose prestige is unsurpassed
in the minds of our peoples. However much and however frequently
the cause of liberty has been betrayed,
it has ignited every revolution on
this continent.

The Press and Freedom:
Contrasting Styles
For Central Americans the press
and freedom of expression represent more than the free play of opinions. They also represent that
invisible wall of containment and
defense against an equally venerable
tradition-that of the "strong man,
whether Spanish or Indian, the
product of a history at once morally
and racially violent.
Our newspapers have thus
played a different role from those of
the US. There, freedom has enjoyed
a multiplicity of defenses. The three
branches of government are independent of one another. The private
sector and individual rights enjoy an
almost sacred status. Thus the

North American press has enjoyed
more freedom, but for that very reason has been less concerned about
the lack of it. In Central America the
most elemental struggle for freedom
of expression is permanent and
dramatic, in a way that our North
American colleagues have never
experienced. That is why they frequently appear to be strangely, discouragingly insensitive to our
struggle, a struggle that, by rights,
should affect them as much as it
does us.
North Americans do not struggle
against power, with rare exceptions,
but rather against a different political party. They fight not for democracy but rather within democracy.
Thus their consciousness of freedom
is very different from our own.
Their perspective is naive-virginal,
without history as it were-when the
unexpected news item suddenly
erupts in their crystal ball. I have
always had a special terror of that
kind of "objectivity" The last
Somoza, educated at West Point,
knew how to speak English well. In
truly deplorable fashion he managed
to convince the North American
press that, as hard as he had worked
at it, the Nicaraguan people were
not ready for democracy. Years later,
Tomts Borge-who lacks neither
intelligence nor a certain charmalso managed to convince the best
newspaper people in the US that as
interior minister he was the greatest
guarantee for keeping the extremists and radicals at bay.
But Borge was one of the founders of the Sandinista Front and
has openly declared his MarxismLeninism on many occasions. No
matter! All that is history.
The journalist's art would seem
to consist of viewing matters with a
spurious objectivity, which somehow

supersedes history itself. We should
not be surprised then that in
Somoza's day a fair number of American reporters categorized La Prensa
as a passionate opponent of the
government and therefore not
objective. Likewise, in today's revolutionary age, Stephen Kinzer of the
New York Times patronizingly called
La Prensato task for lack of objectivity. The article was entitled "La
Prensa: Gadfly of the Sandinista
state. The editors don't let the facts
get in the way" (March 7, 1988).
Many years have passed since
Alexis de Tocqueville recorded the
peculiar myopia that characterizes
American politics when it regards
other countries. This would seem to
be an inheritance that the American
press has made no effort to correct,
particularly when it moves south
of the Rio Grande.
As a poet I sympathize with
Pablo Antonio Cuadra-my other
persona, editor of La Prensa-who
has been forced to endure, for the
nine years of the Sandinista regime,
the almost daily visits of American
journalists. They always ask the
same questions-almost all of them
fervent admirers of what the Sandinistas have told them, contrary to
what they might read in the not-veryobjective La Prensa. And after the
questions and answers, the result
is always the same: a total lack of
comprehension.
It could be, of course, that we
are the ones who do not understand.
Possibly American journalists are
not really interested in the Nicaraguan problem but in certain internal
political problems in the US. It is
not that they are against the socalled "contras"; they are against
Reagan. Their objective is not the
victory of peace and democracy in
Central America but of the US
Congress against the White House.
On other occasions the lack
of understanding or the misconceptions are the result of a guilt
complex, sometimes quite well
developed. We may think they are
looking at the future; in truth, they
are contemplating their own past
and ours. They recognize how

wrong their country's policies have
been. After Vietnam, indecision
would appear to be the best decision
of all. But we Central Americans do
not have the luxury of fighting
within democracy. We are fighting to
establish it. That is quite another,
less comfortable, less easy matter.
Then you have the "liberals." The
liberal American journalist has the
largest conscience Diogenes's lantern will ever light upon. Unfortunately, its very breadth contains a
crucial contradiction. Such journalists are humanitarians who close
their eyes to offenses against human
rights. In my comfortless experience
I can testify that, among the American liberals I have known, the greatest nobility coexists with an
incorrigible naivete.

Another Sellout
If I were so inclined, I might luxuriate in the attention the American
press gives to President Daniel
Ortega's strident attacks against the
US government. After all, we still
have a few scores to settle with "the
Yankees;' and even a verbal reprisal
is a delicious treat for the Nicaraguan
nationalist sensibility. But it is
impossible not to notice the things
that are working precisely in the
opposite direction-the submission
to Castro and the intervention of the
USSR and the entire Soviet bloc in
the internal affairs of our country.
The strangest spectacle of all is the
wave of improbable foreigners-Vietnamese, Cambodians,
North Koreans, Bulgarians, East
Germans-flooding our landscape,
while a contrary current of thousands of Nicaraguans, young people
above all, flee into exile. We have
emptied Nicaragua of human
resources and replaced them with
people at once strange and totally
alien to our history, our customs,
our culture. The Russians and the
PLO kiss us on the lips. We are
addressed with endless bows by the
servants of Kim II Sung; we are
advised by Cuban neo-imperialists;
flocks of blond students help us,
badly, to pick coffee.

In effect, we have lost our historical privacy. For eight years we have
been the biggest story in the world
press, but also the biggest lie. We
have completely destroyed our economy in spite of the advice and
admonitions of high officials of the
regime since resigned; we have sacrificed a unity that our political history has almost never known; we
have provoked a civil war that consumes the same peasants and same
Indians for whom we fought; we
have provoked the hostility of neighboring countries, all to the benefit
of a single beneficiary, not our people, but a foreign power, the one
least respectful of the values of
nationalism that we proclaimed to
be our banner. We have taken in vain
the name of our 30,000 dead and
pushed a revolution off the rails.
Instead of a state for the people, we
have the people for the state.
Instead of power for the people,
once more, we have dictatorial
power imposed upon the people.
Once more, too, the pharaonic pyramid is repeated: the ruler above,
obedience below. On high a "vanguard" enjoys privilege. Below
the salt lies the broad, submissive
multitude.
"Who can say that this is communism?" a member of the US Congress asked me one day, with evident
sincerity. "It is not," I replied, "just
as the scaffold is not yet a house. We
are too close to the history of Cuba
not to see that what has been built
so far is an imitation of that model."
It may be quixotic to ask the press
of democratic countries-and above
all the press of a country that guides
the destinies of the free world-to
take the effort to distinguish
between plagiarism (covered by a
deceptive populist liturgy) and the
genuine creative liberty of a people.
Up to now Don Quixote has
not received a gentle reception. The
big lie seems to be more welcome
than a bloody truth. .

Editor'sNote: Edited version of an
articlepublishedin Resistencia, 2:4
(August 1988).
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The Contras as Political Gypsies
byJoe Eldridge

Bush's feeble declarations of commitment to
President contras,
George
the Nicaraguan
both Democratic and
Republican members of
Congress have declared
the contra project dead. Last fall
Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary
of state for Latin America and a
long-time contra booster, even
referred to the need for a "postcontra" policy. This need became
more pressing when, in February,
the presidents of Central American
nations renewed their commitment
to the regional peace process. Without increased military aid the war
will continue to wind down, leaving
stranded in Honduras thousands
of contra combatants and their
families.
Twice in 1988 Congress
approved contra-aid packages that
included food, clothing, and medicine. The last appropriation, engineered last fall by Senate Majority
Leader Robert Byrd, provided
$27 million in emergency relief. The
issue of contra aid will reemerge in
the spring when the 101st Congress
again tackles this troubling legacy
of Reagan's Central American policy.

Sespite

Who Wants the Contras?
What will happen to the contra
forces and to the tens of thousands
of Nicaraguan refugees living in
Honduras? What will happen to the
political stance of Honduras, which
has provided sanctuary to the
Nicaraguans? What steps can be
taken to prevent the armaments and
fighters from spawning bands of
marauders and drug traffickers that
Joe Eldridgeis a consultant on Central American affairs to the United
Methodist Church.
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could destabilize the region? Washington's scenarios, while providing
political refuge for the politicians,
fundamentally neglect the genuine
humanitarian needs of the contras
and the political needs of Honduras,
Washington's staunchest Central
American ally.
The mass exodus of Nicaraguans
to South Florida and California is
already putting severe strains on the
job market and social services of
those two areas. The addition of
contras and their families, on a large
scale, will exacerbate the problems.
Supporters and critics alike have
neglected the humanitarian needs of
the contras. To the Bush administration, the contras are strategic
players helping to carry out an antiSandinista foreign policy. To Honduras, the contras represent a threat
to social peace and territorial integrity. To the Sandinistas, they are an
implacable foe intent on rolling
back the revolution. To the US Congress, the contras are a nettlesome
problem that refuses to go away.
Rigid stereotypes about the contras (and the Sandinistas) have distorted the issues and undermined
thoughtful debate. Critics of US policy tend to portray the contras as
cutthroat mercenaries, neglecting to
mention that many of the foot soldiers are humble peasant farmers
swept up by chaos. The supporters
reserve similar epithets for the
Sandinistas, viewing the contras as
virtuous freedom fighters and
democrats. These images impede
serious discussion about the ultimate fate of the contras and their
families. Because abandoning these
stereotypes would be tantamount to
surrendering one's political bonafides, critics and supporters alike
make little effort to look beyond the
polemics.
The plight of the Nicaraguan ref-

ugees is often exploited by contra
supporters to emphasize Sandinista
tyranny. Others opposed to aid
sometimes become so preoccupied
with discrediting the contras that
they overlook the serious mistakes of
the Sandinistas that have led to the
Nicaraguan exodus. Repatriation
becomes a distinct possibility only to
the extent that errors are recognized-and corrected-on all sides.
While many people have fled
Nicaragua to escape the draft,
others have left because the meddlesome Sandinistas wanted to exert
state control over many aspects of
their lives. Hundreds of peasant
farmers have left Nicaragua precisely because they wanted to be left
alone. They did not want to be told
what to plant, when to plant, and to
whom to sell their crop and at what
price.
As in most wars the majority of
the refugees abandoned their homes
to escape the fighting. In interviews
at camps in Honduras, many refugees have indicated to me and other
observers they would consider
returning to Nicaragua if the war
ended and if the Sandinistas would
give them iron-clad guarantees that
they would neither suffer reprisals
nor be drafted. Obviously a decision
of this magnitude requires the commitments of the Sandinistas, the
contras, and the US government.
For other fighters and their
families, a return to Nicaragua is
unthinkable, at least for now. The
distrust is too deep and the ideological divisions are too pronounced
for healing to occur.

On the Road Again
Honduran tolerance of the contras
has reached its limit. With the
retirement of Ronald Reagan, their
most formidable advocate, and with

the chronic ambivalence of Congress regarding military assistance,
the Hondurans have asserted their
own political interests. Over the last
several months thousands of combatants and their families have
crossed the border into Honduras
to receive US aid. Nevertheless, the
presence of contras in Honduras is
unacceptable to the vast majority of
that country's citizens. A high foreign ministry official recently told
me that the government considers
the contras a more serious problem
for Honduras than for Nicaragua.
In September special envoy
Morris Busby created a furor when,
asked about the status of the contras, he replied, "They are in Honduras." Since then the US embassy
in Tegucigalpa has tried to reassure
Honduras that the US will not leave
Honduras holding the proverbial
bag. Unsatisfied with US assurances,
Honduran foreign minister Carlos
L6pez Contreras used the occasion
of last fall's UN General Assembly
meeting to propose the creation of a
multilateral peace-keeping force to
police the Honduran borders. The
prompt rejections by Secretary of
State George Shultz and the contra
leadership highlighted the proposal's importance. The Hondurans
hoped the peace-keeping force
would disarm the contra fighters.
The Hondurans have insisted all
along that the contras are Washington's problem. After all, they argue,
the US funded and trained the contras. Recent reports of contra trafficking in weapons and in USdonated food and medicine have
heightened Honduran anxiety and
resentment.
Despite their reluctance, material incentives can probably persuade Honduras to accept some of
the contras and their families. The
majority of these Nicaraguans will
inevitably have to look elsewhere.
Honduras has suggested that resettlement could occur in Costa Rica
and Guatemala, the region's neutral
countries. Predictably both countries have seemingly closed the door
on this alternative. As indicated by
the problems of the Nicaraguans

who are now fleeing to the US, the
onus necessarily falls on Congress
and the Bush administration to formulate a policy that responds to the
genuine humanitarian needs of the
contras and their families.
The fighters and the refugees
are already feeling the pain of abandonment by the US. The contras
who mutinied against their Reaganbacked leadership have been
ostracized and ignored. One former
combatant, interviewed last summer
in Miami, said he felt like the "paper
cup of this war, used and discarded"
(MiamiHerald,July 18, 1988).
A humanitarian solution to the
plight of the contras and other
Nicaraguan refugees is difficult but
not impossible. We can learn much
from the partial successes already
achieved in the repatriation of the
indigenous peoples-the Miskitos
and Sumus-who were uprooted
from their homes on Nicaragua's
Atlantic coast. Over the last several
months thousands of Miskitos and
Sumus have gone home, deciding
that putting up with the hardships
of Nicaragua is preferable to life
in Honduran refugee camps. The
growing impatience of the Honduran military, which recently
unleashed a campaign of harassment and intimidation against
Nicaraguan Miskitos and Sumus
living on the Honduran side of
the Coco River, has contributed to
the desire to return home. Also promoting repatriation has been an
unusual degree of cooperation
among the Honduran government,
the Sandinista government, and the
UN, which have guaranteed safe
passage.
Several organizations have
joined together to ease the trauma
of relocation. The International Red
Cross, the UN High Commission
on Refugees, other private development organizations, and the Sandinista government have helped thousands of Miskitos and Sumus to
resettle in Nicaragua by providing
food, clothing, and building
materials.
What should be done to the
Nicaraguans who remain in Hon-

duras? Emotion-laden language
must give way to dialogue about the
genuine needs and desires of the
fighters and refugee families. On
the one side, Nicaragua must guarantee total amnesty under the supervision of international monitors.
The Sandinistas must also offer
incentives, such as land, to encourage the return of the fighters and
refugees. On the other side, Honduras must participate in finding
opportunities for the permanent
resettlement of those Nicaraguans
who do not want to return home.
International agencies have
expressed their interest in assisting
with this process in Nicaragua,
Honduras, and Costa Rica.
The Nicaraguan government has
voiced its desire to facilitate the
repatriation of the thousands of refugees living in Honduras and Costa
Rica. Further, war-weary peasants
are willing to bind up the nation's
wounds by focusing on the task of
domestic reconciliation. When I
asked if they would live alongside the
contras, peasants who had just
experienced a contra attack
answered: "Why not? Nicaragua has
land here for everyone. What counts
is that we live in peace."
The Bush administration must
be prepared to play a pivotal role in
this process whether the ultimate
destination of the contras and their
families is Central America or elsewhere. Many of the contras, who
believe they are actually defending
the White House's interest, hope to
resettle in the US. The Honduran
government expects Washington to
"take care" of the contras-in the
US if necessary. Regardless of their
destination the Nicaraguan exiles
need material assistance.
Political oratory and expediency
must not take precedence over
humanitarian needs. Central America's war is winding down. Without
more US military aid, negotiation will
supplant the fighting. The US-from
the earliest days the central protagonist-must insure the contra fighters and their families have the chance
to rebuild their lives wherever they
choose to resettle. a

Hemisphere * Winter 1989

Reports: Brazil

Zoning the Brazilian Amazon:
Rond6nia
by Janet M. Chernela
he use of zoning to preserve critical areas of the
Amazon Basin was one
of the principal ideas
espoused by Francisco
"Chico" Mendes Filho,
the Brazilian ecologist
and labor leader who was assassinated on December 22, 1988.
Mendes suggested the demarcation
of forested areas as "use zones,"
restricting some zones to the extraction of resources such as rubber.
His objective was both to preserve
the forests of Amazonia and to
maintain their productivity for traditional economic activities like rubber collection. Mendes was not alone
in espousing a zoning, or multiuse,
method of resource management.
The same method is the earmark of
the UNESCO Man in the Biosphere
Program. But Mendes was remarkable in demonstrating the conservationist and economic viability of a
traditional approach to forest management and in integrating the
approach into a visionary model of
large-scale zoning.
On December 15, 1988-a week
before Mendes's assassination-the
state government of Rond6nia presented a proposal for the "socioeconomic and ecological zoning of
Rond6nia" to a visiting delegation of
US legislators (Didriodo Pard,
Belem, December 16). The proposal
outlines a series of objectives: to
preserve natural ecosystems; to
restore environmentally-degraded
areas; and to set aside areas for
managing sustainable resources, for
preserving traditional economic
activities, for developing new economic activities, and for maintainJanet M. Chernelais assistantprofessor of anthropology at Florida
InternationalUniversity.
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ing national security. One of the
goals is to protect indigenous peoples and others who earn their living
in extractive activities such as fishing and rubber tapping. The document voices concern for "the
territorial integrity of these communities" and their protection from
"the impact of external forces."
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According to the document,
55,000 poor rural families will benefit. Ninety-five percent of these families work in small-scale agriculture
and the remaining 5 percent are
engaged in extractive activities. The
initiative contains incentives for
the cultivation of cocoa, coffee, rubber, and wood. It anticipates a total
cost of $250 million and requests
that the World Bank provide
$150 million.
The proposal, which must win

the approval of the Ministries of
Agrarian Reform and the Interior,
seems to be an effort to repair the
damage caused by the controversial
Polonoroeste project. A combination of roadworks and colonization,
Polonoroeste has brought 160,000
newcomers a year into Rond6nia
since the late 1970s. In just a decade
the project has removed one-fifth
of the state's forest cover. The World
Bank, as the principal lender for
Polonoroeste, has been widely criticized by international environmental groups. The environmentalists
contend the Bank's requirements for
ecological safeguards are either
insufficient or not enforced. In
response to such criticism the Bank
has become increasingly attentive to
ecological issues. Consequently the
Rond6nia proposal was undoubtedly a product of "Bank diplomacy."
There are several potential problems, however. For example, the proposal fails to specify what portion of
Rond6nia would fall under zoning
regulation. If the entire state is to be
regulated, as the document suggests, why would the project benefit
only 55,000 families when the total
population of Rondonia is 1 million
people? Perhaps the most serious
flaw is that the proposal inadequately discusses means of implementation. It is unclear how the
project, if approved by the Brazilian
government and the World Bank,
would be carried out.
Nonetheless, a plan for resource
management in Rond6nia is long
overdue. Environmental zoning,
which simultaneously addresses economic and ecological problems, is a
promising approach. The implementation of a well-conceived zoning project in Rondonia would serve
as a model for resource management in other Amazonian states.

A Martyred Environmentalist
by William T Vickers

D

December 22, 1988,

Francisco Mendes
uring
evening
of
Filho, the
a leading
Brazilian environmentalist,
was killed by a shotgun
blast as he stepped outside his home in the frontier town
of Xapuri, Acre. Mendes was the
president of the Union of Rural
Workers, a labor organization of the
seringueiros,or rubber collectors,
whose livelihood depends on the
wild rubber trees of the Amazon
rain forest. A man of humble birth,
Mendes had been a simple rubber
collector ("tapper") who was known
to his friends as "Chico." His leadership qualities emerged in the
mid-1970s as he helped to organize
the Union of Rural Workers. He
later manifested these qualities in a
difficult and bloody struggle to
defend the tappers' territories
against expropriation and deforestation by cattle ranchers, lumbermen,
and settlers.
Mendes proved to be an effective
spokesman and lobbyist for forest
conservation. Primarily through his
efforts the concept of the "extractive reserve" gained currency and
was officially implemented in the
state of Acre and elsewhere in the
Brazilian Amazon. The creation
of such protected areas placed
Mendes's movement in direct conflict with ranchers and would-be
landowners, who made repeated
attempts on his life and the lives of
other rubber tappers and activists.
Historically, rubber tappers have
been among the most abused laboring classes in Brazil. Like many
tropical plant species, rubber trees
William T Vickers is associateprofessor
of anthropology at FloridaInternational University.

occur as scattered individuals
throughout the forest. Each tapper
has his own estradas,or trails, that
he works on alternating days. He
makes fresh cuts on the tree trunks
in the morning and collects the latex
after the midday meal. Later in the
afternoon or evening the collector
curdles the latex by slowly ladling it
onto a spit that he rotates over a
smoky fire, eventually forming the
crude rubber ball that he sends to
market.

The physical conditions of rubber collecting are lonely and harsh.
But the traditional system of labor
relations in this extractive enterprise was even worse. A system of
debt-peonage prevailed in which all
of the collectors on a particular river
or section of a river worked under a
trader or seringalista.The trader
provided basic supplies to his collectors and purchased their rubber.
Because the traders manipulated
the account books, most rubber
tappers quickly fell into debt and
became bound to their traders. This
relationship benefited the traders

because of the traditional scarcity of
labor in Amazonia. Some rubber
barons employed private armies that
enforced the virtual enslavement of
their rubber tappers. The tappers'
attempts to escape often resulted
in torture and death.
Although it abused human
beings, the traditional rubber system did not destroy the rain forest.
The dispersed rubber trees dictated
a dispersed labor force. In the heyday of the rubber boom most collectors did not clear gardens for food;
traders provided their staples to
maximize collecting time and hence
profits. Amazonian rubber lost its
dominance in the market after 1912
when most of the production shifted
to more efficient Asian plantations,
causing a dramatic decline in world
prices. The glittering excesses of
Brazil's rubber boom era faded as
the Amazon entered a period of economic depression. Nevertheless, the
main economic activities of the
region continued to involve the
piecemeal extraction of forest products, including rubber.
Francisco "Chico" Mendes came
from such circumstances. He was a
tapper who collected latex, Brazil
nuts, and other products from trees
in the forest. It was a hard life with
barely enough earnings to cover the
needs of a family living in an isolated hut beside a jungle river. But,
insofar as the rain forest survived,
it was a sustainable life.
By the 1970s a wave of settlers,
ranchers, lumbermen, and miners
threatened the Amazonian forests.
This wave resulted, in part, from
government development schemes
and tax incentives. Mendes and the
other members of the Union of
Rural Workers conducted many
demonstrations to block the razing
of forest lands. Mendes's soft-spoken
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Reports: Brazil

nature and nonviolent tactics led
some to call him the "Gandhi of the
Amazon." He was certainly a man
of courage, for he knew well that the
history of Amazonian conflicts is
written in blood, not compromise.
In rural Brazil brute force and
the law of the gun often prevail.
Ranchers, mine owners, and other
landholders hire pistoleiros, or gunmen, to intimidate or kill peasants,
squatters, Indians, priests, and anyone else they wish to evict from their
claims. The Brazilian government
rarely prosecutes such crimes.
Indeed, the large landowners portray themselves as champions of
order and progress in the struggle
against leftist agitators, subversive
elements, and foreign influences.
Their powerful organization, the
Rural Democratic Union, is an
effective opponent of agrarian
reform in Brazil.

In 1987 Mendes lobbied the
Inter-American Development Bank
against a loan to finance the construction of a highway of penetration into Acre. In order to secure
the loan the Brazilian government
announced its intention to establish
a number of ecological reserves.
The government designated some of
these as "extractive reserves" to
protect the forest while allowing the

small-scale collection of renewable
resources such as rubber, fruits, and
nuts. These special reserves will benefit Amazonian Indians and the rubber tappers. In this context, whites
and natives forged a conservationist
alliance, with about 10,000 Indians
joining Mendes's Union of Rural
Workers. In 1987 the UN Environmental Program recognized Mendes's
effectiveness as a conservationist
when it honored him with a Global

500 Award.
Mendes's rising star aroused the
ire of ranchers who coveted the
lands now designated as protected
forest areas. In the aftermath of his
murder, the police launched an
investigation and arrested several
members of a prominent Xapuri
family for their alleged involvement
in the crime. National and international protest and media coverage
have forced the police to respond.
With breathtaking speed, Chico
Mendes has become an inspiration
and martyr for the environmental
cause.
The struggle to protect the rain
forests of the Amazon requires constant vigilance. Acre's governor,
Flaviano Melo, is promoting the
concept of a new highway to link the
state capital of Rio Branco with the
Peruvian frontier city of Pucallpa.

This road would connect with the
trans-Andean highway to Lima and
its Pacific port of Callao. Melo
argues that, because Brazil's ports
are much farther away, the 1,000mile route is a key to the effective
marketing of Acre's forest products.
The route would also facilitate the
export of Brazilian soybean, grain,
and meat to the Pacific Rim.
Much to the chagrin of environmentalists, Melo has approached
Japan concerning the financing of
the estimated $300-million project.
The world's foremost consumer of
tropical hardwoods, Japan sees
Amazonian timber as a replacement
for its declining sources in Malaysia
and Indonesia.
Melo contends the road should be
built under his administration to
insure that environmental safeguards will be observed. Despite his
attempt to align himself with the legacy of Chico Mendes, experience
shows Amazonian road construction
unleashes processes of colonization
and deforestation that resist all
attempts at regulation. If the Rio
Branco-Pucallpa highway is completed, Acre's forests are likely to
suffer the massive devastation that
has occurred in the neighboring
state of Rond6nia. .

Central American Studies:
Toward a New Research Agenda
Social Science Research Council
Working Group on Central America
US, Canada, PR, USVI, $8; elsewhere, $10. Please send check or money order to:

Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
University Park
Miami, FL 33199
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The first international
scholarly journal to focus exclusively
on Mexico!
Now in its fourth year, Mexican
Studies/Estudios Mexicanos publishes articles in English and Spanish
in such disciplines as anthropology,
history, economics, political
science and sociology.

Sponsored cooperatively by the
University of California Consortium
on the United States and Mexico
and the Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico.
Twice a year. Subscriptions: $15 individuals; $30
institutions (outside the U.S. add $3). Send orders
to University of California Press Journals,
Berkeley, California 94720.
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Saying One Thing,
Doing Another ...
Two recent developments indicate
that, despite Fidel Castro's emphasis
on anticapitalist "rectification" and
his skepticism about Soviet-style
"perestroika,"Cuba is eager for foreign investments in specific sectors.
One of these is petroleum-where
the country is now producing
1 million tons of crude a year-half
from Matanzas province. Spanish
and Soviet investments have financed
a new oil terminal in the Bay of Matanzas at a cost of about $60 million.

"Foggy Bottom Freedom Fighter"?
Important nuggets of information
can be found in Elliott Abrams's
exit interview on Reagan policy in
Latin America. The former assistant
secretary of state for inter-American
affairs assesses Latin America's
recent experience with and prospects for democracy, and discusses
other matters such as relations
between the executive branch and
Congress on Central American
issues. According to Abrams, House
speaker Jim Wright was "impossible
to work with." While Abrams was
complimentary of the foreign service, he argues the "Department of
State as an institution has shown an
inability to defend itself from one of
its greatest enemies on earth, the US
Congress" (Policy Review, Winter

1989).

State Department's recent "diplomacy of defeat" in dealing with
communist regimes in Nicaragua,
Afghanistan, and Angola. But
Menges does not stop with State.
His Inside the National Security Council (Simon and Schuster, 1988) is one
of the few conservative critiques of
Oliver North's activities while at the
NSC. No wonder Menges is known
by friend and foe alike as "Constant
Menace."

Capital Flight
Panama's foreign exchange reserves
... they've shrunk from about $20.6
billion at the end of 1987 to about
$7 billion in July 1988. An estimated
30% of this capital flight has found
its way to Miami.

Presidential Pecadillos
Andres Oppenheimer reported in
the Miami Herald (December 11,
1988) that Presidential Concubines
(1988), written and published by
Carlos Capriles Ayala, is the hottest
selling book in Venezuela. Alleging
that all of Venezuela's presidents,
from Bolivar to Carlos Andr6s
Perez, have had mistresses, the book
has sold more than 45,000 copies.
The issue of presidential mistresses
has had a growing public-affairs
impact because of the high profile
of Blanca Ibaiez, Jaime Lusinchi's
companion during his recently
completed presidency.

iQuidn tiene la culpa?

iEl gringo del altiplano?

The latest hammering of the US foreign service comes from Constantine C. Menges, whose Policy Review
(Fall 1988) article emphasizes the

In Orbita-Bip... the Bolivian political leader Gonzalo Sanchez Lozada
has been given the nod to be the
country's next president. Why?
According to the Caracas-based
publication, "Goni," as he is known,

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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believes that a second-place finish in
the May 1989 presidential election is
as good as a victory because neither
the left nor the right can tolerate a
victory by the other. With this deadlock the electoral outcome will be
determined by the congress, which
will opt for Sanchez, the candidate
of the incumbent party, the Movimiento NacionalistaRevolucionario.
According to the publication, Sanchez "speaks Spanish with a marked
North American accent, but his
mentality is Bolivian hasta la medula
(to the bone marrow)."

Cueca Solo (They Dance Alone)
Have you listened to Sting's latest
song, "Cueca Solo," on the album
... Nothing Like the Sun (A&M
Records)? Based on the "cueca,"
Chile's traditional courting dance,
"Cueca Solo" asks "Why are these
women here dancing on their own?"
The song resulted from the 1986
Amnesty Tour, when traveling musicians had the opportunity to meet
victims of torture and government
repression.

Roots Rock
Hot new albums that will appeal
to Latin music buffs are Ruben
Blades's Antecedente and Los
Lobos's La pistola y el coraz6n.
Blades is the Panamanian musician
who popularized "crossover" music.
His latest album reflects his feelings
for the people and places of Panama. Los Lobos highlight the use of
indigenous guitars and harps in
their most recent album interpretation of traditional Mexican music.

Watch Out
Three US journalists were recently
awarded Alicia Patterson Founda-

E

tion grants to write books focusing
on Latin America. Sam Dillon of the
Miami Herald, Pam Constable of
the Boston Globe, and free-lancer
Michael Massing will use foundation support to examine respectively
the contra war, Pinochet's impact
on Chile, and US counterinsurgency
doctrine.

The CBI: A Second Look
In Gateway, the Greater Miami
Chamber of Commerce's international economic development publication, international trade attorney
Lee Sandler has suggested that
pending legislation on the CBI
(CBI-II), sponsored by Rep. Sam
Gibbons (D-FL) and Sen. Bob
Graham (D-FL), should focus on
risk reduction. Questioning the
common wisdom that expansion of
duty-free treatment for imports is
the means to enhance CBI's impact,
Sandler suggests that the lack
of adequate or available insurance
coverage is a significant obstacle
to potential investors. The solution? "Increase OPIC insurance
coverage."

806.30-807.00 Redux
The US International Trade Commission has released a multivolume
report on the use and economic
impact of tariff items 806.30 and
807.00. These measures provide duty
concessions for domestic products
that are reimported to the US in
conjunction with foreign processing
and/or assembly. Leading supplier
countries are Mexico (54%), Canada
(14%), and the Caribbean states
(10%). Prepared for the House Subcommittee on Trade, the studies are
useful instruments for researchers
and investment analysts concerned
with the employment impact of offshore manufacturing.

You May Need These
The Center for Immigration Policy
and Refugee Assistance at Georgetown University has published a set
of useful and timely studies on Central American migration to the US.
An analysis by Segundo Montes and
Juan Jose Garcia VAsquez estimates
that there may be as many as 900,000
Salvadorans now living in the US.
(El Salvador's population is approximately 5 million.) Another study, by
Sergio Aguayo and Patricia Weiss
Fagen, calls for greater involvement
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing refugee and safe-haven
protection in the US.

On the Move
Susan Kaufman Purcell is now vice
president for Latin American affairs
of the Americas Society. Formerly
with the Council of Foreign Relations, where she published Debt and
the Restructuringof Mexico (June
1988), Purcell will coordinate a
series of study groups focusing on
the impact of Europe '92 on Latin
America and the US, and the impact
of detente on Soviet and US relations with Latin America.
Antonio Valle Vallejo, who was
Gabriel Garcia MArquez's assistant
at the Foundation of New Latin
American Cinema in Havana, was
assigned by the novelist to represent
him last June at a film festival in
Bogota. Valle accepted the assignment
-it would be his first trip outside the
island. Once in BogotA, he found
the US Embassy, asked for asylum,
and is now in Miami. Reports are
that an indignant Garcia MArquez
belatedly requested that Colombian
president Virgilio Barco return
Valle.

Lillian Pubillones, formerly on the
staff of the House Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs, is now
executive director of the Coalition
for the Advancement of Foreign
Languages and International

Studies (CAFLIS). CAFLIS brings
together 128 national groups representing the foreign language, teaching, and social studies communities
in the US. It hopes to convince
US policymakers of the vital link
between competitiveness and international education and language
training. A major agenda item will
be the possibility of creating a
"national endowment for international studies," similar to the
National Science Foundation.
Peter Eisner, senior editor of foreign news at Newsday for five years, is
moving to Miami to resume work as
a foreign correspondent. The former Associated Press reporter
already has extensive experience in
Latin America, having covered the
news in Central America, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Brazil.
Roberto G. Fernandez recently
published RainingBackwards (Houston: Arte Piiblico, 1988). The
surreal novel is a series of short autobiographical vignettes about a multigeneration family of Cuban exiles in
Miami.
Jackie Tillman, formerly director
for Latin America on the National
Security Council, was named
executive director of the Cuban
American National Foundation in
Washington, DC last October. A
Jeane Kirkpatrick protege, Tillman
has worked in the United Nations
and at the American Enterprise
Institute. Under her tutelage expect
more public affairs conferences and
publications addressing the human
rights situation in Cuba and that
country's foreign policy.
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Upside-Down Decolonization
by Rosemarijn Hofte and Gert Oostindie

pendence of Holland's
Caribbean possessions
he
forquestions
the indeareprospects
clouded by
of economic viability
and political fragmentation, as well as domestic
politics in the Netherlands. The
Antilleans understandably hold that
these problems need to be solved
before changes in the relationship
with the Netherlands can be
addressed.
With Aruba things are different.
According to the 1983 amendments
to the law (Statuut)that governs
decolonization, this island must
become independent in 1996. But
neither the Aruban government nor
the population is willing to take this
final step because they are content
with their present status as an
autonomous partner in the Dutch
Kingdom.
The most extreme scenario
would make the Netherlands Antilles a Dutch overseas province. The
almost unanimous opinion of politicians in the Netherlands and the
Dutch Caribbean is that this option
is not preferable. The larger islands
certainly would not want to take
such a regressive step. Nevertheless,
Rosemarijn Hofte and Gert Oostindie
are anthropologistsin the Caribbean
Section of The Royal Instituteof
Language,Geography and Folklore,
in Leiden, The Netherlands.
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it is not out of the question that in
case of further fragmentation of the
Netherlands Antilles, smaller islands
such as Saba, Bonaire, and St.
Eustatius would eventually opt for
the status of the 13th province of the
Netherlands. Saba and Bonaire have
already expressed their interest in
doing so.
If some, or all, of the islands
choose to become a sort of Department d'Outre Mer, each island would
become a separate municipality with
a so-called "Article 12" status. This
means that each island would be
under the financial tutelage of the
Dutch state. Such an arrangement
could provoke the possibility of
growing Antillean resentment
against renewed Dutch involvement
in local affairs.
When discussing the decolonization of small islands, such as the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba,
one wonders why the metropole
wants such mini-states to become
independent. What is the burden it
finds too heavy to carry? Sociologist
Harry Hoetink has suggested that
Dutch policymakers fear two things:
a revisit to the social unrest and rioting of "Willemstad 1969" and mass
migration from the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba to the Netherlands. A third fear might be added:
the financial costs.

Responsibilities and Image
In our interview with the Dutch

minister of Social Affairs and
Netherlands Antilles Affairs, Jan de
Koning, his Excellency volunteered
his view on decolonization. Koning
preferred the term "decolonialization" to "decolonization." This was
not meant to be a play on words. He
emphasized that, since the signing
of the Statuut, relations in the Dutch
system are no longer regarded as
"colonial," a fact recognized by the
UN. The minister underlined that
the Netherlands, the Netherlands
Antilles, and Aruba are equal partners, even though the former nation
supplies financial and technical
assistance. Moreover, in the area of
foreign relations the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba are included in
relevant negotiations and treaty
signings. In short, the Caribbean
partners possess a high degree of
autonomy, in spite of the social and
cultural traces the colonial past may
have left.
Koning's remarks are justified.
Yet they are telling with regard to
the Dutch concern with world
image. Many Dutch felt the events of
May 1969 severely tarnished this
image. Even though no shot was
fired and the Dutch were required
by Article 43 in the Statuut to
restore order, the episode left a bitter taste for two main reasons.
First, the Dutch, especially the
young, believed the Netherlands
should lead Europe and the US in
improving relations with the Third

S

World. They resented their country's
seeming reversion to its old role as
a colonial power ready to intervene
when its interests are threatened.
Some politicians like Koning still
talk about May 1969 as a nightmare
for both the Netherlands Antilles
and the Netherlands. But the majority of the Dutch do not think the
international community still labels
the Netherlands as a colonial power,
or did so even in 1969. Ironically,
pushing the Netherlands Antilles
into independence today might be
considered a repulsive colonial act.
A second difficulty concerns
Article 43, which mandates the
Dutch to guarantee "adequate
administration" of their overseas territories. Article 43 stipulates that
the Dutch government may be called
upon to control internal unrest.
"May 1969" suggests this provision
is no dead letter. Most Antillean politicians do not resent the "colonial"
connotations of this part of the article, but would not mind if it were
removed. Henny Eman, the former
prime minister of Aruba, has said
that internal defense and adequate
administration are "our own
responsibility; we will never call
upon the Netherlands for help as far
as these are concerned."
The Dutch are still uneasy,
though. Despite their obligation to

intervene, they are not supposed to
exert any influence on Antillean politics. Nevertheless, with the constitutional and economic problems in the
Netherlands Antilles, Dutch involvement has intensified to the dismay of
politicians in the Netherlands. With
this growing involvement Dutch
disaffection with the political system in the Netherlands Antilles has
increased proportionally. The
nature of Antillean politics, including relatively large social and eco-

nomic inequalities and patronage, is
not always appreciated by the more
Calvinistically-inclined officials and
politicians in The Hague.
In addition to internal order,
Article 43 covers the external security of the Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba. External defense is a hornets' nest. The Antilleans and
Arubans cannot defend themselves,
yet the Dutch are not able to do
much more than show the flag in the
hope it will thwart outside aggressors. At present, such external
threats seem relatively remote. The
Dutch presence in the Caribbean
still provides some stability in a volatile region, much to the satisfaction

external security is the disputed
point. In contrast, Koning thinks
the obligatory Dutch guarantees of
internal security and decent administration under Article 43 are the
main problems, because they interfere with the autonomy of the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
The latter problem seems easier to
solve than the external defense
issue.
In short, the provision for intervening in the case of internal or
external threats will probably serve
as a stimulus to Dutch desires to
decolonize and an irritant in future
relationships between the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles,
and Aruba.

Migration

of the US and Venezuela. Major
problems, however, could develop if
the Statuut is changed or revoked,
leaving no adequate provisions for
defense. The vacuum could be filled
by other powers, thereby threatening Antillean sovereignty.
It seems Article 43 will become
one of the major issues in discussions regarding constitutional
changes in the Statuut. Minister
Koning and former Netherlands
prime minister Barend Biesheuvel
are most specific in identifying why
the Netherlands wants to discard its
responsibilities vis-a-vis the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Both refer
to Article 43. Biesheuvel argues

The inhabitants of the Netherlands
Antilles have Dutch passports and
are thus entitled to unrestrained settlement and social benefits in the
Netherlands. Independence will take
away Dutch nationality and close the
borders. It may thereby limit mass
migration to the Netherlands. Fortunately the future of the Netherlands Antilles is not a major issue in
the Netherlands; Dutch political
parties do not openly seek to capitalize on latent xenophobia. All parties
deny that racism or xenophobia
plays any role in their decisions.
Instead, other reasons, such as costs
incurred to the islands by the brain
drain and the bad employment situation for Antilleans and Arubans in
the Netherlands, are used to defend
measures limiting the number of
incoming migrants.
The liberal-conservative Peoples'
Party for Freedom and Democracy
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) yearly calls in parliament for stricter admission rules, yet
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never receives support from any
other major party. The VVD seems
to be guided by the spectre of the
Surinamese exodus of the 1970s. On
the eve of independence in 1975, or
shortly after, 150,000 people (onethird of the total Surinamese population) settled in the Netherlands.
The VVD claims this led to political
and economic disaster in Suriname
and represented a burden on the
Dutch welfare state, because Surinamese immigrants-as Dutch citizens-were entitled to social
benefits. A brain drain will leave the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
with a shortage of trained executives. The problem with this argument is that it easily might be
abused to cover less noble motives
to limit migration.
The total "ethnic" population of
the Netherlands is an estimated
700,000 people, or less than 10 percent of the population. Approximately 50,000 of these "ethnics" are
from the Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba, islands which have a total
population of 260,000. More than 40
percent of these Antillean and
Aruban migrants are unemployed.
This situation makes their position
in the Netherlands vulnerable. It
also gives rise to local resentment
against "the foreigners" who put
pressure on the Dutch entitlement
structure. Support for racist parties
declined in the parliamentary elections of 1986. Nevertheless, it seems
that many Dutch citizens have
reached the limits of tolerance and
acceptance of foreigners. This, too,
may influence Dutch policy.
On the other side of the ocean,
the Antillean and Aruban governments use the migration issue to put
pressure on their Dutch counterpart. They sometimes cunningly
threaten that immigration to the
Netherlands will escalate if the
Dutch, for example, refuse to
increase their financial assistance to
balance the budget or if the Netherlands tells them to prepare for independence. Such threats, which
indeed frighten many Dutch politicians and citizens alike, seem to be
one of the few trumps the Antilleans
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and Arubans are holding in their
negotiations with The Hague. Of
course this could also be a selfdefeating argument, prompting the
Dutch to curtail free immigration.

Finances
Former Aruban prime minister
Eman thinks Dutch financial support is a factor in decisions regarding the future of the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba. One of the most
important goals of his administration was to become financially independent: "Money should not cloud
decisions on your constitutional
future,:' he said.
In these islands development aid
per capita is among the highest in
the world. The Netherlands disburses about 25 billion guilders per
year to its partners overseas. This
amount excludes defense, administration ofjustice, and occasional
budget support. The sum is fixed at
5 percent of the Dutch development
aid budget, which in turn is fixed at
1 percent of the total budget. Per
capita, this is Dfl1000 or $500, many
times more than the aid from all
other sources that the Englishspeaking Caribbean receives.
Most Dutch politicians we have
talked to confide that money is of no

consequence in the debate, and
some even call the amount of financial support "peanuts." Only the
VVD representative expresses some
reservations. His party thinks the
remittance of money from the
Netherlands to the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba is "excessively
high." Two arguments are used.
Poorer countries in the world may
have stronger claims and the Dutch
have experienced painful cuts in the
social and educational budgets. In
other words, the money might otherwise be used to balance the budget
in the Netherlands.
Antilleans counter these arguments with arguments of their own.
First, the Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba have a 300-year-old tie with
the Netherlands that makes them
special. This argument is supported
by some Dutch politicians, especially
older ones. Second, Antilleans
rightly claim that they must cut their
budget more drastically than their
Dutch colleagues. Another argument is that development aid sustains a high standard of living and
high wages in the Dutch Caribbean,
a disadvantage in the intraCaribbean competition for investments and employment. Antilleans
correctly stress, however, that this
standard is not a consequence of
development aid but of past industrial activity, particularly in the oil
sector.
Even though most Dutch say
they want the amount of aid to
remain the same, some of them suggest that the donor country should
have a larger voice in allocation.
This is a new development. During
the past two decades, presenting the
money with strings attached was
"not done." In the 1980s even social
democrats support Koning's viewpoint that the Netherlands should
direct and control the spending of
its development aid. Stimulation of
social and economic development,
not theaters or community development projects, should be its thrust,
they say.
Dutch politicians deny that the
possible independence of the Caribbean partners, most likely followed

by a commonwealth construction,
would have consequences for the
amount of Dutch aid to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. A VVD
spokesperson suggests that aid may
be reduced if the status quo is maintained, rather than when the islands
become independent. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, nonetheless, may express some reservations
about Dutch guarantees for development aid. After all, following the
so-called "December murders" of
1982, when the Surinamese military
junta executed 15 members of the
opposition, the Dutch suspended all
economic aid to the former colony.
In short, the islands may rightly feel
the Statuut offers more guarantees
for financial support than any other
treaty between the Netherlands and
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
ever will.

Why Independence?
Do the Dutch want to extricate
themselves from their "colonial"
relationship because of political
pressure from the rank and file in
the metropole or because there is a
lack of interest for the welfare of the
citizens overseas? Or is it just the
opposite: Dutch concern for the
welfare of their overseas territories?
There might, of course, be another
reason for decolonization: using the
threat of independence as a lever to
influence Antillean and Aruban politics. Finally, there may exist a general uneasiness about the idea of
having "dependencies" in the late
20th century.
The first two motives seem
unlikely explanations of Dutch policy, since the overseas territories are
not a political issue in the Netherlands. One Curagaoan politician
even complains about this "detrimental lack of interest." Probably
the only way the overseas territories
could move into the limelight is
when the Netherlands Antilles or
Aruba make negative headlines, as
happened in May 1969, or when
demagogy gets the upper hand,
expressed in xenophobia, or if the
cost of keeping the islands afloat is

set off against cutbacks in the Dutch
welfare system.
Even among policymakers, whose
actions are guided predominantly by
Dutch interests, a total absence of
concern for citizens in the West
Indies seems no ground to push the
Netherlands Antilles into independence. Some genuinely believe independence would help the development
of the territories. This argument,
rejecting continued dependence,
receives support in Aruba and the
Netherlands Antilles. When we asked
the Aruban pro-independence
politician, the late H. S. "Betico"
Croes, why his country should
become independent, he answered,
"That question has been answered
by more than 140 countries. You have
to fend for yourself and accept
your own responsibility." Antillean
premier Maria Liberia Peters expresses it even more crisply, "It's your
pride, it's your dignity."

As real as these nationalist sentiments are, they do not reveal the
actual dynamics that characterize
the present decolonization process.
Indeed, to the Antillean, the idea of
independence is a long-term one,
not a matter for immediate implementation. The Dutch, though, are
faced with a dilemma. On the one
hand, many policymakers in the
Netherlands want independence for

the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
mainly because of their qualms
about a colonial relationship as we
approach the magic year 2000.
Words such as "unnatural," "anachronistic," and even "futureless" are
used to express these misgivings.
Supposedly, the wheel of history dictates that independence is the next
logical step for the Caribbean partners. A member of the Dutch parliament, however, implies it is not so
much the wheel of history as it is the
wheel of politics that directs the
future of the Netherlands Antilles
and Aruba: "It is hard to retrace
one's steps if there exists no immediate reason to do so."
On the other hand, Antillean
resistance to any clear-cut and
immediate independence might
tempt the Dutch to use the idea as a
threat, indeed, as a punishment, to
achieve two goals. First, the threat
applies pressure on the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba to balance their
budgets and reorganize their disproportionately large civil services.
Obviously the Dutch minister of
Antillean affairs cannot reveal
whether he employs the threat of
independence as an incentive to
ensure that the islands change their
financial and administrative ways.
But some experts doubt such a line
of action would have any effect,
since nobody reckons with a forced
independence. Secondly, and much
more effectively, the threat suppresses possible inclinations in
other islands towards attaining a
separate status. When, for example,
St. Maarten in 1988 expressed its
desire to become a separate country
within the Kingdom, the Dutch
answer was clear: the choice is
between participating in the Antillesof-five or outright independence.
The upshot is that decolonization in the Dutch Caribbean departs
from previous patterns and experiences. It is an "upside-down"
process. Since a colonially-imposed
independence is not expected, what
is unfolding is a complex and often
perplexing, but in the final analysis
eminently-civilized, minuet between
metropole and colonies. .
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Politics and Militarism in Suriname
by Gary Brana-Shute

of Suriname's 370,000
population resided in and
efore
thethe
1980
coupand
most
around
capital
only city, Paramaribo.
The Creoles (AfroSurinamese) dominated
the urban and suburban areas and
high positions in civil service and
business. The Hindustanis (East
Indians) and the Javanese (Indonesians) were agriculturalists. The Syrians, Lebanese, Chinese, Dutch, and
Sephardim were found in urban
trades, mid-level civil service positions, modest shops, and importing
houses. The vast and underexploited savanna and rain-forest interior was home to several groups of
American Indians and six groups of
Bush Negroes (Maroons).
Three parties dominated the
political scene through the 1960s
and 1970s: the Creole Surinamese
National Party (NationalePartijSuriname, NPS), the Hindustani Progressive Reform Party (Vooruitstrevende HeroormingsPartij,VHP), and
the Javanese Indonesian Peasants
Party (Kaum Tani PersatuanIndonesia, KTPI). They divided power
among themselves in an atmosphere
of political wheeling and dealing,
including patronage that greased
palms up and down the social structure. Party politics worked best
when both NPS and VHP were
members of a coalition government.
KTPI regularly joined with either
the Creoles or the Hindustanis when
the latter two groups could not collaborate, thus providing the swing
vote in times of acute CreoleHindustani rivalry. Two narrow
Creole-Javanese victories in 1973
and 1977 led to consecutive govern-
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Gary Brana-Shuteis an anthropologist
at the University of Utrecht in Holland.
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ments that excluded the Hindustanis from power. The country
was tense and angry; development
policies were corrupt, shortsighted,
and vague.

The brittle structure of power
finally snapped. The result was a
coup fomented by 16 army noncommissioned officers. For many there
was joy and hope that the young sergeants would restore a balance to
politics, clean up corruption, and
move the country ahead. But the
sergeants proclaimed a revolution,
collaborated closely with small
groups of radical leftist politicians,
established relationships with Cuba,
Grenada, and Nicaragua, and ruled
with a heavy and increasingly bloody

hand. By late 1982 the people's support evaporated and the military
resorted to thuggery to maintain
power.
Seven civilian cabinets followed.
They themselves were maneuvering
to gain power. But neither the military nor the civilians gained mass
support. Despite efforts to create a
revolutionary Peoples' Mobilization
(Volks Mobilisatie), these cadres, redolent with promised patronage and
nerks ,erks
did not
connect
with tradidi
no..
n......

tional social organizations at the
grassroots level.

Transition
In Suriname each ethnic group has
its own array of social, religious, and
political organizations. One example from the urban Creoles should
suffice. Most urban Creole women
belong to a variety of clubs, societies, and associations that are vertically integrated from the household
level to the highest levels of national
political power, where the organizations serve as instruments of powerholders. Anthropologist Rosemary
Brana-Shute reports that "teams"
of women are bundled together at
the household (oso) and subneighborhood (birti)levels in mutual exchange
and support networks. Building on
these, the women have created burial
societies (fonsoe), rotating credit
organizations (kas moni), and social
clubs to celebrate shared rites of
passage (straativereniging).
As political arms (politiekekernen)
of NPS, most of these social groups
remained active throughout the
revolutionary period. The groups
were permeated by symbols of
"womanness,"' particularly the role
of mother-nurturer, respectful, disciplined, sexually active, and, often,
defiant of the whims, boastings, and
unreliability of men. Much of their
activity was articulated with the
Creole religious system (winti)and
gatherings often took on a deeply
spiritual air when African spirits and
ancestral ghosts joined in the proceedings of the living.
The Peoples' Mobilization
attempted to graft its priorities "top
down" onto these neighborhood
groups through the instrument of
Peoples' Committees (Volkscomitees).
They failed for a number of reasons,

Hemisphere
A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Provokingdebate on the region'sproblems,
initiatives and achievements ...
Providingan intellectualbridge between the concernedpublics
of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Hemis here
A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Provokingdebate on the region'sproblems,
initiativesand achievements ...
Providingan intellectualbridge between the concernedpublics
of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Hemisphere
A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Provokingdebate on the region'sproblems,
initiativesand achievements ...

Providingan intellectual bridge between the concernedpublics
of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Subscribe now! And get a year (3 issues) of Hemisphere.
O $14 US, Canada, PR, USVI

O $22 elsewhere

Name
Address
City/State/Province/Zip
Country

Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Miami, FL 33199
Hemisphere is published three times a year (Fall, Winter and Spring).

Subscribe now! And get a year (3 issues) of Hemisphere.
0 $14 US, Canada, PR, USVI

] $22 elsewhere

Name
Address
City/State/Province/Zip
Country

Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Miami, FL 33199
Hemisphere is published three times a year (Fall, Winter and Spring).

Subscribe now! And get a year (3 issues) of Hemisphere.
Ol $14 US, Canada, PR, USVI

O $22 elsewhere

Name
Address
City/State/Province/Zip
Country

Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
da International University

ni, FL 33199

isphere is published three times a year (Fall, Winter and Spring).

perhaps the most profound being
that their orientation was entirely
male. Young soldiers (i.e. "sons")
entered, uninvited, backyard parties
of clubs (i.e. "mothers") dressed in
combat fatigues and black jump
boots with Uzi submachine guns
slung, cavalierly, over their shoulders. Young males were appointed
Peoples' Committee leaders and
charged with organizing men,
women, and children into revolutionaries, dedicated to the cause of
labor, development, and political
consciousness-building. Women
attended, ate, drank, and politely listened to the oratory. But they
returned home to dismiss the proceedings with a sharp hiss of the
teeth (churi) and, in reply to
repeated questions of why they went
in the first place, answered, "I am
not a fool. If food and drink is available I will take it." Opportunists
signed up for ration cards available
only to members. Virtually everyone
was playing the military for the fool.
Concepts of Surinamese negritude were also violated. Many of the
young soldiers did not present their
orations in Sranan Tongo, the Creole mother tongue and lingua
franca of Suriname. Instead they did
so in school-book Dutch. European
cadence and metaphors did not
stimulate the cultural juices of the
masses nor play well in the backyards of Paramaribo.
The military had deposed the
police from power. The police in
Suriname had the reputation of
"good sons." They were replaced
with military police heavies. And, in
an irony common to neocolonial
societies, the military offended many
by its crude denunciations of the
mother country, the Netherlands.
The abstractions of Dutch exploitation fell flat because many natives
genuinely liked the Netherlands and
wrapped much of their sentiment
around Queens Wilhelmina and
Juliana. Railings against the Dutch
were perceived as rude and bold
(vrijpostig), an attribute of the misbehaving young and disrespectful
(no abi lespeki). Analogous failure
took place with other ethnic groups.

The revolution got no further
than the "Peoples' Palace"' the military barracks, and select bank
accounts that were swollen by graft
and thievery. The military's fate was
sealed when, in December 1982, it
tortured and murdered 15 prominent dissidents, unceremoniously
dumping their bodies at the hospital. Surinamese believe the souls of
the deceased who are not properly
dispatched to the afterworld return
to involve themselves in the affairs
of the living.

The Game
By 1983 domestic and international
support for the revolution had evaporated and Commander Desi Bouterse was compelled to enter into
dialogue with the "old" political
leaders. Everyone knew democracy
had to be restored. They wanted it
and Bouterse needed it as he presided over his bankrupt, demoralized fiefdom. The Dutch and the
Americans supported dialogue,
while the Cubans, Libyans, and
Soviets, knowing the military charlatans for what they were, moved to

the margin. The old parties entered
into dialogue with the military to
secure elections. Many were fearful
the military would renege its promises. During this time the public
countenanced no pessimism. Civilians threw themselves into the desperate political game that eventually
became a messianic reality.
Throughout 1985 and into 1986
the dialogue was going nowhere.
It was at this time that, in Dutch
sociologist Johan Huizinga's words,
a "spoil sport" emerged. A young
Bush Negro named Ronnie
Brunswijk, formerly in the army and
a one-time bodyguard of Bouterse,
began a small, poorly-equipped
insurgency in the Bush Negro areas
of eastern Suriname. Brunswijk
denounced Bouterse's regime and
promised a return to democracy via
free elections. His support primarily
consisted of Maroons. By 1987 he
controlled one-third of the countryside.
Brunswijk's efforts were denounced by the democratic hopefuls
in Paramaribo. Why? In the eyes
of urban residents Bush Negroes
occupy the lowest rung of the
national social hierarchy. Their
Afro-American culture is selfservingly excoriated as unrefined, if
not barbaric. Despite their heroic
battles against white armies in the
18th century-the very inversion of
colonialism-their exploits were
unappreciated by ethnic Paramaribo.
Did ethnic Paramaribo fear that
the Bush Negroes would garrison
Paramaribo and destroy Afro-Asian
dominance there? Or did they
oppose the Bush Negroes because
the "spoil sport," as Huizinga says,
"by withdrawing from the game ...
reveals the relativity and fragility of
the play-world in which he had temporarily shut himself with others"?
Brunswijk dared to challenge the
messianic hopes of the civilians and
thereby scorned their gaming strategy. In so doing he reaped the bitter
harvest of being banished from
Paramaribo's reality.
Nevertheless, it was Brunswijk
who ultimately moved the military to
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concede to civilian elections. Bouterse had to secure his urban flanks
against jungle attacks and he promised elections for late 1987.

Old Shoes Don't Hurt
By early 1987 the rival political
groups began organizing in earnest
for the election. The military transformed its political arm into the
National Democratic Party (Nationale DemocratischePartij,NDP). Several political parties-NPS, VHP,
KTPI, and a number of smaller parties-confederated, not united, into
the Front for Democracy and Development (HetFront voor Demokratie en
Ontwikkeling). NDP dominated the
mass media. State and private radio,
television, and newspapers were
effectively censored. (To avoid
blatant charges of censorship the
government denied licenses to
uncooperative publishers for the
import of paper and ink.)
The Front held its first mass
meeting in August 1987, drawing
together 40,000 celebrative citizens,
the largest body of people ever
assembled in the history of Suriname. The citizens were addressed
by the leaders of various parties,
who appeared jointly on the dais.
Such public gatherings were scheduled up to two days before the elections, and on two later occasions
drew even larger crowds. For four
months it was Mardi Gras in Paramaribo and, dizzy with their collective energy, Surinamese began, for
the first time, openly criticizing the
military and especially Commander
Bouterse.
The keystone of revolution in
Suriname and, indeed elsewhere,
was to mobilize the young. Bouterse,
handsome and fit at 42, constantly
railed against the old "grey heads"
and promoted his acolytes as young,
vital, and hip. Eschewing his military
uniform, the commander began
appearing in Miami Vice-style garb:
woven shoes, silk stockings, linen
suit with sleeves pushed to the
elbow, gold chains, a boldly-colored
tee-shirt, and aviator sunglasses.
Disjuncture was provided by his
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serious premature baldness and
mouth-encircling mustaches and
beard. On state occasions he wore
a European-cut three-piece pinstripe. He appeared discomforted.
Although the Miami look is in for
the young who can afford it, his costume did not generate the expected
youthful enthusiasm. For many it
was precisely the military's disastrous fiscal policies that prohibited
them from acquiring such garb.
Envy is a very powerful emotion.

Rival theme songs were broadcast daily, sung spontaneously in the
streets, and blared endlessly at gatherings. NDP selected as its testimonial a rap-rhyme number sung in
Sranan Tongo. Again aiming at the
young, a young black performer in
obligatory sunglasses and gold
chains rocked and chanted, "One
we stay, two we do, three we see, four
we go, five we are not afraid." If
explicit behavior counts for double,
this gambit also failed. The young
mockingly recited the verses, inverting them into negatives, and raining
ridicule on the singer while merrily
singing out the theme song of the
Front. Older Creoles referred to the
singer as a "street negro" ("straati
nengre") and protested that they did
not like the beat. Sung in Sranan,
the NDP theme song associated the

military/NDP too closely with the
Creole ethnic group. The linguistic
politics mirrored reality: the military
and its profiteers were dominated by
Creoles.
The Front selected as its song a
pop number in Dutch that extolled
the virtues of ethnic collaboration.
Dutch, the colonial language,
caused affront to no one. Dutch is
the language that many Surinamese
love to hate and a mastery of it indicates respectability. Innocent and
nonthreatening, the kind of ditty
mom and dad would sing after a few
drinks, "Vote Front" ("Stem Frontaal") promised: "Everyone is a
front, then the country is healthy
again, vote Front, Surinamers all.
Democracy and development, that is
the whole thing, brother don't lose
your vote." The crowd ended by
roaring out, "That is that thing"
("Dat is dat ding"), and the air was
filled with waving V-for-victory fingers. People meeting on the street
ignored normal conventions and
greeted each other with "Dat is dat
ding," while motorists, whose driving panache rivals only that of
Rome, waved V-signs at one another.
Front leaders Henck Arron and
Willie Soemita, both in their 50s,
wore tailored Caribbean shirt-jacks
and campaign caps with the logo of
either the Front or their own political party (for Creoles the flambeau
or flame, for Javanese the Wajang
puppet). Another Front leader,
Jaggernath Lachmon, 70 years old,
played to the humility and traditional outfit of the Hindustani
farmer: old black lace-up shoes,
black slacks, white shirt open at the
collar, and all cinched up by a belt
doubled back through the first two
loops. His cap was either the VHP
elephant or the Front emblem,
which contained each of the three
symbols in its own circle surrounded
by a larger circle. Slow, lumpy, and
cumbersome, "Lach" was just what
the people wanted.
Slogans were popular and
threaded throughout the campaign's
discourse. Bouterse's NDP contribution to political opera was "only
love" ("soso lobi"), which was offered

up by candidates in a gooey mix of
wide smile, open arms, and silky
pronunciation. People had difficulty
relating this slogan to the murders
of 1982 and the ravages perpetrated
by the military against Bush Negro
women and children in the interior
insurgency. Love is a highly-charged
word and many considered NDP's
slogan further evidence that their
daughters were under siege. "Only
love" ("soso lobi") shortly became
transformed into "only trouble"
("soso trobi") and "only losers"
("soso lasi").
In a revelation that brings to
mind V S. Naipaul's The Suffrage of
Elvira, the Front selected an old
shoe (oru su) as its symbol. Old shoes
began appearing all over Paramaribo: hanging from flagpoles,
nailed over doorways, mounted on
hoods of automobiles, and, as the
election neared, carried about by
the faithful. The caption for the old
shoe was "old shoes don't hurt."
Front meetings were carefully
staged in public terrains rather than
the headquarter yards of political
parties. Each group sported its own
ethnic costume-Creole women in
koto, Hindustanis in sari, Javanese
in sarong. There was no pretense of
merging the identity of the ethnic
groups into one national culture (as
NDP sought to do). The goal was
unity in diversity and the US motto,
"United we stand, divided we fall,"
was widely used in the original
English. Ethnically-exclusive meetings were scheduled at different
times in separate political party
yards. Even though the military and
its revolutionary administration
were predominantly Creole, the
Front never referred to them in ethnic terms. The opponent was the
ethnically-faceless army. Recognizing its delicate confederated plurality, the Front dared not refer to
the ethnic identity of its opponent.
NDP offered up a recipe of love
and socialism. Like the Front, the
NDP made no mention of ethnicity,
save one occasion with disastrous
results. Two nights before the election it was clear that NDP would
lose; the question was merely one of

degree. Bouterse was the keynote
speaker at an NDP night meeting
and was going to arrive three hours
late. Free food and beverages had
already been consumed and the
crowd was getting restless. The rap
singer was growing hoarse. When
Bouterse arrived he was clearly
intoxicated. Surrounded by his Creole lieutenants, Bouterse mounted
the podium, wearing sunglasses and
a shirt more than discretely open,

wobbled a bit, mopped his brow, and
launched into a discussion of how
socialism would remove the perils of
multiethnicity. Groping for a metaphor, he claimed Suriname no
longer could have "Hindustani pandits [priests] huddled in their temples going 'kakara, kakara, kakara.'"
The live broadcast became the
talk of the town. Not only had Bouterse singled out one group for
excoriation but he had insulted its
language by using a crude onomatopoeic description. He then made reference to the fallen comrades of the
revolution and demanded that the
members of the audience remove
their campaign caps for a moment
of silence. Some did, some did not,
and in an outburst of anger he told
them to put their caps back on and
to remove them again when he gave

the order. This was interpreted as
the last desperate commands of a
weak and demoralized dictator. As
he began to wobble, he was escorted
off stage while yanking at his slipping pants.
The Front won 90 percent of the
votes cast and secured 40 of the 51
seats, despite the fact that NDP
had barred the Front from running
candidates in the war zones. The
Front even carried the vote in areas
that were heavily populated by NDP
supporters (insofar as housing and
land tracts were granted to them in
exchange for political support at
one time or another). The result was
a massive psychological and political
victory for the people of Suriname.
The night of the election, as
returns were pouring in, Lachmon,
in a moment of braggadocio,
announced, "Gentlemen, the game
is over, you have to go home."
But alas, it was not. As the crowd
grew evermore festive and spilled
onto the streets singing and waving
flags, Lachmon once again rose to
the podium. In his strictest and
most commanding voice he ordered
the crowds to go home, not to torment the military, and to stay off the
streets. There were still a few hands
of the game left to be played.
By January 1988 a president
(Hindustani), a prime minister (Creole), and a cabinet (carefully balanced Creole, Hindustani, and
Javanese) had been assembled. As
they have for years, Surinamese
scrupulously observed which ethnic
groups obtained which ministries.
Indeed, the faces were new but the
ethnic assignments were old. Larger
issues were left unresolved. Would
amnesty be granted to the military
for the murders of 1982 and other
times? What would be their role in
power or power-sharing? Would the
police take over the administration
of law? Would the military continue
to absorb a huge piece of the
budget? Would the war in east Suriname continue? And what would
eventually happen to Bouterse, who
still commands the military? It is
likely that these questions will remain
unresolved for a time to come. .
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Crisis in the Backlands
by Adiante Franszoon

ethnically-diverse societies in South
America. Blacks, East Indians, Indonesians, Chinese, Europeans, and
Amerindians comprise the population. The blacks consist of two subgroups: Creoles, who tend to be
urban, and Maroons. The latter are
the descendants of African slaves
who escaped from coastal Suriname
between the mid-17th and late-18th
centuries.
After more than a half century
of brutal guerrilla warfare against
colonial troops, the Dutch recognized Maroon independence in the
1760s. This treaty allowed the
Maroons to occupy a large part of
the interior of Suriname, which has
been their homeland ever since. The
Maroons of Suriname thus were
among the first people in this hemisphere to gain their independence
and for hundreds of years their isolation allowed them to develop a rich
community and cultural life. Today
there are six Maroon groups total-

ing around 65,000: the Djuka, the

uriname's current political crisis is rooted in the
deep tensions that exist
between its ethnic communities, as manifested
in the civil war between
the Maroons and the
national army.
Formerly known as Dutch
Guiana, Suriname became independent from the Netherlands in 1975.
Its citizens live in a country the size
of Illinois. Despite its small population, Suriname is one of the most
Adiante Franszoon, a Maroonfrom
Suriname, is a member of the Suriname
Maroon Resettlement Fund, Inc., in
Baltimore,Maryland.
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Saramaka, the Matawai, the Aluku,
the Paramaka, and the Kwinti.
While they do some trading with the
urban populations, the Maroons are
as distinct as any Indian tribe from
the Amazon heartland. They are
ethnically, linguistically, and demographically separate from the rest of
the Surinamese, who blend Dutch
language and culture with other
multiple ethnic strains.

A Military Strongman
The military strongman, Desi
Bouterse, is a Creole product of
that blend. A sergeant and physical
education instructor in the DutchSurinamese army until Suriname
became independent in 1975, he
then joined the newly-formed Surinamese national army. Five years

later Bouterse led a bloodless coup
against the government of Henck
Arron. Hailed as part of the new
"socialist" revolution sweeping the
Caribbean, Bouterse was especially
close to Grenada's new revolutionary
leader Maurice Bishop. The Cubans
also had important missions-civilian
and military-in Paramaribo. Virtually
unchallenged, and with this external
help, Bouterse soon gained control
of all aspects of the government.
The peaceful appearances changed
when, at dawn on December 8, 1982,
Bouterse rounded up 15 prominent
Surinamese, and tortured them
before executing them on the grounds
that they were plotting a countercoup.
A shocked population turned against
the regime. Doubting the loyalty of
urban Surinamese, Bouterse began
to recruit Maroons into the army.
Soon his own personal bodyguard
was largely composed of Maroons.
One of these was a young
man from the Djuka tribe, Ronnie
Brunswijk. A former sergeant in the
Surinamese army, he was Bouterse's
personal bodyguard before they had
a falling out in 1986. On one level
the present situation in Suriname
could be described as a personal feud
between Bouterse and Brunswijk.
During the years of close "revolutionary" association between Bouterse
and Cuba, Brunswijk was among
those sent to Cuba for military training. The main cause of the civil war,
however, is the age-old contempt
with which many urban Surinamese
view Maroons.
We do not know exactly why
Brunswijk was dismissed from the
army. We do know that he did not
take this blow lying down. His
Maroon background and identity
came into play. Before he left the
army, he took arms and munitions
into the jungle. Acting as a modern-

day Robin Hood, he "appropriated" money from Creole society to
build homes and help elderly people
in his tribal community of Mongo
Tapu. His popularity among the
Maroons grew.
In June 1986 Bouterse responded. He unleashed his military-including field artillery, aerial
bombardment, and tanks-on the
defenseless village of Mongo Tapu.
The army claimed it was looking for
Brunswijk. In the following months
similar violent actions were taken
against other Maroon villages. In
December 1986 the New York Times
reported that 244 Maroons had
been killed.
Bouterse's pogroms were no
more successful than those of the
Europeans centuries ago. The
Maroon resistance stiffened. Many
felt that if, as Bouterse claimed, he
was merely looking for Brunswijk, it
was needless and excessive to practice a scorched-earth policy against
communities that, until then, had lit-
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tle or no connection with the guerrilla leader. Bouterse even hired
Amerindians to hunt Maroons for
him, just as the colonial troops had
done in the 18th century. At the
same time the army was attacking
Maroon villages, the US Committee
for Refugees (in February 1987) said
the army was also carrying out a
policy of arrests and murders of the
Maroon residents of Paramaribo.

The Ramifications of Violence
Suriname enjoyed one of the highest
per capita incomes in the region.
But Bouterse's actions have taken
the country down with him socially,
economically, and politically. After
Suriname gained independence in
1975, the Netherlands agreed to provide $100 million annually in aid for
15 years. Following the execution of
the 15 civil leaders in 1982, the
Dutch suspended their aid and the
US cut off its annual subvention
of about $1.5 million. The price of

ACAMPU

bauxite, which once provided 70
percent of foreign earnings, has
also fallen. And the government has
depleted its foreign cash reserves.
The fall in bauxite prices, poor government administration, and the
withdrawal of foreign aid have
caused Suriname's economy to contract dramatically. In 1985 it had a
gross domestic product growth rate
of negative 50 percent. Yet Bouterse
manages to keep an army of 2,700,
armed with some 30 modern
Brazilian-built small tanks and personnel carriers, and several modern
aircraft converted for aerial bombardment. Suriname's military
budget for 1985 ($44 million) was
double that ofJamaica, which had
six times its population. Facing this

army is the lightly armed 200-300man 'Jungle-Commando" army of
Brunswijk's Suriname Liberation
Army.
How could such a depressed
economy sustain such an army and
such a war? The well-documented
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answer is that Bouterse has been
financing the conflict through drug
trafficking. In November 1986 Bouterse's closest aide, Captain Etienne
Boerenveen, was sentenced in
Miami to 12 years in federal prison.
He was found guilty of conspiring to
allow drug dealers to use Suriname's
airfields as a base for their operations into the US. The fee was
alleged to be $1 million per load
(New York Times, June 18, 1987). It is
also alleged there is a heavilyguarded cocaine-processing factory
in a remote western corner of the
country.
During my recent visit to the
Guianas, one informant claimed to
be a former drug salesman for certain military officers. He nervously
and very reluctantly described the
trafficking to me. The raw materials,
and some already-processed
cocaine, he said, come from Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Brazil.
The cocaine is shipped out by Brazilian fishing boats from Paramaribo to Cayenne and Brazil. Most
of it goes to Brazil. From Brazil and
Cayenne it is transshipped to European and North American markets.
All the salesmen, he said, are from
the army or are close associates of
Bouterse. The informant added that
Bouterse already had bought land
and houses in Brazil.
The source also said the drug
runners had to adhere to a formal
agreement that, if they were caught,
their supplier would never be revealed. He said the drug runners
are paid well, to the point that they
do not mind the risk involved.
Brazil's fishing boats are always moving in and out of the port of Paramaribo, but have yet to be seen
loading or unloading fish.

IsThere Hope?
Suriname held a referendum in
September 1987 to ratify a new constitution, and in November held an
election to choose a new government. These only came about as a
result of intense internal and international pressure and the increasing
isolation of Suriname. The election
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was held as a desperate attempt by
Bouterse's regime to have the suspended foreign aid restored to its
former level. A few months after the
election, the political and military
situation in Suriname had changed
little. Despite the election of a new
government, the National Assembly
remains under military control.

Since the election, Brunswijk,
the Suriname Liberation Army
leader, has openly invited the government to negotiate. The government, however, has turned down the
offer. Some church groups have
taken upon themselves the search
for a peaceful solution to the crisis,
but they are working without official
guidelines or government cooperation. Bouterse has repeatedly said
there is no way he will negotiate with
Brunswijk. Bouterse is the dominant
political force in Suriname. Even
after their landslide victory, civilian
leaders Jaggernath Lachmon and
Arron, who promised during the
campaign they would sweep away
military influence in the government, have subdued their claims.
The role of the military in the government is untouchable.
Few Maroons were included in
the election; only people and politi-

cal parties from Paramaribo, the
capital, took part in it. As a result
the Maroons have no representative
in the new government. The new
constitution, which Bouterse himself helped draft, has given the army
wide control over the affairs of
the country. With this constitution
Bouterse can still do whatever he
pleases, and he has repeatedly said
he will not rest until he has eliminated all the Maroons from
Suriname.
The Maroon situation remains
grim. Despite the presence of a civilian government, the army continues
to hold power-only now from
behind the scenes. On December 31,
1987, while many people were trying
to get home for New Year's Eve, an
army unit randomly pulled eight
young Maroon men out of a bus and
murdered seven of them. The other
was severely injured. The army
sealed off the Saramaka and
Matawai regions of eastern Suriname. No one could go in or out,
and no food or medical supplies
were allowed to be taken to the
area's 26,000 residents. In June 1988
the army mounted an offensive
against Brunswijk's rebels in the
same regions and incurred heavy
casualties. Shortly thereafter, the
army reduced its presence in the
area and established a system of
checkpoints that allows people holding passes to enter and leave. The
catch is that one must get a pass,
which is only available from the
army in Paramaribo. As long as
these conditions prevail, democracy
in Suriname remains an illusion.
The immediate challenge concerns the fate of the more than

14,000 refugees. At least 10,000 of
them are Djukas, Paramakas,
Alukus, and Amerindians, who have
fled across the Maroni River into
French Guiana. In addition there
are 4,000 refugees within Suriname,
as Maroons have fled from the Saramaka homeland. Before Suriname
can again become politically stable,
and before questions concerning
the future of the Maroons can be
answered, the issue of the Bouterse
dictatorship must be settled. .

~
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Towards Democracy in Mexico?
by JonathanFox

nJuly 16, 1988, in Mexico's
largest opposition electoral
mobilization ever, more
than a quarter of a million
citizens protested the government's crude efforts to
manufacture a sliver of an
electoral majority. An outsider might
have expected to find rage, with overtones of violence. Indeed, the moment
of silence in memory of the electioneve murder of candidate Cuauhtemoc
Cirdenas's top antifraud expert cast a
dark shadow over the crowd. But the
general mood was far more festive
than angry. Owners ofjewelry stores
facing the overflowing plaza did not
even shutter their doors. Cheery
marchers flowed in "self-organized
order," as opposition strategist Adolfo Gilly put it, avoiding the rigid
contingents of official and opposition street traditions.
For the first time, the result of
Mexico's presidential election was
not a foregone conclusion. People
believed that their votes mattered.
The candidate of the new center-left
coalition probably would have
received the most votes in a free and
fair contest (including equal media
access), though it is possible that the
official candidate came in with a
plurality. We may never know the
"true" figures. Fear of less than
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total control led the government to
resort to the "perfecting of the popular will," as commentator Carlos
Monsiviis quipped.
Last summer marked a turning
point in Mexico's political transition.
Divisions in Mexico's governing elite
created opportunities for ordinary
people to influence events to an
unusual degree. Hundreds of thousands of citizens, many already
democratically organized at the
community level, participated
actively in electoral politics for the
first time, catching analysts completely by surprise. Mexican politics
will never be the same.

The Opposition Emerges
Since the 1930s, when President
Lizaro Cardenas incorporated the
masses into the fledgling official
party, the Mexican regime's leadership has continually frustrated
periodic foreign predictions of its
imminent collapse. The 1988 election, by undermining the legitimacy
of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI), thrust the regime into
an uncertain transition from oneparty dominance to a fluid new multiparty system.
The story of the 1988 election
began at least 20 years ago. Peaceful
student protests during the summer
of 1968 were followed by the army's
massacre of untold hundreds on
October 2. By the mid-1970s a wide
range of social groups had followed

the students' lead, charting new
paths towards autonomy from PRI's
top-down controls and calling for
the government to put its rhetoric of
social justice and democracy into
practice. Peasants and slumdwellers
began bypassing their official representatives, business leaders began
forming their own organizations,
and workers continued pressing for
trade-union democracy. These
emerging grassroots movements,
which expressed a new sense of citizenship, became one of the driving
forces of today's electoral opposition.
The regime's credibility was
briefly revived by a limited electoral
reform, combined with the oil- and
debt-driven 1978-82 economic boom.
Interest groups contended for
pieces of a rapidly growing pie. Then
oil prices fell, interest rates shot up,
and capital flight spiraled out of
control. The government responded
with the halfhearted 1982 bank
nationalization that discouraged
private investment without providing an alternative to replace it.
After six years of policies to
attract private investment, the economy remains in crisis. As long as
debt payments preclude recovery, no
improvement is in sight for the
majority of Mexicans, whose real
income has fallen by more than 50
percent since 1982. Their resulting
dissatisfaction is exacerbated by
government budget cuts that have
sharply reduced the regime's long-

standing capacity to divide and conquer dissent with selective economic
concessions.
The 1988 election surprise was
clearly driven by unending austerity.
But poverty alone does not explain
the nature of dissent, nor where and
how it is expressed. After all, Mexico has not experienced classic food
riots, the burning of buses, or the
mass pillaging of supermarkets seen,
for example, in the Dominican
Republic and Brazil. Even after the
opposition exhausted the limited
legal recourses to protest fraud,
Cardenas's firm moderation prevented his followers from resorting
to violence.

Electoral Competition:
What Happened?
Cardenas's National Democratic
Front (FDN) won Mexico City, home
to about one-fourth of the country's
population. His electoral victory was
linked to the 1985 earthquake, which
provoked a spontaneous, self-help
mobilization of hundreds of thousands of metropolitan residents.
This left an indelible mark on city
politics, as democratic, grassroots
organizing bypassed official agencies and opposition parties. Since
the government later made significant concessions to the mobilized
earthquake victims, people saw that
their collective action could make a
difference. Impatience with official
austerity and authoritarianism deepened the following year. A broad
new democratic student movement
began at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico. And thousands of citizens expressed unheardof public defiance when they booed
and cursed President Miguel de la
Madrid at the inauguration of the
1986 World Cup.
Some Cardenas voters wanted
to reject the official candidate or to
renew PRI's commitment to reformism and nationalism. Others wanted
to democratize the internal workings of PRI, as Cardenas's dissident
Democratic Current emphasized
in 1987, before being expelled and
forced into the opposition. But

many FDN votes were also in favor
of an effective electoral opening. We
still do not know which attitudes
best explain the wave of support for
CArdenas: dissatisfaction with economic policies or the quest for democratic government. Because exit
polls were banned, only the future
evolution of the opposition will tell.
Cardenas's support from moderate voters and disaffected PRI
bureaucrats was greatly reinforced
by the fact that he was a mainstream
figure from within PRI and not a
radical outsider. Because of rigid
electoral procedures, most of the
democratic urge was expressed
through votes for pro-Cardenas parties that, until recently, were mere
shells-small, often corrupt and
authoritarian electoral machines,
sponsored by the government. The
candidate of the new, independent
Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) withdrew late in the race, throwing his
support to Cardenas.
No presidential candidate is
likely to have received more than a
slim plurality of votes. The official
returns gave PRI 50.7 percent of the
vote. FDN was awarded 31 percent
and the conservative National
Action Party (PAN) totaled 17 percent of the official count. But FDN's
analysis of available election data
indicated that PRI received only 36
percent, leaving PAN with 23 percent of the vote and FDN with a
42 percent victory.
Neither FDN nor the official
totals are definitive, however,
because only slightly more than half
of the ballots-54 percent-were
made available for public scrutiny.
These ballots showed Cardenas leading Salinas by a five-point margin:
39 percent to 34 percent. The government claims that the 46 percent
of the ballots that were not made
public provided an overwhelming
majority-67 percent for Salinas to
20 percent for Cardenas-and determined the outcome of the election.
It is doubtful Salinas's actual share
of the unexamined ballots would
have been sufficient to swing a
majority.
Most of the questionable ballots

were cast in rural precincts, where
ballot security is more difficult to
assure than in cities. Political bosses
were able to manipulate more rural
than urban votes because of the
rural opposition's restricted access
to media and limited poll-watching
presence and experience.
Salinas effectively competed for
organized peasant support in some
regions, proposing creative policies
and treating peasants as citizens.
But austerity and Mexico's heritage
of agrarian reform still led significant rural areas to vote for CArdenas. It was difficult, however, for
the opposition to penetrate those
rural areas, such as Chiapas,
Oaxaca, and Veracruz, where there
is little freedom of assembly and
association. In cacique-dominated
Pinotepa, Oaxaca, for example,
CArdenas's campaign stop was the
first public-opposition assembly
in memory.
A widely-accepted official result
is that only 52 percent of the registered electorate voted at all (probably a massive increase over past
elections, when participation rates
were seriously inflated). Taking the
unregistered and annulled votes
into account, 57 percent of the
potential electorate did not vote. In
many areas suspected of opposition
sympathies, large numbers of voters
were reportedly purged in advance
from the rolls. Many voters were
also apparently added to the rolls
where opposition oversight was lacking. Official figures claimed that
only 13 percent of the electorate
were not on the rolls. But, according
to Gallup's reputable pre-election
poll of nearly 3,000 citizens, 24 percent were unregistered. The gap
indicates room for manipulation of
election results that may have been
much more important than the
often reported stuffing and destruction of ballot boxes.
After the election, attention
shifted to the congress, which is
constitutionally mandated to ratify
the results. PRI held a small but sufficient majority of seats. Lack of
unity around legislative candidates
cost the FDN coalition at least 50
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congressional seats. Thus tensions
emerged within FDN between those
affiliated with political parties
(a minority) and those unaffiliated
(a majority).
Since July several state and local
elections have shown that both right
and center-left opposition parties
generally lack effective grassroots
structures. Nevertheless, when
analyzing the combination of PRI
sweeps and the extremely low turnout rates in these races, continuing
fraud and media monopolies must
not be underestimated.

Opposition Dilemmas
Three challenges await the Cardenista movement. The first challenge is to build on Cirdenas's mass
support without provoking repression. The base for mobilizing to
overturn the official victory was limited, given the degree of abstention,
the lack of unity between left and
right opposition, and Mexicans'
long memories of past official
repression. Cirdenas's initial victory
claim, lacking public proof, briefly
boxed him into a political dead end.
But he modified his stance to stress
the need for official review of the
contested election results-an
equally unwinnable but more politically sustainable demand. The opposition coalition's decision not to
pursue civil disobedience in defense
of its claim to the presidency helped
avoid unpredictable results. In Mexico the difference between limited
civil disobedience and open rebellion is not always clearly defined,
either by participants or security
forces. By exercising caution, FDN
seems to have avoided causing an
official backlash.
The second challenge is to
develop creative strategies that
encourage grassroots participation.
Having exhausted the legal channels
for challenging the election results,
Cirdenas directed his political energies into the construction of the new
Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD). PRD becomes the fifth member of the FDN coalition, uniting
former Priistasfrom the Democratic
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Current with a wide range of liberals, nationalists, and socialists.
Given the choice within FDN
between the combination of
government-spawned parties and
the socialist PMS, it is not surprising
that Democratic Current chose to
express its own identity. The challenge, however, is to build a party
that does better than other parties
in reaching the grassroots movements and the unorganized populace. If the leadership builds yet
another conventional party, then it
will turn away many of the citizens
who last summer were talking politics for the first time.
The third challenge is to demonstrate that the opposition can actually govern. Cirdenas proved an
effective governor in the past, but as
a man of the system rather than as
an opponent. Will Salinas break the
ice and be the first president to
allow victorious opposition candidates to become governors? The
opposition needs to demonstrate
that it can win overwhelmingly,
probably in a state not considered
"strategic." If elected, the Cardenistas need to make the difficult
transition from an opposition movement to an effective governing coalition. Clearly the Cardenistasare
seeking power within the system.
The question remains: what would
they do with that power if they
attained it?

Are Democratization and Political
Stability Compatible?
Some insiders contend PRI's manipulation of the rolls and its electionday irregularities were insufficient,
leading the party to snatch victory
by means of a massive, last-minute
computer intervention. Two contending positions seem to have
emerged as the returns came in: the
"traditional" hard-line faction in
favor of a clearly-exaggerated majority vote versus the technocratic
"modernizing" faction, which might
have accepted a clear plurality. The
technocrats, forced to rely on the
"dinosaurs" (such as the union
bosses) to win, were too weak to rec-

ognize an official less-than-majority
win even if they had wanted to. In
this scenario the official sliver of a
majority probably represented a
precarious compromise.
The night the Federal Election
Commission's computers "went
down," the outgoing government of
De la Madrid clearly chose stability
over democracy. How will the
Salinas team confront this choice in
the future? In light of their electoral
compromise, the difference between
PRI's "modernizers" and "dinosaurs" has blurred significantly.
Both factions defend heavy state
intervention in social and political
life and are moderately nationalist in
foreign policy. What distinguishes
the modernizers is their free-market
inclination and their greater tolerance for political dissidents.
Manuel Camacho, for example,
Salinas's principal ideologue and an
oft-mentioned 1994 presidential
prospect, honed his modern-style
bargaining skills with the postearthquake protest movements. This
effort is widely considered a "positive-sum" success-most participants won something. Both Camacho and Salinas had raised hopes
that the 1988 electoral process
would be cleaner than in the past. In
the cities it probably was, because of
unprecedented citizen vigilance of
an estimated 80-90 percent of the
polls. The course of the state and
local elections since July has not
raised hopes of an electoral opening
in the near future.
Salinas's December 1 inaugural
speech, though short on specifics,
reiterated his public commitment to
dialogue, electoral democratization,
and social reform. Those who hoped
for the success of the reformists on
the Salinas team consider his secretarial appointments to be transitional. Optimistic reformists recall
that several past presidents chose to
dramatically shift directions in the
course of their terms. Camacho, initially expected to be named secretary of the interior, the key ministry
of police and politics, ended up with
the thankless job of running the
Federal District. Instead, hard-liner

Fernando Gutierrez Barrios captured the Interior Ministry. Gutierrez Barrios previously ran Interior's
feared political police, and he is widely
believed to have something on
everyone.
Salinas's inauguration was
marked by an unusually elaborate
military parade and the presence of
eight foreign heads of state, ranging
fromJose Napole6n Duarte to Fidel
Castro. Apparently the military
did not play an active role in the
electoral process, wanting to avoid
tarnishing its political image.
Throughout his campaign, CArdenas, the son of a general, addressed himself respectfully to the
military, winning some rank-andfile votes.
What does the rise of national
opposition mean for the future
prospects of governance in Mexico?
Not surprisingly, the breadth and
intensity of last summer's opposition
mobilization proved impossible to
sustain. Like the 1985 post-earthquake upsurge, some of the freshlypoliticized sectors will find channels
for sustaining their activity. But
many will not, waiting for future
opportunities to become political
contenders.

Right-wing and left-wing electoral mobilization has ebbed. Yet
democratic social movements that
predated the election and grew dramatically during the contest have
endured as major players. Mobilized
peasant grain producers have
recently put on the national agenda
the terms of trade between agriculture and industry, contending that
crop-support prices are as important as the minimum wage. Urban
community movements continue to
press for more equitable and efficient service delivery.
Organized labor remains a wild
card. As workers reel from unemployment, trade unionists await the
passing of long-time boss and archetypal PRI-dinosaur Fidel Velasquez
to speed the transition to new
collective-bargaining arrangements.
We cannot assume that Salinas will
extend his longstanding personal
and political battle with the leader-

ship of the Oil Workers' Union to
other union bosses. Salinas's honeymoon with big business has continued, since the rise of a center-left
opposition put a damper on its previous flirtation with the right-wing
PAN. Whether the private sector's
support will translate into renewed
domestic investment remains to
be seen.
The official PAN vote of 17 percent was far below the expectations
of the right wing on both sides of
the border. PAN has since been
divided between defense of democracy and opposition to Crdenas. Its
leaders claimed the unprecedented
FDN senatorial victories in the Federal District were fraudulent. PAN's
presidential candidate, Manuel
"Maquio" Clouthier, called for the
annullment of the entire electoral
process, in sharp contrast to CArdenas's attempt to separate clean
from fraudulent results. Salinas has
recognized the Church as a legitimate political actor, a striking
change in Mexican affairs. The proChurch PAN began a rapprochement with the Salinas administration. A sign of improved relations is
that, in a departure from its usual
practice, PAN accepted federalelection support funds.
In any scenario increased congressional opposition will tend to
check presidential power. PRI won
52 percent of the seats in the lower
house-by far its lowest proportion
ever-and the 1990 congressional
elections are likely to provoke a new
round of opposition initiatives. PRI
will now have to form coalitions to
pass constitutional amendments,
though the opposition's disunity will
facilitate PRI's maneuvering. The
government's first small concession
to "home rule" in the Federal District, the newly-created representative assembly, is likely to outgrow its
intended limits and become a further opposition counterweight during the Salinas years.

Towards a "Historic
Compromise"?
Salinas may be Mexico's weakest

president in decades. Yet his history
has shown him to be stronger than
he first appears. His surprise move
against the mafia of the Oil Workers'
Union reminded observers of a key
element of the current situation:
opposition inside and outside the
government remains divided.
Many of the leaders of the grassroots movements that drive the Cardenista opposition-slumdwellers,
trade unionists, peasants, and teachers-were shaped by the student
protests and massacre of 1968. So,
too, were the Salinistas.But the
"bottom-up" vision of the Cardenistas contrasts with the "topdown" vision of the Salinistas.
According to the latter, Mexico's stability depends on the commitment
to "modernization" from above
-opening the system up within
limits and backing off when the
pressure from the traditional political establishment becomes too
great. Both contenders have years of
experience sizing up one another.
And each has become increasingly
skilled (and even respectful) in bargaining with the other. Mexico's
democratization depends in large
measure on the capacity of the two
groups to develop and sustain new
rules of the game.
Rapid and radical political
change is not on Mexico's agenda.
Yet, after July's opposition upsurge,
Mexico faces a choice between more
democracy or more authoritarianism. The old system has eroded
beyond repair. A new one, however,
is not yet ready to take its place. To
continue a relatively stable transition to more democratic rule, Mexico needs a "historic compromise."
Such a compromise would not be an
alliance, but a flexible agreement
among the contenders regarding the
boundaries for political bargaining.
Reformist policymakers must choose
between their alliance with the
"dinosaurs" and an opening towards
the grassroots movements that are
inside and outside the official sectors. Conflict is inherent in both
choices, but one alone holds the
potential for long-run political
renewal. .
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An Ex-President's Memoirs
Mis tiempos by Jose L6pez Portillo. Mexico, DF: Fernindez Editores, 1988.

by Julio Mojuel

portrays the Lopez Portillo administration in favorable light. He argues
that his own administration was
decidedly not an "Echeverristamaximato"-a puppet of the ex-president
Echeverria. Indeed, Lopez Portillo
attempts to vindicate his own political persona by emphasizing his independence from the Echeverristas,
who many consider a surviving
nucleus of political resentment. As
for the focal points of today's politics, Lopez Portillo is an enemy
of De la Madrid and Salinas and a
supporter of Cardenismo, the antiPRI (Institutional Revolutionarv
Party) movement led by Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas.
The second incision made by
L6pez Portillo is barely perceptible.
In elliptic fashion the ex-president
suggests that the policies of his sexenio (six-year term of office) were
more original than those of his succesor, De la Madrid. At the same
time Lopez Portillo dismisses as
"false" and "ill-willed" the charges
of corruption and incompetence
that taint his name in the pages of
contemporary Mexican history.
With these two incisions Lopez
Portillo succeeds in conveying the
aura of a Mexican president. Unintentionally, however, he illuminates
how Mexico's political system operates, behind a facade of democracy,
according to secret, personalist, and
authoritarian lines of power. This is
precisely where the ex-president
commits a major blunder: why
reveal the intricacies of "his crime"
and expose himself to wider condemnation? Lopez Portillo writes
prolifically of "his crime," assuming
that by doing so he glorifies his persona and somehow rescues it from
his political legacy.
(Translatedby Lourdes Sinuimn)
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Mexico-Bashing in Washington
by George W. Grayson

S

presidency last July,
ince
hisSalinas
electiondeto the
Carlos
Gortari has moved to
strengthen ties with the
US. By so doing he may
preempt US-launched
attacks on Mexico, which have
become so frequent in recent years
that the neologism "Mexico-bashing"
has entered the vocabulary of Washington decisionmakers. In addition
to meeting with president-elect
George Bush in late November,
Salinas has selected Gustavo Petricioli
as his ambassador to the US. A
61-year-old economist and former
finance minister who holds a master's degree from Yale, Petricioli
possesses the stature to bring
coherence, dynamism, and greater
effectiveness to Mexico's previously
understaffed, overworked, and
sometimes outflanked embassy.

Mexico-Bashing
Despite efforts to improve relations
with Capitol Hill, Mexico often
finds itself the target of stinging
blows. The Senate hurled the latest
punch when it voted 61 to 27 in midApril 1988 to penalize Mexico for
inadequacies in its war on drugs.
Epithets such as "crooked'," "corrupt," and "venal" suffused the
speeches and corridor gossip that
attended this move.
The Senate was reacting to
White House certification of Mexico as "fully cooperating" on narcotics matters pursuant to the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986. This statute, which was aimed at Mexico,
requires the president to terminate
George W Grayson is the Class of 1938
Professor of Government at the College
of William and Mary.

most foreign aid and to oppose
development bank credits to nations
whose antidrug efforts fail to meet
US standards. Had the House followed the Senate's lead-fortunately,
it did not-only an executive veto
would have prevented a nasty
bilateral rift amid the most crucial
Mexican presidential campaign in
50 years.

The spring 1988 brouhaha follows, by two years, Senator Jesse
Helms's emergence as the Mexico
basher with the hardest punch. During hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs, which he chairs, the North
Carolina Republican treated Mexico
with all the tenderness of Cromwell
ruling Ireland. He charged that
President Miguel de la Madrid was
elected fraudulently in 1982 and
that the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) kept two sets of
election books-"one private and
one public." William von Rabb, commissioner of the US Customs Service, Assistant Secretary of State
Elliott Abrams, and other executivebranch spokesmen also pummeled
Mexico for "engrained" wrongdoing and "widespread drug-related
corruption."
Mexicans greeted the Helms
hearings as the political version of
fingernails clawing a blackboard.
For them, the soft-spoken North
Carolinian embodied the spirits of
Minister Joel Poinsett, General
Winfield Scott, General John "Black
Jack" Pershing, Ambassador Henry
Lane Wilson, and other Americans
who had meddled egregiously in
their nation's affairs.
Attorney General Edwin Meese
III's apology to his Mexican counterpart did little to quell a firestorm
of anger. Resentment mushroomed
when leading US newspapers ran

features on our "neighbor in distress" and a CIA report estimated
that there was a 20 percent chance
the Mexican political system would
collapse within five years. Last
year's Senate vote poured salt into
these wounds before they could
begin to heal.
Why has Mexico been so vilified?
It is of critical economic and strategic importance to the US. It has
undertaken an impressive offensive
on drugs. Why have members of
Congress and the executive branch
openly accused Mexico of actions
they would never dream of saying
publicly about Canada, Taiwan, or
Israel. Is there anything that Mexico
can do to boost its influence here,
or will every philippic against drug
trafficking and ballot-box stuffing
incite a mean-spirited donnybrook?

Reluctance to Lobby
The Mexicans believe their importance to the US and their antidrug
commitment are self-evident. Thus,
unlike other large nations with
interests at stake, they have failed to
devote the necessary resources to
win friends and influence people in
Washington. In the past a medley of
factors explained Mexico's reluctance to play the power game in an
organized, assertive, and prominent
manner. To begin with, lobbying
means involvement in the affairs of
another country and, as such, runs
afoul of Mexico's cherished, though
inconsistently applied, belief that
nations should keep their noses out
of each other's business. A variation
on this theme is the antipathy the
fiercely-nationalistic Mexican government has traditionally felt toward
justifying its actions to anyone, particularly to its mighty northern
neighbor. Even more troubling is
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the possibility that attempts to influence Washington would be seized
upon to justify more blatant American intrusiveness in Mexico. The
precedent was set when John Gavin,
US ambassador until May 1986,
assumed an extremely high profile
and vehemently crossed swords with
detractors of him and his country.
Of course, any appearance of
pandering to Uncle Sam is political
suicide for those Mexicans involved.
One of the many ironies of a 2,000mile cheek-by-jowl relationship is
that close association with the adjacent country, considered highly
desirable by US politicians anxious
to propitiate Chicano voters, can be
the kiss of death to their Mexican
counterparts.
Limited resources and cautious
ambassadors have nourished Mexico's timidity at a time when scores
of other countries benefit from selfpromotion. Conversations with
dozens of Capitol Hill staffers reveal
that Petricioli's predecessor, Jorge
Espinosa de los Reyes, rarely sought
meetings with senators. He complied graciously with requests for
interviews, yet seldom took the initiative-except that his political
advisers encouraged contacts with
such border senators as Lloyd
Bentsen, W Philip Gramm, and
Peter V. Domenici. His inertness,
compared to other envoys, set the
tone for an embassy in which key
foreign-service officers, including
then political counselor Jorge Pinto,
thoroughly understood the importance of moving and shaking within
the beltway. In all fairness, Ambassador Espinosa and his embassy colleagues were active in communicating to congressmen the negative
consequences of decertifying Mexico under the 1986 narcotics statute.
They also actively communicated
their country's views on the Omnibus
Trade Bill, which contained provisions detrimental to Mexico.
The embassy's press office has
shown remarkable attentiveness to
US journalists and other opinionmakers. Still, former foreign secre-

_ _

_ _

the cabinet as a designated advocate
for Third World unity, solidarity
with Nicaragua, and anti-US nationalism. Such policies excite support
among vocal elements within PRI,
the mass media, intellectual and academic circles, the Mexican congress,
and segments of organized labor.
These constituencies are particularly important for a government
pursuing conservative economic
policies to cultivate. Men and women
with Sepilveda's outlook resist
entanglements with the "imperialist"
US, which they regard as hostile to
Mexico's well-being in particular and
to developing states in general.
Mexican activism has also been
discouraged in the past because of a
fatalistic sense that nothing could be
done to chill anti-Mexican sentiment. Some Mexican officials were
even convinced their country was
the target of an orchestrated defamation campaign.
In March 1986, two days after a
cover story on Mexico appeared in
Newsweek's international edition,
Deputy Jose Angel Pescador claimed
to speak for PRI when he said it
was "possible to suppose" that the
magazine was "following the line
assumed by some foreign publications that consistently have tried to
distort the image of Mexico abroad
and, at times, to degrade the Mexican people." Familiarity with the
press control exerted by their Tammany Hall-style regime leads many
Mexican politicos to see the US government's heavy hand in American
media reports critical of their own
country.
Many Mexican elites, like other
Latin Americans, view the US system as the mirror image of their own
authoritarian, presidentially-dominated regime, further impeding
their nation's effectiveness above the
Rio Grande. This perception
blinded them to the mounting
involvement of Congress in foreign
policy and to the enormous importance of independent regulatory
agencies.

tary Bernard Septilveda (1982-88)

The Canadian Effect

relished his highly-scripted role in

Doubtless the Mexicans could profit

from the experience of the Canadians who, until a few years ago,
were equally hesitant to push their
cause in Washington. Obviously
Canada enjoys several advantages
over Mexico vis-i-vis the US. Among
these are a mutual enthusiasm for
democratic institutions and capitalism, a cultural affinity, a shared language (except for the Quebecois), a
history free of armed conflict since
the War of 1812, and common
defense ventures.
Still, many problems bedeviling
US-Mexican affairs also affect those
between Canada and its southern
neighbor. High on the list are trade,
protectionism, investment, fishing,
US cultural penetration, and pollution. Like Mexico, Canada is acutely
affected by Washington's actions or,
to quote former prime minister
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "It's like a
mouse and an elephant trying to
sleep in the same bed."
Traditionally Ottawa dealt with
the red, white, and blue colossus in
the same understated manner now
typifying Mexican diplomacy. As
recently as the 1970s, embassy regulations prevented most Canadian
officials from traveling the 17 blocks
from their ornate Massachusetts
Avenue chancery to Capitol Hill.
When problems arose, a Canadian
diplomat would register his country's concerns with the appropriate
State Department desk and, possibly, with a White House official.
The surge of protectionist pressures in response to a ballooning US
trade deficit persuaded Canadathe US's largest commercial partner
after Japan-to change its tactics.
The new phase in its Washington
diplomacy began with the December
1981 arrival of Allan E.Gotlieb as
Canada's ambassador. Rather than
tiptoe around the capital and craft
discreet notes to the State Department, the bespectacled Harvard
Law School graduate and former
Rhodes Scholar soon inserted himself into the power game.
As he explained his actions to an
American journalist: "Your constitution works on the basis of deal
making. The administration can't

govern by itself. The Congress can't
govern by itself. You need a 'treaty'
to govern. I get caught in that.
The administration can't move the
Congress, so I've got to get my
hands dirty and try to move
Congress myself."
And move Congress he has,
thanks to an excellent flow of information from public-opinion surveys
and well-connected friends, cultivation of American corporations with
links to Canada, mastery of Washington's social life, and aggressivelysuave lobbying techniques. "No
ambassador," according to Wyoming's
Senator Alan Simpson, "understands
the jungle of our politics as well."
The Canadians enjoy a superb
reputation for making their case in
Washington. This adroitness bore
fruit in April 1987 when President
Reagan agreed to consider an
accord on acid rain. In 1988 the two
countries signed a sweeping trade
pact to eliminate all bilateral tariffs
over a ten-year period. Subsequently
Reagan overrode opposition from
Navy brass and approved a Canadian purchase of nuclear submarines using American reactor
technology.
The reasons for Canada's lobbying success as compared to Mexico's
lack of success can be quantified
from the reports of agents who have
registered with the Justice Department, under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, to advance the
interests of the private and public
clients. First, the number of Canadian agents more than tripled from
29 to 100. The total for Mexico (29)
declined. Second, in 1986, 88 of
Canada's 100 agents were "active"
compared to 21 of those signing up
on behalf of Mexican entities.
Third, public and private Canadian
firms increased from 15.7 percent to
68.1 percent their funds earmarked
for political and quasi-political pursuits, whereas Mexican entities continued to disburse only several
percent of their monies for such
important purposes.
Fourth, Canadian clients consistently channeled 10.5 to 25 percent
their resources into attracting

investment to their country and fostering US-Canadian joint-corporate
initiatives-activities that enlarged
an influential pro-Canadian constituency. Meanwhile, between 1978 and
1986, Mexican clients forked out but
a pittance on similar endeavors,
which helps explain the harsh treatment inflicted on Mexico by Helms
and his fellow critics.

Finally, funds spent by Canadian
clients for tourist promotion
declined steadily in recent years,
even as their Mexican counterparts
continued to lavish more than 90
percent (94.9 percent in 1986) of
total outlays on a sector of marginal
political significance.

Mexican Stirrings
The Mexican government has
made desultory attempts to improve
its standing in the US. Mario
Rodriguez, the embassy's University
of Texas-trained trade attache,
reported that in the early 1980s he
was sent to Washington "to change
... attitudes and communicate better" with the US power circle on
trade matters. To accomplish these
goals, he doubled the size of Mexico's Trade Office, computerized his
files, and tried to keep in touch
with key congressional aides. This
stepped-up diplomacy was done quietly. "It's our way of solving problems without creating others for
ourselves;' said Rodriguez.
Still, he was only one person and
found it impossible to cover all the
political bases. After Mexico banned

US trucking services on the strength
of an obscure 1955 presidential
decree, the Teamsters and the American Trucking Association retaliated
by convincing Congress to pass the
1984 Motor Carrier Safety Act. Few
Mexican truckers could meet the
law's strict standards in order to
operate on US highways.
Ultimately the Mexicans forfeited the legislative contest
because, at the insistence of the
Ministry of Communications and
Transport, no representatives
appeared at Senate hearings on the
safety bill. In the absence of opposition the bill passed easily. "If you
don't show up, the guy who does,
wins;' observed a lobbyist employed
by several Mexican clients. "That's
the way the system works." In all fairness to the Mexicans, it would have
taken a herculean effort to triumph
in a US legislative arena over the
combined force of the trucking
firms and organized labor.
Increasingly their American
friends urged Mexican authorities
to hire a public relations firm to
magnify their country's clout in
Washington. In the aftermath of the
scathing publicity beamed on fraudridden state and local elections in
mid-1985, the Office of the Mexican
Presidency recruited Mark Moran,
a Washington lawyer originally
employed by the Hannaford Company, and now a partner in Sawn,
Berger, Mann & Moran, to help tell
Mexico's story to US opinion
leaders. Despite hard work and
goodwill, the ebullient Moran's
modestly-funded efforts have scored
few points, as demonstrated by the
periodic Mexico-bashing.
Salinas epitomizes a new generation of Mexicans who have traveled
and studied in the US, speak English
fluently, know American elites, comprehend the substantial differences
between the US political system and
their own, and realize that Mexico
must not shy from exerting its influence in Washington. These relatively
young men and women understand
the growing interdependence of
Mexico and the US and prefer hammering out pragmatic solutions to
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mutual problems rather than
indulging in demagogic rhetoric.
Salinas's commitment to a tradefocused development strategy has
expanded Mexico's export sector,
magnified the relationship between
internal and external policies, and
forced Mexicans to increase their
foreign contacts. This demarche
coincides with the declining ideological character of US policy toward
Latin America exhibited by the Bush
administration.
The key element in an energized
Mexican lobbying effort would be a
dynamic embassy, which must add
substantially to the 22 professionals
working there in January 1989. The
staff of 11 consulates and the experienced specialists in the Trade Office
should complement the embassy's
activities. As the Canadians have
done, the ambassador might assign
special projects to one of the bigleague lobbying outfits or law firms
that abound in Washington.
The cultivation of legislative and
executive contacts should be an
invigorated embassy's first priority,
followed by continued upgrading of
its standing with the media. Mexico
will loft its star in the halls of Con-

gress, in the White House, in the
State Department, among editorial
writers, and in the TV newsrooms if
it can activate business leaders who
have an interest in both the country's economic vitality and harmonious bilateral ties.
Intensive and systematic mobilization of Mexico's oil clients is imperative-with the Mexican ambassador, appropriate consuls general,
and key cabinet secretaries cultivating the Texas-Oklahoma-Louisiana
oil patch. Equally prudent would be
mobilizing the scores of US corporations that supply goods and services
to Petr6leosMexicanos (Pemex), the
national oil monopoly, and to other
state firms. A letter or phone call
from a Mexican diplomat may
impress-but not move to action--a
senator or representative. More
likely, a contact from the chief executive officer of US Steel, whose
profitable Marathon Oil subsidiary
is a key Pemex customer, will have an
activating effect. Few people realize
that hundreds of thousands of
American jobs are generated by
trade with Mexico and that Mexican
political stability and economic wellbeing are important to US security.

The embassy should make common cause with the Mexico-US
Business Committee, a binational
organization composed of corporate elites in both nations. The
American component of the organization is the "US Council," which is
chaired by Rodman C. Rockefeller
and composed of 33 giant corporations ranging from ALCOA to
Zenith.
The Mexico-US Business Committee is not a registered lobbyist.
Nevertheless, its members have buttonholed key policymakers in both
nations to oppose protectionism
and support a bilateral framework
for trade and investment.
Failure to develop an effective
presence in Washington militates
against favorable laws and administrative acts. Worse still, it encourages more bludgeoning by officials
who perceive Mexico to be an inviting target. In turn, such diatribes
spark recriminations from Mexico
City. Hence they provide ammunition to the critics of pro-American
leaders such as Salinas, who are
valiantly promoting the economic
and political advancement of their
deeply troubled nation. .

The Quest for Business Survival
by Francisco Valdes

Carlos Salinas de Gortari
further exposes Mexican
business to the rigors and
risks of international
competition, domestic
s
the administration of
firms are scrambling,
economically and politically, for sur-

A

vival. It remains unclear which sectors of domestic business, and which
particular firms, will survive. What
is clear is that business associations
have responded to the uncertainties
of the 1980s by assuming a more
active political stance.

The Old-style Politics of Business
FranciscoValdes is professorof political science at the Centro de Investigaci6n y Docencia Econ6mica, in Mexico
City, and a visitingprofessorat Brown
University and the University of
Connecticut.

Mexican entrepreneurs channel
their political actions through two
kinds of business associations (see
table): associations based on sectoral
and regional concerns and those
built on wider business concerns.

Among the sectoral organizations
are confederations of industry, commerce, banking, insurance, and agriculture, while among the regional
organizations are Mexico City's
Association of Vallejo Industrialists
and Monterrey's Chamber of Manufacturers. The organizations that
address wider business concerns
(e.g., labor relations, fiscal policy,
foreign investment) include
COPARMEX, CCE, and CMHN.
The various strata of the nation's private sector-as divided by activity,
size, capital, technology, market, and
region-use such associations to
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Business Organizations and the State
Moderate Faction
Unconditional
Support
I
CNPP
CNPC

Radical Faction
Strong
Criticism
V
COPARMEX
CONCANACO

Moderate
Criticism
II
CANACINTRA

III
CANACO-MEX
CNG
AMIS
CMHN
AMCB

IV
CONCAMIN
CCE
CAMCO
CNA

AMCB

Asociaci6n Mexicana de Casasde Bolsa
Mexican Association of Stock Market Brokers'

CNA

Consejo NacionalAgropecuario
National Agricultural Council"

AMIS

Asociaci6n Mexicana de Institucionesde Seguros
Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions'

CNG

Confederaci6nNacionalGanadera
National Livestock Confederation"

CAMCO

CdmaraAmericana de Comercio
American Chamber of Commerce"

CNPC

ConfederacibnNacional de Comarasdel Pequeho Comercw
National Confederation of Chambers of Small Commerce*

CANACINTRA CdmaraNacionalde la Industriade Transformaci6n
National Chamber of the Transformation Industry*

CNPP

CANACO-MEX CtmaraNacional de Comerciode la Ciudad de Mexico
National Chamber of Commerce of Mexico City*

Confederaci6nNacionalde la PequerlaPropiedad
National Confederation of Small Property Owners"

CONCAMIN

ConfederacibnNacionalde CdmarasIndustriales
National Confederation of Chambers of Industry'

Colzseio ~omtlinrulm Emhrpmrinl
Entrepreneurial Coordinating Council
(affiliates all national organizations)"
CMHN

CONCANACO Confederaci6nNacional de Coimarasde Comercio
National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce*

Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios
Mexican Businessmen Council
(formed by 32 key heads of investment groups)"

COPARMEX

ConfederacionPatronalde la RepusblicaMexicana
Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic"

*Legallyrecognized as a mandatory affiliationand state-policy consultingorganization. "Voluntary affiliation
organization.

pursue their political interests and
spread their vision of "what's good
for Mexico."'
The participation of business

associations in Mexican politics is
nothing new. It dates from 1917,
when, as the victors of the 1910 Mexican Revolution began to reconstruct the nation's economy, major
entrepreneurs founded confederations of industry (CONCAMIN) and
commerce (CONCANACO) to represent their interests. Private enterprise, like the military, was excluded
from the official party of the Revolution (which eventually became the
Institutional Revolutionary Party,
PRI, whose membership comprises
peasants, labor, and the amorphous
"popular sector"). By the 1940s,
however, the official party and Mexico's business leadership had agreed
on guidelines for the latter's involvement in economic policymaking.
Business leadership agreed not to
oppose, as a sector, the state's oneparty system, receiving in exchange
the right to participate in selecting

government officials and in making
economic policy.

By the 1960s the upper rungs of
Mexican business had become a
more powerful economic force,
having consolidated their position
in finance, industry, commerce, and
agriculture. The state's policies of
"stabilized development" dictated
that government intervention in the
economy gradually give way to private enterprise. As this process
occurred, state-business relations
entered a new phase. The heads of
major firms were no longer content
to restrict their political involvement
to matters of economic policy; they
became increasingly concerned with
shaping both public opinion and
state policy in general. In the early
1970s business representatives
launched a campaign to end the
sector's "second-class" citizenship,
claiming that "leftist groups" (i.e.,
sectors of PRI and various intellectuals in the press and in universities)
dominated civic affairs.
During a bitter conflict with the

administration of Luis Echeverria
(1970-76) over its emphasis on populist reforms, representatives of leading businesses founded the CCE.
Its purpose was to coordinate the
efforts of business associations in
striving to make government policy
more responsive to the interests of
the private sector. The CCE remains
a key channel for business initiatives
in Mexican politics.

The New Politics of Survival
The Mexican economy is in the
midst of painful, massive adjustments. President Salinas's policies of
economic restructuring, which he
began to shape while at the Ministry

of Budget and Planning in 1982-88,

push Mexico further into the competitive arena of the world market.
These policies emphasize export-led
industrialization, and thus the dis-

mantling of government protectionism, as the path to economic
recovery. The political worries of
business focus on the exhaustion of
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Mexico's post-1940 pattern of economic development and the uncertainties inherent in exploring a new
economic path.
Mexican business is heterogeneous. Firms run the gamut in
terms of specialization, size, capital,
technology, and market. The leading
domestically-owned industrial, commercial, and financial enterprises
are concentrated in three metropolitan areas: Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara. The country's
northernmost region has become
transformed into a booming,
export-oriented zone of predominantly foreign companies.
Numerous studies indicate that the
leading domestically-owned firms of
Mexico City and Monterrey dominate the major business associations, such as AMCD, CCE, CMHN,
COPARMEX, CONCAMIN, and

CONCANACO.
The politics of business associations run the gamut from strident
criticism to unconditional support
of government policies (see table).
At the antigovernment end of the
spectrum are COPARMEX, which

represents employers, and CONCANACO, which represents chambers of commerce. This faction
aggressively pursues a right-wing
agenda in wide-ranging spheres
such as labor relations, taxation,
elections, education, and religion.
Ranging from less critical to moderately supportive are CCE, as
already discussed; CMHN, which
serves the heads of Mexico's key
investment groups (e.g., Grupo Alfa,
Televisa, and Casa de Bolsa); and
CANACINTRA, which serves the
manufacturing industry. What the
centrist associations share is a preference not only for cautious stances
but for direct, discreet negotiations
with the government. Lastly, at the
pro-government end of the spectrum are two of the least influential
associations, CNPC and CNPP,
which represent small business.
Their differences aside, most
business factions agree that public
authority is excessively concentrated
in the presidency, that state bureaucracy is too involved in the economy,
and that the private sector is poorly
represented in government. In

response the factions are stepping
up their participation in the political
arena. The most powerful organizations, such as CCE, CMHN, and
CANACINTRA, focus on the circumspect strategy of bolstering
their roles in the making of national
economic policy. The lower-tier organizations are more likely to take the
riskier path of becoming more
active in electoral politics and in
spreading the "world view" of the
private sector. Yet both strategies
serve the same agenda:
* Setting up a true partnership
between government officials and
business leadership.
* Establishing the direct involvement
of business in government
policymaking.
* Building a strong network of civic
organizations to disseminate the
values and broaden the political
influence of business.
During the Salinas administration Mexico's private sector will continue its quest to gain a leading
economic, political, and social role
in charting the future course of
Mexican affairs. a

A Repoliticized Military?
by Stephen] Wager
he politics of Mexico's
military stands in sharp
contrast to that of its
Latin American counterparts. The fundamental
difference is that the
1910 Mexican Revolution
depoliticized the nation's military.
The Constitution of 1917, the capstone document of the Revolution,
defines a threefold mission for the

Stephen Wager, a lieutenantcolonel
in the US army and a doctoralstudent in history at Stanford University,
served as the US assistantarmy
attachiin Mexico Cityfrom 1985

to 1988.

Hemisphere* Winter 1989

---------

I

military: defending Mexico's sovereignty, enforcing the constitution,
and preserving internal order. Since
World War II the military's principal
mission has been the preservation of
internal order. In light of geopolitical considerations, the choice of that
mission has been a judicious one,
since defending Mexico against the
US is not feasible and defending
Mexico against Guatemala is hardly
necessary.
The present strength of Mexico's
armed forces is approximately
135,000. In Mexico, as in the rest of
Latin America, the army is the dominant service, accounting for about
75 percent of the active forces and
receiving a commensurate portion

of the defense budget. As a percentage of gross domestic product,
however, Mexico's military budget
continues to be among the lowest in
Latin America. Mexico's military is a
closed institution; its activities have
long been shrouded in secrecy. Even
specialists, both Mexican and foreign, have trouble discerning the
pulse of the nation's armed forces.
Many observers have assumed that
since the mid-1970s the armed forces
have had a burning desire to take
an active role in political affairs.

The Crisis Unfolds
During the mid-1970s deteriorating
economic conditions under Presi-

dent Luis Echeverria fomented
rumors of a military coup. In 1982,
when President Jose L6pez Portillo
nationalized Mexico's banks, the
atmosphere of tension and uncertainty led to further rumors of military intervention. But on both
occasions the army, the military's key
sector, obediently remained above
the fray of national politics. Traditionally, presidential elections have
stimulated debates over the feasibility of a military candidate. Yet, in
contrast to other Latin American situations, the overriding assumption
in Mexico has always been that such
a candidate would resign from the
armed forces before accepting the
presidential nomination.
In 1988, for the first time in more
than 40 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was engaged
in an all-out struggle against strong
electoral opposition. Heading the
opposition was Cuauhtemoc CArdenas, the son of ex-president
LAzaro Cirdenas. The older CArdenas was an army general and
remains a powerful symbol of the
Revolution's legacy of social reforms
and nationalism. In opposing the
PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas
courted the armed forces. Some
analysts suggest that, like the electorate in general, the military voted in
substantial proportion for Cardenas.
The fact remains that the army
stayed at the periphery of Mexican
politics, thereby ensuring a peaceful
and lawful election on July 6.
The army has been the subject of
rumors in recent years concerning
its growing role in deterring political
violence and instability and in
enforcing the government's antidrug
policies. During the presidency of
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), the
government increasingly anticipated
problems of violence and demonstrated the military's strength before
the opposition could mobilize. De la
Madrid's administration featured
this strategy before and during state
elections. A prime example was the
case of Chihuahua in the summer
of 1986, when his administration
forestalled violence by deploying

extra troops to patrol streets and
polling places.

Regarding the antidrug campaign, De la Madrid's government
concluded that the production
and transportation of illegal drugs
required the attention of administrative and law-enforcement agencies. The armed forces continue to
participate in the antidrug campaign. The army is responsible for
the eradication of illegal crops. And
the navy is responsible for the interdiction of drug-transporting vessels
in territorial waters.

The Military under Salinas
The direction the Mexican military
will take under Salinas is unclear.
Salinas chose a secretary of defense,
Antonio Riviello Dazan, who
ensures the military's loyalty. Doing
so was crucial in the wake of the
political uncertainties arising from
last year's presidential election and
the new administration's program of
economic restructuring. The military is expected to continue its allegiance to PRI in the near future. A
recent example was the army's role
in January's lightning-like strike
against "La Quina" and the powerful Oil Workers' Union. The army
has demonstrated such allegiance
not only by actively supporting
Salinas against the oil-union leadership, but also by parading on inauguration day, an uncommon

practice.
Undoubtedly Salinas will call on
the army to handle additional conflicts. Nonetheless, the army will
probably try to minimize the use of
force. After all, it still bears the scars
of the 1968 Tlatelolco incident,
when soldiers fired upon masses of

protesting students. The army's
actions on that fateful day severely
tarnished its image. Today's leaders,
who were majors and lieutenant colonels then, have taken precautionary
measures to prevent such incidents.
The army remains wary of performing police-arrest functions. Instead
it prefers to intercede in potential
problems before they get out of
hand.
During the De la Madrid years
the army began a process of extensive reorganization that will likely
continue during the Salinas government. Army leadership views the
reorganization, which emphasizes
the institution's tactical divisions, as
an initiative to further depoliticize
its role. A series of military educational reforms has complemented
this initiative. Analysts of Latin
America have learned that professionalization is not synonymous with
depoliticization. Still, the Mexican
military is unique among the armed
forces of Latin America, and continued depoliticization may indeed be
its future.
Rumors about the building of a
Mexican national security apparatus
have proliferated in recent years.
If it does exist, such an apparatus
could override the various reforms
and lead the military into the political arena. Yet the military would
likely confine its involvement to the
well-defined sphere of national security and thus avoid entanglement in
the nation's formidable economic
problems.
It is erroneous to equate the
heightened visibility of the Mexican
military with heightened political
influence. Moreover, the military
remains insufficiently trained to
take over the reins of government.
The next six years will probably not
provide the military with a crash
course in heading the government.
As far as the military's leadership is
concerned, this is all for the best. In
light of the recent failures of military-led governments throughout
Latin America, the military leadership of Mexico welcomes the opportunity to stay out of the political
limelight. a
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Grassroots Challenges
by Luis Hern6ndez and Laura Carlsen

exico's presidential

election of July 6,
1988, gave voice to a
widespread phenomenon that has been
quietly growing for
years. Grassroots
movements-independent organizations of campesinos, workers, slumdwellers, religious groups, feminists,
environmentalists, and othersprepared the ground for the massive
anti-PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) expression on election day.
Such movements have evolved from
the aftermath of the government's
antistudent repression of 1968,
which spawned a generation of social
activists. But the movements have
gained force as survival mechanisms
in a setting of authoritarian government and economic crisis. The goal
of the grassroots initiatives is survival
-for families, communities, and
the nation.
Grassroots movements provide
the key to understanding the changing political climate of Mexico. Who
are these groups? And what is their
political role?

The Urban Popular Movement
As Mexico's cities became bloated
with poor residents during the
1970s, the urban masses began to
press for housing and neighborhood
services such as sewage, water, and
transportation. The onset of economic crisis in the early 1980s, as
well as the 1985 earthquake and the
1988 presidential election, escalated
Luis Hernndez is a consultant, in
Mexico City, on grassrootsorganizations to the Inter-American Foundation. Laura Carlsenis on the editorial
staffofThe Other Side of Mexico, in
Mexico City.

popular demands for government
response. The government, however,
did not respond. As a result, grassroots organizations entered virgin
terrain by providing urban services.
The urban popular movement
(UPM) displays several novel characteristics. To begin with, its participants come together because of
their demands as consumers, not as
producers. Thus their tactics consist
not of strikes, which are the bread
and butter of labor movements, but
of sit-ins and marches. Another
innovation is that women form the
core of UPM's constituency. "Popular feminism" focuses attention on
the "quality of life"-family economic needs, domestic work, bearing and rearing children, personal
relationships, crime, and sex discrimination. This aspect of UPM is
full of contradictions: their practices
notwithstanding, the women cling to
traditional conceptions of gender
and would never call themselves
"feminists." The fact remains that,
through groups like the Women's
Regional of the National Coordinating Body of the Urban Popular
Movement, they exert a growing
impact on a broad array of grassroots initiatives.
An additional new feature is
UPM's concept of "territorial" organizing. The nucleus of the organization is always the people who live
side by side. This may include a
group that invaded land to build
self-help houses, people who sought
to rebuild their neighborhood after
the earthquake, or a community that
would no longer tolerate life without
basic services. Among the resulting
initiatives are neighborhood housebuilding cooperatives, tenant-rights
organizations, food cooperatives,
and crime-watch committees.
A final novelty is that UPM is nei-

ther a formal nor legal organization.
The resulting flexibility makes the
movement more resistant to government co-optation and repression
and to its own in-fighting. By making the movement accessible to
neighborhood residents, the informality also facilitates the leap
from personal complaints to public
action. Furthermore it lays the
groundwork for nationwide coalitions among all types of grassroots
organizations. One instance is the
alliance between the Peoples' Union
of Nueva Tenochtitln, an organization of Mexico City tenants, and the
Venustiano Carranza National
Organization of Street Vendors.

Labor
The economic crisis has unleashed
considerable repression against
Mexico's "rank-and-file" labor movement. This movement encompasses
"independent" unions, which are
officially registered but not affiliated with the government or labor
confederations; and "currents,"
democratic movements within official unions. The latter have become
the more common of the two; since
1972 the government has refused to
grant independent registration at
the national level, with the notable
exception of the "19th of September" Garment Workers' Union that
formed after the 1985 earthquake.
Labor is the least likely of the
grassroots movements to advance its
interests during the Salinas administration. For one thing, the local and
national labor arbitration and conciliation boards, government authorities, PRI officials, and "charros"
(official union bosses) oppose the
rank-and-file movement, which challenges the entrenched lines of power
and corruption. For another, thou-
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sands ofjobs have been lost not only
to the national downswing but also
to industrial reconversion, the

government's project to improve
Mexico's productive capacity and
reorient it to foreign markets. In
recent years the government has
guaranteed the proliferating
maquiladoras,or export-assembly
plants, of the northern border
region a cheap and docile work force
as part of a package of direct subsidies and decreased export taxes.
Inflation, wage controls, and cutbacks in social services worsen the
plight of working-class families. The
bottom line is that since 1982 the
purchasing power of Mexicans has
plunged by more than 50 percent.
These conditions augur poorly
for both independent and official
unions. Indeed, the longstanding
privileges of the official unions are
quickly eroding. Indications of the
latter are the devastating Economic
Solidarity Pact of December 1987
and Salinas's action against the leadership of the Oil Workers' Union
(which was not simply a matter of
eliminating corruption, as commonly reported in the US press).
Nevertheless, it is not yet time to
write eulogies for the Mexican labor
movement. The emergence of the
Garment Workers' Union after the
earthquake, the success of workers'
cooperatives (notably the Pascual

ances hold a key to revitalizing the

labor movement and, more generally, to forcing the Salinas adminis-

tration to take seriously grassroots
pressures.

Campesinos
The demand for land remains the
driving force of campesino initiatives,

but now it has company. Demands
for control over the marketing of
crops and for democratic represen-

tation have risen to prominence on
the agenda of rural grassroots
movements.

For decades opponents of PRI

pesino campaigns to raise the official
price of corn. Garment workers
march alongside poor urban women
to demand social services. Orga-

gained strength in the cities, but the
countryside remained the privileged
terrain of the official party. This situation dramatically changed in July
1988, when thousands of campesinos
abandoned the ranks of PRI and
their state of apathy to back the candidacy of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas.
In Michoacdn, Oaxaca, La Laguna,
coastal Guerrero, and parts of
Veracruz, PRI's near monopoly over
the peasantry has finally been broken. Rural discontent with PRI
stems from government policies that
encourage large-scale production
for export, thereby concentrating
land, credit, and other resources in
the hands of a few. Such policies
sacrifice rural living standards to
export growth and industrial development, a key reason for the massive
migration from rural zones to
Mexican cities and to the US. A sign
of plunging living standards in the
countryside is that, according to
researchers at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, from
1982 to 1987 the terms of trade of
agriculture with industry dropped
by 30 percent.
Agrarian protest-more isolated
and severely repressed than that of
any other popular sector-has continued unabated. In cases like the
Democratic Campesino Front of
Chihuahua, it has become regional

nized professors actively support

in scope. For some groups the presi-

students' demands for participation
in university decisions. And unions
of all kinds have joined together to

dential election was just the most
recent form of protest. A case in
point is the Guerrero town of "El
Quemado" ("The Burned Town"),

soft-drink factory), and the victory
of Volkswagen workers in staving off
contract givebacks are signs of life
in the rank-and-file movement.
Attempts to unify the independent

unions, particularly the three-yearold Union Coordinating Council,
are potentially important.
Equally significant, many unions

are beginning to view their objectives in broader light. For instance,

rural teachers participate in cam-

protest electoral fraud. Such alli-

whose name derives from the
scorched-earth tactics of the Mexican army in fighting the area's guerrilla insurgency of the 1960s. Those
residents who suffered imprisonment and torture at the hands of the
government are Cardenistastoday. In
addition are thousands of rural converts without organized political
experience who see in Cirdenas a
viable alternative to PRI.
There are also economic implications. Salinas, when he served during the De la Madrid presidency in
the Ministry of Budget and Planning, developed a program of agrarian modernization based on the

principle of negotiation. Some campesinos, especially those who belong
to the National Union of Autonomous Regional Campesino Organizations (UNORCA), adopted this
style. Not only did they implement
successful cooperatives; they also
reached accords with the government regarding matters such as
price guarantees, marketing, technical training, housing, and social welfare. Apparently the government
was willing to concede greater independence to the campesinos in
exchange for more efficient production. Signs are that, as president,
Salinas will continue this approach.
PRI's agrarian proposals have
openly incorporated the principles
of UNORCA's project and some of
UNORCA's advisors have considerable influence with Salinas.
The relationship between
UNORCA and the government illustrates one political avenue open to
grassroots organizations. This avenue is potentially viable for two reasons. First, the traditional left has
failed to generate a workable program of agricultural modernization.
Second, the Salinas approach, it
seems, respects the independence of

grassroots organizations.
UNORCA's strategy, however,

contains points of serious vulnerability. The strategy underestimates the co-optive powers of PRI
in the form of the party's old-style
agrarian leaders. It therefore overestimates the Salinas administration's willingness to sacrifice political
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control, and overlooks the possibility that regional campesino leadership could become absorbed by the
government bureaucracy. Furthermore the strategy could benefit the
most favorably-positioned campesinos-those who own decent land
and produce exportable crops-at
the expense of their "less important" counterparts.
In the meantime last fall's official
announcement of low guaranteed
prices for corn and beans elicited
massive rural protest. Campesinos
blocked federal highways, refused to
deliver crops, and seized silos, while
grassroots organizations maneuvered to form coalitions. What is
more, since the Salinas administration began, almost three dozen campesino activists have been murdered
in Chiapas, Guerrero, Jalisco,
Morelos, Oaxaca, and Veracruz.
These murders, including the killing
of four activists and the wounding
of 15 others during a municipal election on January 22 in Xoxocotla,
Morelos, are evidence that the
defense of traditional Indian culture
and self-government is often a leading goal of campesino protest. This is
especially true in the southern states
of Chiapas and Oaxaca, where
indigenous culture forms the basis
for alternative economic and community projects.

What's to Come?
The emergence of other grassroots
movements-of, among others, students, Christian base communities,
and environmentalists-is infusing
new values and constituencies into
the campaign for democracy. In
doing so, these movements provide
myriad new combinations of grassroots alliances. For instance, Christian base communities have joined
forces with UPM to provide health
services in poor neighborhoods,
with campesinos to fight for price
supports, and with environmentalists to protest against the Laguna
Verde nuclear plant. And environmentalists have organized not only
against Laguna Verde but in support of both Cardenismoand efforts
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by Indian groups to defend their
access to natural resources.
The context for the continued
development of grassroots initiatives is clear. During a period of
economic crisis, the presidential
contest of 1988 opened the way for
"ground-up" and "top-down" competition to gain the support of the
vast middle sectors: the millions of
Mexicans who neither participate in
grassroots organizations nor fill government posts. These sectors of
Mexican society are becoming vocal
-people who previously restricted
their protests to grumbling around
the kitchen table or Fridayafternoon griping in the neighborhood cantina.
This is a time of strange bedfellows, as political allies eye each
other suspiciously at meetings previously not thought possible. Not that
the new scenario is without risks.
For example, in many states, antiPRI Cardenistafactions do not yet
constitute a viable democratic force.
By the same token, new movements

face an old threat: co-optation by
Mexico's government machinery.
Professional politicians are inherently a risky bet as popular allies.
Already several federal deputies,
who were elected as opposition candidates, have returned to PRI, having succumbed to the juicy offers of
the official party.
Yet professional politicians of the
new electoral opposition have been
forced to adopt new tactics. The
elections proved they can neither
win elections nor build democracy
without developing new political
channels of mass participation.
Enter the grassroots organizations. One of their major tasks is to
ensure that the new Party of the
Democratic Revolution, linked to
the Cardenistamovement, understands this message. The grassroots
organizations must take into
account the many risks and the possible gains, move carefully but
quickly, and constantly judge how
best to advance democracy under
unprecedented circumstances. .
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Family Business, Mexican Style
by Alan Knight

A Mexican Elite Family,
1820-1980

a work of anthropology, by anthropologists. (Or, at a pinch, it falls
within Paul Friederich's category of
"anthrohistory," albeit squarely
emphasizing the "anthro.") Historians of Mexico will note with interest those episodes in which
macrohistorical trends impinged
upon family fortunes: the railway
building of the 1870s; the entrepreneurial setbacks of the 1910s and
1930s; and the residential shifts
associated with the prodigious
growth of Mexico City after 1940.

by LarissaAdler Lomnitz and Marisol
Prez-Lizaur.Princeton:Princeton
University Press, 1987 294 pp.

Paperback. $15.00.

Family Business, Past and Present
Don Pedro G6mez (all the names in
this book are pseudonyms) was a
Creole landowner in the Puebla
region of Mexico during the late
colonial period. The family he
fathered went on to prosper, first as
modest provincial entrepreneurs,
then as powerful Mexico City capitalists. The family fortune took off
along with the Mexican economy
during the Porfiriato,the "order and
progress" dictatorship of Porfirio
Diaz (1876-1911). By the time of the
1910 Revolution the G6mez family
owned stores, textile factories, lumber mills, banks, insurance companies, and real estate. Buffeted,
but not sunk, by the storms of revolution, the G6mez's made an impressive comeback during the 1920s,
their familial trajectory again following the curve of national economic
upswing. They continued to prosper, weathering the ugly challenge
of Cardenismo(1934-40) and benefiting from the sustained boom of
World War II and the postwar
decades of "desarrolloestabilizador"
("stabilized development").
This diachronic process, however, is not the central feature of the
book. At its heart lies the synchronic
analysis of the G6mez family during
the 1970s and early '80s. The main
sources are oral accounts and firsthand observations, supplemented by
archival work. The book is therefore

category "mestizo" is absent from
contemporary G6mez family discourse (p. 196).
The anthropological analysis of
the modern G6mez clan is a different matter. Here the authors move
with the assurance conferred by a
mass of detailed data and a sure
grasp of the comparative and theoretical literature. Their main point is
that the G6mez family constitutes a
three-generation grandfamily of
remarkable cohesion. This cohesion
is maintained by co-residence or
close residence, shared rituals, a
durable family ideology (Catholic,
conservative, nationalist, and patriarchal), and an evolving family
memory, or "cognitive map." This
"map" is chiefly compiled and maintained by the family's "centralizing
women," who are the principal
sources of the authors' data. (This
fact raises the unanswerable question: to what extent have these
sources colored the authors' analysis, substituting family norms for
practice?)
So enveloping is the familial network that escape proves difficult,
except for those individual deviants
(a jailed divorcee, a renegade flamenco dancer) who are disowned,
or those poorer, provincial branches
of the family that are discreetly
lopped off. Women who marry into
the G6mez clan are grappled to it.
Their original family ties must atrophy. As one such affinal woman puts
it: "The ideal of a G6mez man is to
marry a test-tube baby" (p. 229).
Members of the family can run but
they can't hide. When a G6mez
daughter married and went to live
with her new husband in the US
("partly in order to get away from
the domination of the family"), "several sisters bought properties near
them and on one occasion a plane-

But the historical analysis is thin
and includes some aberrations.
Diaz's Cientificos were hardly a "class
of professional bureaucrats"; the
sketch of the 19th century is questionable; and in 1923 the Christero
[sic] War was still three years from
starting (pp. 17, 18, 205). A more
serious shortcoming is the interpretation of the Revolution as primarily a movement of mestizo selfassertion that led to a "new mestizo
society" This interpretation takes
too much at face value the rhetoric
of the Revolution. Indeed, in one of
their many illuminating observations, the authors note that the very

Alan Knight is professor of history at
the University of Texas, Austin.
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load of fifty-one ... relatives arrived

to spend Christmas with the wouldbe loners" (p. 101).
This suffocating solidarity
reveals its utility in the realm of
business. Unfortunately the book
tells us little about the family's
business operations. We learn the
G6mez's are suspicious of the state.
They loathed presidents Lazaro Cardenas, a "Communist," and Luis
Echeverria, "a madman who was
tearing down everything that had
been achieved in Mexico during earlier decades." We also learn they revered Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, "a great
president," the scourge of students,
subversives and "intellectual bums,"
who happened to attend G6mez
family weddings (pp. 199-201). Nonetheless, the character of the G6mez
economic empire, its business operations, and its relations with government remain obscure. What we see
is a view from the drawing room and
not the board room.
Hence the book contrasts with
those more conventional analyses of
Mexican business elites that focus
on public rather than private personae (e.g., Alex Saragoza's The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State,
1880-1940, 1988). In addition the
book contradicts the familiar thesis
(first sustained by Sanford Mosk's
IndustrialRevolution in Mexico, 1950,
and since repeated by Saragoza)
that Mexico City entrepreneurial
groups, in contrast to their counterparts in the northern industrial city
of Monterrey, operate in close and
even sympathetic conjunction with
the Mexican state. The G6mez family, at least in its rhetoric, spurns the
state; whether its business practices
match its rhetoric is not clear.
What is clear is the nature of
family ideology and ritual. Here the
information and insights are telling.

We learn of a family that is aggressively Catholic yet displays a
strangely secular indifference to the
priesthood. (This is not the only
respect in which the G6mez's,
despite their elite status, resemble
some peasant cultures.) We learn of
a family steeped in machismo: for
the women, Kirche, Kiche, Kinder
(church, kitchen, and children); for
the men,feo,fuertey formal (ugly,
strong, and formal), according to
the G6mez ideal of the kept mistress
and the casa chica (the husband's illegitimate family) (pp. 142, 210-11).
We learn, too, of a family that is
aggressively nationalistic, in somewhat knee-jerk and hypocritical
fashion. Its members value Mexico's
modern image, typified by the Olympic games of 1968, which President
Diaz Ordaz providentially saved
from domestic subversion. They
flaunt traditional Mexican symbols
-food, the Virgin of Guadeloupe,
and charro (cowboy) customs-and
they see the 1938 petroleum nationalization by President Cardenas as
his one positive achievement. Yet
they salt away their money in foreign
banks, they deplore President Echeverria's replacement of French furniture with "coarse Mexican handicrafts" at the presidential residence
of Los Pinos, and, for their lavish
riding expeditions, they have discarded Mexican for Spanish saddles.
Their nationalism, it seems, has a
strong taint of material self-interest.
Despite frequent trips abroad, they
have no time for foreigners or
foreign culture, and they entertain
Mexican stereotypes worthy of any
petty bourgeois bigot. Only Spain
and Spaniards escape censure: the
family boasts Spanish roots, and
Spanish capital and marriages have,
for generations, reinforced the
family business.

Conversely Mexico's Indian heritage is disdained. The G6mez family
affords further evidence of the shallowness of revolutionary indigenismo,
at least among the country's elites,
as well as of the pervasive importance of Spanish commerce and
immigration. Oddly the book makes
no mention of servants-their
numbers, role, and treatment. While
the existence of servants is implied,
the G6mez women, we are told, are
expected to breast-feed their
numerous children, change their
diapers, get up at night when they
cry, and shepherd them to and from
school (p. 212). To what extent are
these indeed daily practices, or
merely idealized norms?
Such questions aside, the
authors' patient cognitive mapping
is valuable and illuminating. They
penetrate the institutional facade of
the Mexican elite-the eternal
impersonal acronyms of parties and
business confederations-and touch
the intangible mentalit of Mexican
conservatism. They reveal something of its abiding strengths, its
inner contradictions, and its
forms of ideological self-reproduction.
Ritual is of key importance. It must
be said the G6mez's are a pretty boring lot. Despite decent educations,
they have few or no cultural interests. Family, money, and politics (in
that order) dominate dinner-table
conversations. Their lavish entertaining, horse rides, and foreign
excursions evoke somewhat Reaganesque images.
Thus, if the authors' lengthy discussion of the family's daily routines
and rituals sometimes palls, the fault
lies more with the G6mez's than with
the authors (ch. 5). Nor can the rites
of passage of such Mexican elites
compare, in terms of novelty and
exotica, with those of Melanesian
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primitives. Family conversations, we
learn, "present an important arena
for the process of adaptation of
the family ideology to daily needs"
(p. 181). But, apart from a growing
awareness (and practice?) of birth
control, it is not clear that the G6mez
family's ideology has undergone significant changes over the years; it is
the clan's dogged familism, Catholicism, anti-intellectualism, and conservatism that are striking. Like the
Bourbons, the G6mez's have learned
nothing and forgotten nothing. Or,
to take a more recent, quasi-regal
analogy, they seem to blend Reaganesque cultural tastes with a flair for
gemittlich, extended-family junketings that resemble those of the new
American First Family, the Bush's.

Comparing Family Portraits
Behind all this detail, humdrum yet
often fascinating, lies a thesis. The
authors argue the G6mez's exem-

plify a three-generation grandfamily
typical of Latin American families,
rich and poor, and distinct from the
more or less Anglo-Saxon pattern
of two-generation nuclear families.
Cultural norms thus display a
marked consistency across countries, across classes, and across time.
As Lomnitz and Perez-Lizaur say,
"The basic elements of the kinship
system appear to have been essentially invariant since colonial times"
(p. 235). The Mexican bourgeoisie,
the Peruvian middle class, Mexican
shantytown dwellers, and even Mixtec and Maya Indians, all share
three-generational, co-residential
family patterns that set them apart
from British or American families.
These claims are bold and
significant.
In addition business activities
revolve around the family and
impart a distinct irrationality to its
decisions. For the G6mez's it is more
important to preserve the business(es) in family hands, to avoid
corporate anonymity, and to find
niches for deserving family members, than to pursue profit with
ruthless entrepreneurial rationality.
Board meetings are occasions for
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macho bragging, not sober deliberation. Payrolls are padded with relatives; indeed the family has its own
(G6mez) doctor and dentist.
Yet this apparent irrationality
has a perverse rationality. The family
represents a tightly-knit, ideologicallycoherent, and socially-durable
source of mutual support in what
-especially in the 30 years after 1910
-was a dangerous world. Like the
19th-century entrepreneurs described
by David W Walker (Kinship,Business and Politics: The Martinez del
Rio Family in Mexico, 1824-1867, 1987),
the G6mez clan became an elite
version of the extended-family
networks that sustain peasants and
shantytown dwellers.
Since the 1940s, however, the
family modus operandi has become
outdated. In the more benign business climate of PriistaMexico, the
rationality of the padded payroll has
diminished; the need for technological innovation (spurned by the
G6mez's) has increased; and the
multinationals have shouldered
aside these representatives of an
older phase of familial enterprise. As
in the past, the fortunes of the
G6mez family reflect secular phases
in the development of Mexican
capitalism.
The analysis of the G6mez family
is convincing, though it would have
been strengthened by greater concentration on business activities per
se. But is the stark contrast drawn
between irrational Latin and rational Anglo-Saxon capitalism entirely
valid? The authors' rationalcapitalist norm is drawn from Max
Weber, that is, from a deliberately
schematic "ideal type," a model that
is contrived, utopian, and abstract.
Actual business practices are a different matter: irrational familism
(jobs for the boys) and an associated
resistance to technological innovation have been regularly cited as
explanations of Britain's relative
industrial decline. (Conversely the
now fashionable model ofJapanese
industrial organization contains
strong familial strains.) Other elements in this stark cultural contrast
are perhaps
A overdrawn. Reference

to Alan Macfarlane's analysis of the
historical roots of "individualistic
Western societies" (p. 146) is contentious and provides a slippery foothold for grand comparison.
The same problems characterize
the authors' analysis of the state.
"The Mexican state," they write, "is
not a classical bourgeois state in the
sense that other capitalistic societies
are described as such....The Mexican power elite is not identical with
the class owners of the means of
production: one deals in capital, the
other deals in power" (pp. 237-238).
Again, the problem here is not the
Mexican formulation, but rather the
implied contrast with an imaginary
capitalist norm, which supposedly
points to the aberrant character of
the Mexican case. Yet it is something
of a commonplace that, as Karl
Kautsky observed as long ago as
1902, "the capitalist class rules but
does not govern"; that, in Ralph Miliband's more recent formulation,
"the economic elites of advanced
capitalist countries are not properly
speaking a 'governing' class comparable to pre-industrial aristocratic
and landowning classes" (The State
in CapitalistSociety, 1973, pp. 51-55).
To the extent that capitalist relations
broadly prevail, entrepreneurs do
not need to have their hands
directly on the levers of political
power. In this respect the G6mez's
are not so different from entrepreneurs in more "advanced" or "rational" capitalist societies. This does
not mean comparisons of this kind
are inherently invalid. It means,
rather, they are exaggerated, as contrasts between Mexican reality and
non-Mexican ideal types are almost
bound to be.
It would be unfair to blame such
a penetrating case study for failing
to construct a convincing comparative framework. If the contrast
between rational, individualistic
Anglo-Saxons and irrationally familial Mexicans is overdrawn, at least it
emphasizes those aspects of the
G6mez family that are integral to its
growth, survival, and character.
These aspects are reproduced elsewhere in Mexican and Latin Ameri-

can family structures. Lomnitz and
P6rez-Lizaur extend anthropological research beyond the village and
shantytown, to the inner sanctum of
the bourgeois drawing room. In
doing so they have shed light on a
class whose impersonal political
agency is often invoked (e.g., Nora
Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy, 1982, pp. 282-85), but whose
carnal embodiments have usually
remained shadowy and anonymous.
A Mexican Elite Family puts flesh
on the skeletal bones of the Mexican
bourgeoisie. Historians, anthropologists, and sociologists of Mexico
and of Latin America in general
should be grateful. The G6mez's
may not be nice to know, but they
are well worth knowing about.

Mexican Struggles
From Insurrection to Revolution
in Mexico: Social Bases of
Agrarian Violence, 1750-1940
by John Tutino. Princeton:Princeton
University Press, 1986. 425 + xx pp.
$50.00.
The interpretation of insurrections
has come a long way from the stereotypical portrayals of unleashed
animalistic mass violence, stories
about great heroes and villains, and
accusations of "outside agitators"
spouting alien ideologies. They have
gone beyond accounts of "necessary" transitional steps between
"inevitable" historical stages, or
alleged measurements of frustrated
expectations. The trend over the last
20 years has been to combine structural social science with history
from below-in different proportions. This approach has generated
understandings that typically are
sympathetic to insurgents while
specifying the conditions under
which they revolt and the limitations
of their accomplishments. John
Tutino's synthetic history of rural
rebellion in Mexico represents a
splendid example of this intellectual
trend.
Tutino divides his long time span
into three periods: late colonial,

mid-19th century, and the revolution. For each he specifies the loci of
rebellion and passivity, exploring the
changing socioeconomic structures
that gave rise to varying political
actions. For the first period he
focuses on the Bajio (the zone
around Guanajuato), where population growth and commercial
quickening led to lower wages for
campesinos and reduced their access
to land. Two disastrous famine years
led to relief efforts favoring urban
elements, making rural masses available to follow Father Miguel
Hidalgo into sustained insurrection.
But neither the autonomous peasant
communities of central Mexico nor
the secure estate dependents north
of the Bajio felt actionable grievances. The latter, in fact, provided
the troops that suppressed
Hidalgo's forces and the rebel bands
that arose inJalisco and San Luis
Potosi.

The second half of the book covers the "agrarian decompression"
(1810-1880) and "agrarian compression" leading to revolution
(1880-1940). After independence
elites were weak and small holdings
and tenancies grew more numerous.
By 1840 elites had begun to use
political means to secure new
resources, a tendency accelerated
after the passage of "liberal" legislation outlawing communal property.
Mid-century rebellions occurred in
the Yucatan, the Sierra Gorda, and
the isthmus of Tehuantepec. In the
1860s and 1870s peasant revolts in

Chalco, Chiapas, Jalisco, the
Huasteca, and elsewhere helped to
frustrate or delay the implementation of new property arrangements.
But, under Porfirio Diaz, rural elites
in many regions were able to profit
greatly at the expense of the direct
producers: coerced plantation
workers in the center-south lowlands, despoiled villagers in the
highlands, and insecure tenants and
dispossessed smallholders in the
north. When economic crisis, elite
conflicts, and succession problems
came together in 1910-11, a disparate
set of rural rebels took up arms in
what became a revolutionary struggle for land reform. As in 1810,
secure estate dependents played a
minimal part as insurgents.
When Tutino gives detailed
accounts of particular struggles he
introduces familiar factors from
other studies of revolution in Mexico and elsewhere: elite divisions,
popular ascription to elites of
responsibility for distress, and communal and religious traditions.
These factors are not themselves
defined. But Tutino's real interest is
explaining variations in peasant
grievances. For this purpose he
works with four variables: material
well-being, autonomy, security, and
mobility. If declines in any of the
first three are not compensated by
opportunities for the fourth, rebellion becomes probable. As elements
of a descriptive typology, these variables perhaps suffice. Historians of
the old school may even find that
this much theory is an unwarranted
intrusion. Those who prefer a
higher proportion of social science,
however, may well be disappointed
that Tutino eschewed the opportunity to integrate analyses built
around capitalist encroachments
upon peasants with those built
around class relations within distinctive agrarian sectors. Nonetheless, his synthesis of his own archival
investigations, the research of
others, and recent theoretical currents make From Insurrectionto Revolution a welcome contribution to the
burgeoning literature in modern
Mexican history. Attractively pro-
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duced as well, it symbolizes the high
quality that has brought its publisher to the forefront in Latin
American studies.
Walter L. Goldfrank
University of California, Santa Cruz

Cuban Expression
La ultima frontera: 1898
by Alfredo Antonio Fernindez. La
Habana:EditorialLetras Cubanas,
1985. 220 pp. n.p.
El Candidato (1978), Alfredo A. Fernandez's first novel, obtained the
PremioNovela UNEAC and broad
popularity among Cuban readers.
La iltimafrontera reiterates the
qualities that merited such fame.
Fernandez writes in a historical format that Cuba's postrevolutionary
literature has profoundly revised.
This novel tells of the adventures
of a North American lieutenant who,
passing himself off as Stephen
Crane, the correspondent of the
London daily The World, disembarks
on the isle a few months before the
Hispanic-Cuban-American War. The
novel presents an almost mystical
voyage through a historical period
that began with the explosion of the
Maine and culminated with the taking of San Juan Hill by Teddy Roosevelt's "Rough Riders." In
portraying both events the novel
emphasizes the presence of Crane's
imposter among the mambises
(Cuban rebels during the Spanish
domination of the island). The novel
also highlights the events surrounding the mysterious explosion of the
Maine. Fernandez's epilogue transcends the barriers between history
and fiction.
Fernandez presents the disjunction between the history-fiction
and/or fiction-history genres that
texts such as Crouch's Riding with
Garciaand A Yankee Guerrilleroor
Eliseo Perez Diaz's La rosa del cayo
(1947) have exhaustively examined.
Fernandez knows quite well the
epoch explored by historians such as
Foner and Hugh Thomas. The analysis that resulted from works by
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Manuel Moreno Fraginals and Jorge
Ibarra aided in the demystification
of the historical process of Cuban
independence that has now found
an echo in literature.
What differentiates La ultima
fronterais its proximity to a public
made conscious and educated by a
revolutionary process. The novel
does not follow the narrative guidelines of European literary histories;
rather, it represents a new language
in Latin America that merits critical
attention. At times the text parodies
pamphleteering with these characteristics, though it lacks the euphemistic metaphors of that genre. The
book highlights the impact of popular culture through an eroticism
that lacks the controlling mechanisms that Cornelia and Jan Flora
attribute to the Latin American
soap opera and Virginia Erhart
attributes to the works of Corin
Tellado.
La ultimafronterais not a conformist text or the porter of the
hidden ideological messages that
characterize the continental
"fotonovela." If analyzed as an example of literature emerging from the
processes of historical rupture and
discontinuity, this novel establishes a
clear framework for a public that is
witnessing the new literary expressions of Latin America.
Manuel Cachan
University of North Dakota

Taking Shape
The Emergence of Latin America
in the Nineteenth Century
by David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay.
New York: Oxford University Press,
1988. 335 pp. $3250.
David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay
provide a distinguished text for the
period of 1810-1880, a text that adequately reflects current thinking
and is wholesomely analytical.
Although it suffers from a few small
errors, it will stimulate teachers and
students of Latin American history.
Previous texts overstate the
personalismo at work in the 19th century, grossly underplay economic

factors, and ignore the social analysis that has been an important part
of the Latin Americanist trade for
the last generation. This book
attempts to remedy these omissions
and alert us to the fact that today's
political systems have their origins in
the past century. The work's comparative dimension may be its most
valuable contribution. We can see
clearly the 19th-century utilitarianism, liberalism, conservatism, and
positivism in a variety of contexts.
The book will serve admirably as a
first-assigned text in a course on
modern Latin America.
In keeping with recent theory
the authors stress the "corporatist
heritage" of Latin America rather
than class conflict. This emphasis is
appropriate given our belated
understanding of the importance of
corporatism in Latin American culture. A recurring theme in the volume is the inherent contradiction
between corporatism and individual
freedom. Individualism is a "foreign" idea that suffers many defeats
but will not die. The volume's analysis of economic change is thorough
and rewarding. Class analysis is
present when deemed relevant, but
the authors delight in exploring the
multiclass nature of alliances in the
last century. For example, they cite
cases where artisans supported conservatives when doing so saved the
former from the perils of "free
trade." Indians fought liberals if the
latter went "too far" in attacking the
Church's secular and religious role.
The authors' treatment of the implications of ideas for the groups is
realistic, even earthy.
The work begins with two essays
devoted to the formation of new
political, economic, and social systems in independent Latin America.
We glean rich insights from Bushnell's deep understanding of conflicts during the era of independence.
The chapters on the Brazilian empire
display refreshing interpretations
derived from Macaulay's pioneering
work on the subject. The analyses
of Brazil and New Granada, or
Colombia, are the most stimulating
and will force the redrafting of sev-
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eral sets of lecture notes.
Teachers will fault the work for
its lack of maps, especially since the
authors stress regional diversity
within countries. Many place names
appearing in the text are not present on the map at the front of the
volume. Specialists on the 19thcentury history of Latin America
will occasionally find cause for complaint in the chapters devoted to
their particular countries of interest. Since my specialty is early 19thcentury Mexico, I find it distressing
to encounter several errors in chapter four, "Mexico in Decline (18211855):' This chapter is the weakest;
it stresses detail at the expense of
analysis and, since the authors are
not experts on Mexico, the detail
leads them astray.
Allow me to point out several
errors. The Scottish Rite Lodge
existed prior to the arrival of the
British minister and was not chartered by him (p. 66). Alaman was
"interior and exterior minister" in
Victoria's cabinet, not "foreign minister" (p. 65). Interest in education
developed early on: schools were
founded in the 1820s, but they were
disappearing by the 1830s for lack of
financial support. Santa Anna was
not present at the suppression of
the Bravo revolt in December 1827;
he was en route, probably to join
Bravo (p. 72). President Victoria's
favored candidate in 1828 was
G6mez Pedraza, his minister of war,
not General Guerrero (p. 67). And
Victoria did not join the revolt
against his own government, though
he did surrender to rebel forces
when he determined that the cause
was lost (and to avoid further bloodshed) (p. 67).
In effect, the Acordada Revolt
brought down Victoria and G6mez
Pedraza; G6mez Pedraza did not
attempt a "preemptive strike" per se
(p. 67). Guerrero did not order the
expulsion of Spaniards in 1829; the
authority came from laws passed by
the national congresses (as they
had also in 1827 and would again in
1833-34-not mentioned in the text)
(p. 68). Most important, slavery was
not abolished in Texas in 1829-an

exemption was made for that province (a part of the state of Coahuila
y Tejas) to avoid rebellion (p. 68).
Guerrero's wartime "extraordinary
powers" were not the issue upon
which his government was ousted in
December 1829; rather, it was fiscal
bankruptcy and an underpaid army
that did the trick (as Santa Anna's
repeated letters to the chief had
warned it would) (p. 69). Poinsett
was ordered out by Guerrero, his
friend, before Bustamante came to
power, not by the latter (p. 70).
Guerrero did not seek refuge on
Picaluga's ship but, rather, was
invited to dine. He was then
betrayed by Picaluga, on instructions from Minister of War Facio,
not Alaman (this error is present
twice, on pp. 70 and 193), who has
been cleared of suspicion.
Had the same analysis been
applied to the Mexican case for the
1820s and 1830s as was used in the
treatment of other countries, the
authors would not have become
enmeshed in so much detail. Their
basic scheme fits the early Mexican
case as well as it does that of New
Granada. They might consider this
when they undertake (as they surely
will) a second edition.
HaroldDana Sims
University of Pittsburgh

Flesh and Blood
The Human Tradition in Latin
America: The Twentieth Century
edited by William H. Beezley and
JudithEwell. Wilmington: Scholarly
Resources, Inc., 1987 360 pp. $12.95.
What do the lives of an Argentine
tango artist, a Chilean housewife
whose son is among the desaparecidos, a Peruvian soccer star, an
urban squatter from Uruguay, a littleknown power broker from Yucatan,
a Mexican prostitute, and a Cuban
Baptist preacher reveal about the
human tradition in Latin America?
These are among the 23 people
who are profiled in The Human
Traditionin Latin America: The Twentieth Century. Rather than presenting

statistical models and focusing on
historical themes, the book's contributors strive to present the
human element in their studies of
modern Latin American history. In
this compilation of individual biographies, flesh-and-blood people
emerge from a historical context
fraught with obstacles, vicissitudes,
and social injustice.
These individuals come from
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela,
and Uruguay, and from walks of
life that are as diverse as the countries that serve as the backdrop for
their personal dramas. The editors,
however, do not give their criteria
for excluding countries like Paraguay,
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala,
and Puerto Rico. Notwithstanding
these omissions, the editors have
attempted to adequately represent
Latin America's heterogeneity.
What are the common denominators that emerge from such
diverse biographies? What is the aim
of such an apparently amorphous
volume? The editors argue "the
heritage so evident is the story of
courage ... These are stories of
women and men who lived their lives
with pluck and determination." They
also emphasize these stories are of
"ordinary, everyday" people.
A few of the individuals are well
known: the colorful Chilean military
leader, Marmaduke Grove; tango's
greatest artist, Carlos Gardel; and
the senior statesman and intellectual
of Panama's West Indian community, George Westerman. The majority, however, are members of the
obscure masses. Nonetheless, several
of these men and women are extraordinary and heroic, while others seem
adrift in the course of their country's history. They encountered
discrimination based on gender,
nationality, ethnic or racial heritage,
economic class, and family status,
and the difficulties of life under a
dictator.
The "strategies for survival"
chronicled on the pages of The
Human Tralitim in Latint
Amea
Human Traditin in Itin Americ-,
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include: artistic expression (dance
and music, literature, weaving, production of arpillerasor tapestries);
pursuit of athletic prowess (organized sports); adoption of leadership
roles (as minister or priest, lay leader
in a base community, feminist,
regional cacique); and defiance of
authority and established social conventions (Brazil's Patricia Galvio).
In every case the authors introduce
us to people struggling to bring
meaning to their lives under
extraordinarily difficult circumstances, each demonstrating tenacity, perseverance, and trust in his
future.
Steve Stein profiles Miguel Rostaing, one of Peru's premier soccer
players in the early decades of this
century. Venezuelan murderer Ligia
ParraJahn is profiled by Judith
Ewell who writes: "Cultural traditions and values, often nurtured by
gossip, limited modern women as
much as the laws did:' Leoncio
Veguilla's suffering and imprisonment as a Baptist preacher at the
hands of Castro's government is
written by Harold E. Greer. These
and the other biographies of The
Human Tradition in Latin America
clearly demonstrate that what is
political is also personal.
Elena M. deJongh
Florida International University

Growing Pains
Trinidad and Tobago:
The Independence Experience
1962-1987
edited by Selwyn Ryan. St. Augustine:
Institutefor Social andEconomic
Research, University of the West

Indies, 1988. 599 pp. n.p.
In 1962 Eric Williams and the People's National Movement (PNM) led
polyglot Trinidad and Tobago to
independence with a mix of economic centrism, nonalignment, antiimperialism, and a nascent ideology
of Black Power. In 1987 Williams was
six-years dead. The country's postoil-boom economy was in shambles,
the PNM had been drummed out of

office by the National Alliance for
Reconstruction (NAR), and many of
Williams's cronies had departed in
ignominious circumstances. Economic hardship and social factionalism plagued the country as the NAR
splintered along ethnic lines.
These events provide the chronological framing for Trinidadand
Tobago: The Independence Experience
1962-1987 Their significance is
indispensable for understanding the
political conditions that shaped this
collection of essays and commentaries. The contributors are local
academics, politicians, public servants, prominent business leaders,

and some who wear a combination
of hats. While this diversity provides
insight into Trinidad and Tobago's
development experience that goes
beyond the views of academics,
there is a negative side as well.
For example, Frank Rampersad,
who was one of Williams's most
trusted and influential advisors,
reflects on the development experience in what comes off as a banal
apologia, since he says little about
the period's attendant corruption
and waste. In another chapter, former university lecturer and present
NAR cabinet member Bhoe Tewarie
urges his fellow Hindus to reduce
their public identification with the
NAR and to reduce their expectations of patronage from the state.
The political message in his contribution is clear- stop raising a
ruckus-causing "confusion,"' as
they would say in Trinidad-and
your time for political spoils will
come.

This collection examines discourses that are familiar to those
who know Trinidad and Tobago. For
example, it examines the theme of
"pure East Indian culture" being
swamped by "African culture,"' and
the countertheme of an East Indian
"takeover" of the economy, that are
picked up by not only local sociologists but used with impunity by local
politicians. The collection trots out
the "Carnival mentality" (i.e., a supposed aversion to hard work) once
again, if only implicitly. It reminds
us of government corruption,
bureaucratic indiscipline and inefficiency, and of Williams and his "yes
men." And it discusses the symbolic
importance of nationalizing the
banks, which resulted in enhanced
local economic control, but perhaps
more important for the public,
installed dark faces in positions that
had previously been reserved for
light ones. Further, the volume pursues questions of economic dependency and inequality among ethnic
groups. Finally, in the face of foreign cultural bombardment via the
media, the book extols the legitimate, "indigenous culture" (usually
taken to mean "African").
The contributors develop these
themes in interesting ways. For
example, the chapter by Gordon
Draper, though ponderously written, analyzes the role of Williams in
the centralization and thus the near
incapacitation of the government
bureaucracy.
In a rather surprising chapter,
Earl Lovelace, one of the country's
most gifted novelists, reaffirms
"African" identity by valorizing the
role of the "indigenous traditions"
of steelband, stickfight, Carnival,
and the bongo dance. Despite a corrective that these traditions have
their meaning in the Caribbean
context, he is vulnerable to V S.
Naipaul's acerbic remarks in The
Middle Passage(1962). "Culture,"
according to Naipaul, "is spoken of
as something quite separate from
day-to-day existence, separate from
advertisements, films and comic
strips. It is like a special native dish,
something like a callalloo"'The inde-
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pendence struggle of Trinidad and
Tobago, however, was precisely a
struggle againstbeing defined solely
in the terms of the tourist
brochure.
Perhaps the most important
chapters are those by Selwyn Ryan,
Dennis Pantin, and Ralph Henry.
Ryan, the author of the seminal Race
and Nationalism in Trinidadand
Tobago (1972), explains in his introduction that the collection seeks
to address the extent to which the
PNM achieved the goals of economic development and political
autonomy put forth in its charter of
1956. In another chapter he argues
it is impossible to evaluate the consequences of independence without
evaluating Williams and the PNM.
Ryan points to the PNM's considerable accomplishments, such as those
in education. Nonetheless, he does
not mince words in criticizing Williams and the party, and he blames
the leadership of Trinidad and
Tobago for allowing Williams to
monopolize power and decisionmaking.
Pantin, in a chapter on the past
and future of the Point Lisas industrial estate (a state venture), emphasizes the dangers of bureaucratic
centralization. Point Lisas continues
to provide little employment and to
drain the treasury; it may soon be
known as "Williams's Folly"' Pantin
astutely locates the origins of this
venture in Williams's obsession with
steel production and in the political
contingencies of Black Power. Henry
questions the utility of the development economist Simon Kuznets's
models of growth and equity for
what Henry calls a "plural society"'
He argues the PNM was committed
to redistributing wealth, within the
limits it set for itself by following
W Arthur Lewis's "industrialization
by invitation" development plans.
Moreover, Henry demonstrates that,
during the 1960s, Trinidad and
Tobago's income distribution actually worsened when compared to
pre-independence levels, but that
thereafter it improved. Henry shows
that the income levels of blacks and
East Indians achieved parity by the

early 1980s.
The contributions by Patricia
Mohammed and Rhoda Reddock
perform the overdue task of examining women's history. From Mohammed we learn about the changing
status of East Indian women and
their integration into the wider society. Reddock reminds us that,although
women were the PNM's vociferous
foot soldiers, women's emancipation
is far from complete. While women

continue to possess informal authority, access to formal power continues
to elude them.
The book is billed as a "retrospective:' but it frequently serves as
a launching pad for commentary on
present-day politics. This is unfortunate in many ways, since the volume
presents no sustained analysis of the
"February Revolution" of 1970 and
the Black Power movement of the
same period. Arguably this was the
most important period of the postindependence era because it not
only represented an attempt by a
subordinate group to fundamentally redefine its identity, but it also
forced the predominantly-black
PNM to support the redistribution
of wealth. In addition the volume
includes no discussion on or by
Lloyd Best or others on "the left,"

not to mention early opposition politicians. And it makes no serious
attempt to address the development
of religious cults, including the
Spiritual Baptists and the Orisha,
which continue to gain followers.
Nonetheless, the volume's commentary reflects the authors' concern with Trinidad and Tobago's

future, now that it appears less than
rosy. Trinidad (more than Tobago)
has always been blessed with
extremely good luck: sugar busts

gave way to booms, cocoa was
crowned king as King Sugar died for
the last time, and oil rescued the
society from the brink of who knows
what. Such luck explains a rather

Pickwickian attitude of trusting that
everything will be all right. The tone
of the book indicates this attitude
may be changing.
Kevin A. Yelvington

University of Sussex
/

The Underside
Unseasonal Migrations: The
Effects of Rural Labor Scarcity
in Peru
byJaneL. Collins.Princeton:
PrincetonUniversity Press,1988. xviii
+ 207 pp. Cloth. $2750.
In Peru and throughout Latin
America, peasants are increasingly
turning to seasonal migration, wage
labor, petty commerce, and other
kinds of employment to supplement
income from agriculture. Unseasonal
Migrationslooks at one such case,
diagnosing the reasons for this trend
and its destructive impact on peasant society and the environment.
The setting is the Peruvian
department of Puno on the shores
of Lake Titicaca, where peasants
migrate seasonally to small coffee
farms in the nearby tropical lowlands of the Andes' eastern slopes.
The family members who stay
behind in the highlands must work
harder to compensate for the missing workers, neglecting established
reciprocal labor obligations between
households. In the lowlands seasonal cultivation leads to short cuts
in coffee production and environmental deterioration. Despite low
returns, coffee cultivation is necessary to supplement highland agriculture income; the peasants are
locked into an exploitative and
destructive system.
Collins amply documents this
phenomenon. She analyzes in detail
the labor history of the region, the
causes of migration to the lowlands
since the 1930s, and the mechanisms
keeping coffee prices low. Unseasonal
Migrations is a model for regional
studies of the relation of smallholding cultivators to larger market
systems.
Some gaps appear, however, in
the data presented at the community level. Collins short cuts the ethnographic descriptions, leaving but
one case study to document a major
point. She cites a "consumption survey," but gives no details about the
survey or sampling methods. The
role of migration in the peasant
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household economy and the economic exchanges between households need further examination.
Collins omits these details in favor
of historical data on the region, for
example, on wool production since
1850 and on average population
density, making her book not an
ethnography but a regional history
informed by ethnographic field
work.
On the positive side, Collins's
regional analysis successfully combines ecological and historical
explanations, a difficult task.
Nevertheless, her attempt to place
this study within the context of the
Marxist literature on peasant economy is less successful. Although her
summary of this literature is interesting, the comparative material is
neither focused nor original, and it
intrudes on the author's own work,
sometimes obscuring the argument.
Collins concludes with a sweeping and simplistic condemnation of
capitalism, claiming that as long
as uneven exchange and surplus
extraction through market forces
persist, "the settlement of new land
only perpetuates poverty"' This
kind of statement only detracts from
her powerful, historically-specific
analysis.
The basic argument in the book,
that labor scarcity causes difficulties
for peasant livelihood, is well documented. In addition, Collins makes
striking conclusions about the causes
of this scarcity of rural labor. She
argues that state policies favor
urban consumers and intermediaries at the expense of small-holding
peasants. The peasants stay poor, in
spite of their hard work and entrepreneurship, because of low prices
paid to the producers of highland
food products and coffee, the monopsonistic power of the staterun marketing cooperatives, and the
lack of credit to improve productivity of small-scale agriculture.
Thus Puno remains one of the most
impoverished and underdeveloped
departments of Peru. Unseasonal
Migrations could have made an even
more valuable contribution if it
had emphasized this aspect of the
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argument-the specific state policies
perpetuating poverty-and recommended new policies for rural areas.
Ronald H. Berg
Latin American Scholarship
Program of American Universities

Regional Affairs
Inter-American Relations:
The Latin American Perspective
edited by Robert E. Biles. Boulder and
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1988. 236 pp. Cloth. $25.00.
This volume is a collection of papers
previously published in the Texas
Journalof PoliticalStudies. Several of
the articles are the products of firstrate scholarship and well worth publishing as independent essays in a
professional journal. But the value
of including them in a work entitled
Inter-American Relations: The Latin
American Perspectiveis dubious.
Through a series of introductory
essays, the editor tries to develop
common threads between the articles. These threads were to be woven
into the Latin view of international
affairs in the hemisphere. The result
is disappointing.
One of the better essays, by
Philip Kelly, analyzes Brazil's role
in South America. Kelly speculates
that Brazil "could, in time, assume a
hegemonic role over the Southern
Hemisphere similar to the authority
held earlier by the United States,
Great Britain, and the Iberians.' He
examines the parameters of Brazil's
foreign-policy framework within the
context of potential or actual conflicts, and concludes "Brazil favors
stability and integration and consequently will exert a strong influence
toward lessening regional conflict
during future decades."
Another valuable essay, by Dale
Story, examines trade relations
between Mexico and the US. Story
explains why trade with the US has
become such a critical factor in both
domestic and foreign policy for
Mexico, and discusses the forces of
protectionism in both countries.
Unlike some of the other contribu-

tors to this volume, Story does not
try to draw ambitious conclusions
based on limited data.
Parts of this volume follow an
unfortunate pattern characteristic
of much social science research,
where scientists are apt at describing
phenomena, but very sloppy at
explaining them. An example is the
article by WilliamJ. Fleming, who
tests for a causal linkage between
foreign investment and infrastructure construction in Argentina in
the period 1854-1914, to draw lessons
for contemporary Latin American
development. Fleming concludes
that this case indicates that, used
carefully, foreign-debt-driven economic growth can generate sustained development. His research
design and data, however, do not
warrant this conclusion. He presents simplistic cross-tabulation
analyses (without all the relevant statistics that rigorous quantitative
analysis requires) to test a hypothesis of questionable relevance.
Moreover, Fleming ignores the issue
of whether the differences in the
nature of the current international
capitalist system and that of the
earlier period under consideration
allow for meaningful comparison.
Bruce R. Drury's essay on agrarian development and foreign debt in
Brazil is another example of weak
analysis. Pointing to hunger and
malnutrition in Brazil, he claims the
major cause of the food crisis is the
massive external debt. But he provides little solid evidence for such a
conclusion. Most observers agree
the origins of the food problem in
Brazil are much more complex than
this article suggests; in fact, the
problem existed well before the
emergence of the recent debt crisis.
This volume does not significantly enhance our knowledge of
the Latin American perspective on
inter-American relations. Some of
the articles are valuable. A selective,
well-focused volume on the Latin
view of hemispheric affairs might
have justified their re-publication.
This volume does not.
MartinJ Collo
Widener University
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